Global S&T Development Trend Analysis Platform of Resources and Environment
DOI | 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106503 |
Strategic behavior and dynamic externalities in commercial fisheries | |
Klis, Anna A.1; Melstrom, Richard T.2 | |
2020-03-01 | |
发表期刊 | ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS |
ISSN | 0921-8009 |
EISSN | 1873-6106 |
出版年 | 2020 |
卷号 | 169 |
文章类型 | Article |
语种 | 英语 |
国家 | USA |
英文摘要 | This paper uses game theory to analyze commercial fishers' willingness to practice conservation to recover a depleted fishery. We compare a game in which players choose their conservation effort simultaneously to a game in which there is a leader and a follower. We show that because the players ignore the effect of their conservation effort on the other player's expected benefits, their collective effort is suboptimal. When the players choose their effort sequentially, the leader puts less effort in conservation, reducing the likelihood of recovery and collective welfare. |
英文关键词 | Bioeconomics Game theory Cooperation Overfishing |
领域 | 资源环境 |
收录类别 | SCI-E ; SSCI |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000510953600036 |
WOS关键词 | GAME ; COMMON |
WOS类目 | Ecology ; Economics ; Environmental Sciences ; Environmental Studies |
WOS研究方向 | Environmental Sciences & Ecology ; Business & Economics |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/278946 |
专题 | 资源环境科学 |
作者单位 | 1.Northern Illinois Univ, Dept Econ, Zulauf Hall 510, De Kalb, IL 60115 USA; 2.Loyola Univ, Inst Environm Sustainabil, Chicago, IL 60611 USA |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Klis, Anna A.,Melstrom, Richard T.. Strategic behavior and dynamic externalities in commercial fisheries[J]. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,2020,169. |
APA | Klis, Anna A.,&Melstrom, Richard T..(2020).Strategic behavior and dynamic externalities in commercial fisheries.ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,169. |
MLA | Klis, Anna A.,et al."Strategic behavior and dynamic externalities in commercial fisheries".ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 169(2020). |
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