Who Is Responsible for Mitigating the Effects of Climate Change in Russia?

January 14, 2021

On May 29, 2020, a massive diesel leak from Thermoelectric Power Plant 3 in Norilsk, home to the industrial giant Nornikel, heavily polluted the region's major waterways. Nornikel's management claimed that unusually warm weather thawed the ground beneath the reservoir and damaged it, suggesting that forces beyond the company's control was a primary cause for the disaster. Environmental activists, however, directly blamed the company for the lack of investment in and improvements to infrastructure as well as limited governmental oversight.  Eventually, both the company and local authorities bore the brunt of the blame: the mayor of Norilsk was blamed for mishandling the disaster, and, in a stark address, the speaker of the Federal Council, Valentina Matvienko, accused Nornikel of corrupting the municipal government. This shift in focus and blame from federal ministries to subnational ones raises larger questions about who holds responsibility for environmental and climate-related governance in Russia: The federal government? The regional authorities? Corporations? All or none of the above?

The Federal Response

Climate change first and only briefly appeared in Russia’s political agenda during the presidency of Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012). Emphasizing the need for global cooperation, Medvedev commissioned a Climate Doctrine in December 2009, which was approved by the federal government two years later. But the climate agenda lost momentum after President Vladimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012, even though Medvedev continued to oversee climate policy in his new role as prime minister. Medvedev officially signed the Paris Agreement in September 2019, four years after it was adopted by consensus, and pledged to increase Russian government investments in renewable sources. Putin instructed the government to meet its Paris commitments—but only if those commitments were “in balance with economic development.” In January 2020, Medvedev approved a national climate change adaptation plan until 2022, but this plan, alongside a proposed task force on climate change under the Commission on Natural Resources and Environmental Protection, was lost in the government reshuffle that month.

Today, it remains unclear which federal agency holds the reigns on Russian climate policy. The climate agenda, though it is not referred to as such, has been widely dispersed among multiple ministries and agencies. Under Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, the word "climate" almost exclusively appears in issues pertaining to entrepreneurship, which is in line with Putin’s view of climate as economic opportunity. Deputy Prime Minister Viktoria Abramchenko coordinates key policies regarding environmental protection—she chairs a commission that includes heads of the leading resource-extracting companies (such as Gazprom and Lukoil) and the governors of the regions where these companies reside—but climate change is not mentioned in the list of her responsibilities. Similarly, the Ministry for Natural Resources and Ecology makes no mention of climate change in its mission, though it does have environmental oversight powers encapsulated in the Federal Agency for Environmental Management (Rosprirodnadzor). In fact, the head of Rosprirodnadzor, Svetlana Radionova, was among the first to intervene in the Norilsk leak; she estimated damages to the environment at 147.8 billion rubles (approximately $2 billion)—an unprecedented sum for Russia that represented a strong state reproach of a powerful company. 

In addition, the Ministry of Natural Resources runs a federal program called "Ecology” with a sizeable 2019-2024 budget of 4,041 billion rubles (approximately $53 billion)—the second-largest amount among the national projects. However, funding is allocated mostly to federal waste management reform, expanding natural protection zones, and increasing anti-wildfire policies' efficiency. Once again, climate change is not mentioned at all in the program's roadmap. 

Today, neither Putin nor Mishustin recognize climate issues as critical. It also does not appear that the Russian Security Council, where Medvedev is now a deputy chair, has taken up the issue of climate, although it is keenly interested in Arctic affairs. Natural candidates for activism related to Russia’s climate agenda, such as the Ministry for Natural Resources, are forced to counter heavyweights like the Ministry of Energy, the major lobbyist of industrial giants like Gazprom and Rosneft, whose representatives repeatedly warn against "politicization of the climate agenda" on the international arena. Despite this pressure, another key player in the area, the Ministry for Economic Development has prepared a bill that would introduce the concept of "climate change adaptation," laying the foundation for developing necessary legislative and organizational capacities. It is one of Russia’s more obscure agencies, the Federal Service for Hydrometeorological and Environmental Monitoring (Roshydromet), that is the most vocal advocate of the climate change agenda. Roshydromet’s work presents the most detailed picture of the challenges posed to Russia by rising global temperatures, but the agency ranks low in the hierarchy of Russia’s federal government.

Russia’s Regions: Overburdened, Under-resourced

Climate impacts across Russia's vast territory are unevenly distributed, and it is the regional authorities who are increasingly tasked to address the issue. For territories in Siberia, the Northwest, and the Far East, the impact of climate change is most pronounced: thawing permafrost in these regions releases methane and other carbon intensive gases as well as anthrax bacteria, undermining economic development in the North. Wildfires from unusually dry weather costs millions of hectares of forestry in Siberia and the Far East each year; in 2019, wildfires in the Krasnoyarsk Krai region alone burned through an area the size of Belgium. Krasnoyarsk governor Aleksander Uss initially attempted to downplay the need to combat the fires, arguing they did not pose a danger to human settlements. But public outcry over the scale of the fires forced him to reverse course and even raise the issue of forest management in a meeting with Putin. It is not just Russia’s northern regions that stand to lose: droughts in Russia’s agriculturally productive southern regions, including the Kalmyk Republic and Stravopol Krai, are likely to increase, while in the Urals and Central Russia, changes in rainfall patterns will lead to more frequent and devastating floods.

While regional governments usually have environmental protection departments under their purview, they typically ignore climate change issues rhetorically as well as administratively. Consider Yamal, an Arctic region home to the major gas producers like Gazprom and Novatek. The job description for the head of the regional Department for Natural Resource Regulation mentions climate change infrequently and alongside a tally of other environmental problems. No working group or any other administrative structure have been established despite the fact that the region is warming at an alarming rate—2.5 times the global average—and has already suffered the human consequences of global warming. The problem is not a lack of awareness; it is purposeful avoidance.

Most regions run massive budget deficits with the federal government and simply lack the resources to develop the capacity and organizational structures required to address the consequences of climate change, leading some regional governments to actively downplay the issue. Only Moscow, with its enormous budget, as of 2019, of 2,327 billion rubles ($31.5 billion), can afford to develop a climate adaptation strategy. Although it is regional and municipal governments that will have to manage the daily consequences of climate change, budgetary restraint incentivizes them to ignore the issue.

Regions take their cue from the center, and there is no agreement within the federal government over how to frame climate change. While some institutional players, like the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment and Ministry for Economic Development, have publicly recognized the economic costs of climate change in the long run, others are more reluctant or deny it is a problem. Climate adaptation is costly, and without a clear signal from the national leadership, municipal governments are unlikely to voluntarily take responsibility for an impossible task. Moreover, most industrial giants in Russia’s extraction economy oppose greater oversight of their operations from their own government even as some take steps to improve their environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings for international investors. At the same time, Russian business stands to lose profits from a proposed EU carbon border tax. A business-backed climate agenda could create a wedge between political and business elites further. Speaker Matvienko’s harsh reaction against Nornikel and the devastating diesel spill is a possible sign of further discord to come.

Climate Coalitions? The Young and the Private Sector

Awareness of the Challenge Grows. Russia is one of the most climate-skeptical countries, and Russians are reluctant to press their government to make necessary policy changes. State control over the media and political landscape is also not conducive to meaningful public discussion on the issue. But this may be changing. A majority of Russians believe that climate change is a significant issue (58 percent according to a September 2020 poll from the Russian Public Opinion Research Center). Rising air pollution seems to be catching public attention, as does the prevalence of wildfires. Yet there continues to be a disconnect: only 18 percent of Russians agree in that same survey that climate change directly affects their lives and the lives of their families. A plurality of Russians get their information about the environment from social media (39 percent) and regional and local television networks (32 percent), suggesting Russians rely largely on independent sources for information about the environment.

The Young. Although for decades the environment has been among Russians’ major concerns, its salience is highest among younger generations. Because Russia’s political landscape is devoid of viable political “green” voices or parties, youths concerned with climate change have begun to create their own movements or tapped into existing ones such as the "Fridays for Future," inspired by Swedish activist Greta Thunberg. Attendance remains low, in part due to restrictive protest laws preventing unauthorized rallies, but the spread of these movements to Russia could eventually create bottom-up pressure on the issue. As the ruling United Russia’s popularity wanes, and federal and regional governments defer responsibility for addressing climate change, the younger generations may generate momentum for a climate agenda.

Russian industry. The business community, too, recognizes the economic perils resulting from climate change. Of course, the renewable energy sector clearly would benefit from a comprehensive government climate change adaptation strategy that makes large public investments into green tech. But even other Russian enterprises have voluntarily begun to disclose information about their carbon impact. Some are issuing annual sustainability reports as a part of a strategy to attract or retain global investments. There is growing recognition within Russian industry that inertia on climate policies will hurt the economy in the long term. This “business perspective” has some powerful advocates, such as former RUSNANO CEO Anatoly Chubais, who has positioned himself as an advocate for energy transition within government and who was recently appointed special representative to the president of the Russian Federation for relations with international organizations to achieve Sustainable Development Goals. However, it is unclear if Chubais’ new appointment has any meaningful influence over the climate agenda, though he continues to publicly endorse the cause.

Greater public awareness of environmental issues means that activists and self-interested industry could join forces to pressure Moscow to get serious on climate policy. Urgent tasks include mitigating economic and political risks emanating from a changing climate and establishing an institutional framework to cope with it—a difficult balancing act that, should it fail, no one will wish to be responsible for.

Andrei Semenov is a visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

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