Global S&T Development Trend Analysis Platform of Resources and Environment
The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidence | |
Marcelo Caffera; Carlos Chávez; Analía Ardente | |
2021-03-04 | |
出版年 | 2021 |
国家 | 瑞典 |
领域 | 资源环境 |
英文摘要 | Using experiments in which participants play the role of polluting firms, we study compliance behavior with emissions limits under two types of fines and two different regulatory instruments. We find that the market price of pollution permits and the probability of violating permits holdings are higher with a fine that is convex in the level of violation than with one that is linear. This effect operates through an increase in the prices asked by sellers, not in the bids made by the buyers of permits. We do not observe an effect of the type of the fine on the average level of violation or the number of firms in violation in the case of emission standards. We conclude that the type of fines may affect the cost-effectiveness of pollution control programs based on tradable pollution permits. |
URL | 查看原文 |
来源平台 | Environment for Development Initiative |
文献类型 | 科技报告 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/317023 |
专题 | 资源环境科学 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marcelo Caffera,Carlos Chávez,Analía Ardente. The deterrence effect of linear versus convex fines: laboratory evidence,2021. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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