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The Biden Transition and U.S. Competition with China and Russia: The Crisis-Driven Need to Change U.S. Strategy | |
Anthony H. Cordesman | |
2021-01-06 | |
出版年 | 2021 |
国家 | 美国 |
领域 | 地球科学 ; 资源环境 |
英文摘要 | The Biden Transition and U.S. Competition with China and Russia: The Crisis-Driven Need to Change U.S. StrategyBy Anthony H. Cordesman with the assistance of Grace Hwang January 6, 2021 The U.S. needs to fundamentally reassess its approach to competing and cooperating with China and Russia. Its present path has tilted more and more towards a poorly structured approach to confrontation focused more on worst case wars than on the broader forms of military and civil competition the U.S. needs to address. It has failed to integrate civil and military competition, to address grey area operations, to look at the global nature of this competition, and to focus on the fact that most forms will either not involve direct combat or will do so at low levels of combat. It has not given the proper priority to address America’s strategic partnerships or to develop net assessments of the longer-term patterns in this competition. This analysis addresses the failures in the current U.S. efforts to implement the new National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy issued in 2017 and 2018, respectively. More broadly, it addresses the nuclear balance and the shortfalls in the U.S. approach to modernizing its strategic nuclear forces. It highlights the fact that the U.S. also cannot focus on major conventional combat with Russia and China or on combat at the theater level, and that most actual military competition will probably take place at the gray area, hybrid warfare, or irregular level. It stresses the fact that the U.S. must compete on a global level as China and Russia will often compete indirectly and target U.S. strategic partners, other states, and non-state actors. This will require that the U.S. continues to deploy strong forces at major command levels in every region of the world, and especially in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The strategic partnerships between these U.S. commands and key allied states will determine both the overall patterns of U.S. success, and they will be critical to deterring and defending against escalation to major conflicts and nuclear war. It notes that U.S. strategic partnerships must also evolve to create interoperable conventional forces that can actually implement what has come to be called Joint/All-Domain Warfare, and it will compete with Chinese and Russian rates of modernization, force improvements, and changes in operational range and tactics. At the same time, the analysis focuses in depth on the civil side of competition, and the fact that both China and Russia – and especially China – integrate military and civil competition at every level, including the development of their international trade and investment, their national technology base, as well as their political and diplomatic efforts. These are areas the U.S. needs to give far more attention, along with the need to compete in information warfare and at the pubic diplomatic level. The analysis is supported by some forty charts that attempt to quantify the current military, economic, and technological balances as well as the nature of the key patterns of competition – including the scale of the military and defense efforts of each state. It is supported by two chronologies that illustrate the level and nature of Chinese and Russian activity. It also examines the risks to the U.S. in taking an ideological approach to competition, focusing on strategic intentions rather than their implementation, and needlessly alienating America’s strategic partners. It concludes that major changes are needed to the ways the United States competes. If the U.S. is to develop a more effective approach to its national security strategy, it needs to look beyond just the need for military competition, and it cannot take its strategic partners and other states for granted. If the U.S. is to compete effectively, it must:
The U.S. must also compete far more effectively on an unclassified level. Many aspects of such efforts have to be classified, but a primary emphasis should be placed on open-source reporting, revealing areas where competition is illicit or covert, exposing Chinese and Russian official and covert activities by name, citing the use of third countries and non-state actors, and showing the history and patterns in such activities. Public information is the key to building an understanding of these threats posed by such forms of competition, recognizing the need to counter them, and growing an awareness that using information is a weapon in countering disinformation. Finally, the U.S. will need to develop plans, programs, and budgets that actually implement a practical and cost-effective strategy to counter the Chinese and Russian challenge, and one tailored to addressing the new issues raised by the new emerging industrial age and the lasting repercussions from the Coronavirus. The U.S. needs to be smarter in utilizing its current resources and allies at their highest potential, but it is also clear that if the U.S. does act more wisely, it has the strategic partners and the domestic resources in its civil and economic sector to compete successfully with both China and Russia. This report is supported by two working chronologies covering China and Russia that support this study: One is entitled Chronology of Possible Chinese Gray Area and Hybrid Warfare Operations and is available on the CSIS website here. The second is entitled Chronology of Possible Russian Gray Area and Hybrid Warfare Operations and is available here. This report entitled, The Biden Transition and U.S. Competition with China and Russia: The Crisis-Driven Need to Change U.S. Strategy, is available for download https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/2020811.Burke_Chair.AHC_.GH9_.pdf The analysis has the following Table of Contents: ![]() These issues in the U.S. strategy and the present U.S. planning, programming, and budgeting process (PPB) are addressed in more detail in four other Burke Chair studies:
Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant on Afghanistan to the United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of State. |
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来源平台 | Center for Strategic & International Studies |
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文献类型 | 科技报告 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/310495 |
专题 | 地球科学 资源环境科学 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Anthony H. Cordesman. The Biden Transition and U.S. Competition with China and Russia: The Crisis-Driven Need to Change U.S. Strategy,2021. |
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