The Moon Caught in a Bad Romance

May 18, 2021

“All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way” – Leo Tolstoy

These days, one must pity the moon.

It appears to be caught in a “bad romance” of geopolitical competition between China, Russia, and the United States—but thankfully not as dramatic as the titular Lady Gaga song.

Focusing First on China

On May 14, China’s space program made history by becoming the second country to successfully land its Zhurong spacecraft on Mars, following the United States. Prior to the Mars landing, however, China also conducted several other landmark lunar exploration missions in pursuit of President Xi Jinping’s “space dream.”

In April, China’s Wenchang Space Launch Site launched the Tianhe-1, a core module for its future Tiangong space station, using a Long March 5B rocket. Unlike China’s previous launches with temporary space stations Tiangong-1, which burned up over the South Pacific in 2018, and Tiangong-2, the Tianhe-1 provides new power and propulsion capabilities, as well as “the life support technologies and living quarters required by visiting astronauts.” Ultimately, China aspires to send crewed spacecrafts to the moon and have the Tiangong space station operational by 2022.

On December 1, 2020, China landed its third unmanned, robotic spacecraft, Chang’e-5, on the moon to collect four pounds of lunar rocks and soil and returned safely to Earth on December 17. During this lunar mission China also became the second country to plant a flag on the moon.

Looking ahead, China’s National Space Administration (CNSA) aspires to conduct a lunar exploration mission with Chang'e-6 as early as 2023, develop interstellar probe missions for Chang'e-7 and Chang'e-8, and even build a moon-based research station in the 2030s.

According to CNSA spokesperson Xu Hongliang, China “welcome[s] other countries around the world that are carrying out international moon base construction programs to join us, and make contributions to the cause of enhancing human well-being with space solutions.”

What about Russia?

Russia appears to be heeding the call to collaborate with China on an international lunar research station. On March 9, Russia's Roscosmos space agency and China’s CNSA signed an agreement to cooperate on the establishment of a shared lunar research center and an agreement to pursue deep space exploration with the Chang’e-7 mission and Luna-Resurs-1 Russian orbital spacecraft mission.

However, Moscow is also taking measures to develop a “Russia-only space station” by 2030.

But what about Russia’s partnership with the International Space Station (ISS)? Since 1998 the ISS has been praised as an exemplary model of international cooperation. Unfortunately, the station’s structure is aging; the “metal [is] getting old,” said Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yury Borisov, posing significant safety risks to astronauts. A deteriorating space station is sadly symbolic of deteriorating relations between both countries following recent geopolitical tensions.

In response to the recent harmful foreign acts attributed to the Russia Federation, on April 15 the Biden administration issued Executive Order (EO) 138873. This order imposed sanctions against Russia for election interference in 2020 and the role of the Foreign Intelligence Services, Russia’s external intelligence agency, in the SolarWinds cyberespionage campaign. Despite simmering tensions, the EO recites “the United States desires a relationship with Russia that is stable and predictable. We do not think that we need to continue on a negative trajectory. However, we have also been clear—publicly and privately—that we will defend our national interests and impose costs for Russian Government actions that seek to harm us.”

Three days later, Deputy Prime Minister Borisov announced that Russia might end its 23-year partnership with the ISS by 2025 and instead create its own orbital space station, citing safety concerns. Lending further credence to this potential breakup, the head of Roscosmos, Dmitry Rogozin, posted a video on Telegram explaining that “the first core module of the new Russian orbital station is in the works” and is expected to be operational by 2025.

The United States and the Artemis Program

In October 2020, NASA announced it was advancing international cooperation for lunar exploration under the Artemis Accords Principles for a Safe, Peaceful, and Prosperous Future. The Artemis Program aims to land the first woman and the next man on the moon by 2024 and conduct the first human mission to Mars.

Presently, there are ten signatory states to the nonbinding Artemis Accords: Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, and, most recently, Brazil. According to NASA spokesperson Mike Gold, the Artemis Accords are instrumental for upholding the centrality of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, as well as helping “avoid conflict in space and on Earth by strengthening mutual understanding and reducing misperceptions. Transparency, public registration, deconflicting operations – these are the principles that will preserve peace.”

What Does ‘Peaceful’ Mean in Space?

The preamble of the Outer Space Treaty promotes “the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes” in support of the common interest of humanity. Fundamentally, peaceful purposes is about being a good steward of space. The treaty also champions international cooperation in the scientific and legal aspects of exploring outer space.

To ensure space stability, however, communicating with allies and other partners is necessary, as noted in the Department of Defense’s 2020 Defense Space Strategy. Thus, despite the palpable geopolitical competition over lunar missions, the Biden administration should encourage collaboration with international partners to signal what it means to be a good steward of space. Only through discussing our cross-cultural visions of peaceful lunar exploration, can we begin to change this bad romance narrative.

Zhanna Malekos Smith, J.D., is a senior associate (non-resident) with the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., and a professor of cyber warfare studies with the Air War College.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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