Global S&T Development Trend Analysis Platform of Resources and Environment
DOI | 10.1007/s10584-015-1511-2 |
Incomplete cooperation and co-benefits: deepening climate cooperation with a proliferation of small agreements | |
Hannam, Phillip M.1; Vasconcelos, Vitor V.2,3,4; Levin, Simon A.4,5,6; Pacheco, Jorge M.2,7,8 | |
2017-09-01 | |
发表期刊 | CLIMATIC CHANGE |
ISSN | 0165-0009 |
EISSN | 1573-1480 |
出版年 | 2017 |
卷号 | 144期号:1 |
文章类型 | Article |
语种 | 英语 |
国家 | USA; Portugal; Sweden |
英文摘要 | Case study and model results lend some optimism for the potential of small coalitions with partially excludable public goods to substantially deepen international cooperation on energy and climate issues. Drawing motivation from other issue areas in international relations ranging from nuclear non-proliferation, transboundary air pollution and liberalized trade, we use an evolutionary-game-theoretic model to analyze regimes that yield domestic incentives to contribute to public goods provision (co-benefits). Co-benefits may be limited, but can create a nucleus for formation of coalitions that grow while deepening provision of global public goods. The Climate and Clean Air Coalition (CCAC) is a prime example of an agreement that employs partially excludable club benefits to deepen cooperation on non-CO2 greenhouse gases. Our game-theoretic results support two important insights for the building blocks approach to addressing climate change: sustained cooperation in club agreements is possible even when public goods are not entirely excludable and some members of the population free-ride; and second, cooperation in small club configurations yields larger non-excludable public goods benefits than cooperation in more inclusive forums. This paper lends positive support that a proliferation of small agreements under a building blocks approach at the UNFCCC may be more effective (not just more likely) for deepening climate change cooperation than a fully inclusive approach. |
领域 | 气候变化 |
收录类别 | SCI-E ; SSCI |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000408999500006 |
WOS关键词 | TRADE NEGOTIATIONS ; COLLECTIVE ACTION ; MULTILATERALISM ; COORDINATION ; INSTITUTIONS ; EVOLUTION ; FAILURE ; COMMONS ; NUMBERS ; LAW |
WOS类目 | Environmental Sciences ; Meteorology & Atmospheric Sciences |
WOS研究方向 | Environmental Sciences & Ecology ; Meteorology & Atmospheric Sciences |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/30236 |
专题 | 气候变化 |
作者单位 | 1.Princeton Univ, Sci Technol & Environm Policy Program, Woodrow Wilson Sch Publ & Int Affairs, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA; 2.Inst Invest Interdisciplinar, Applicat Theoret Phys Grp, Ctr Matemat & Aplicacoes Fundamentais, P-1649003 Lisbon Codex, Portugal; 3.Univ Minho, Ctr Fis, P-4710057 Braga, Portugal; 4.Princeton Univ, Dept Ecol & Evolutionary Biol, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA; 5.Resources Future Inc, Washington, DC 20036 USA; 6.Beijer Inst Ecol Econ, SE-10405 Stockholm, Sweden; 7.Univ Minho, CBMA, P-4710057 Braga, Portugal; 8.Univ Minho, Dept Matemat & Aplicacoes, P-4710057 Braga, Portugal |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hannam, Phillip M.,Vasconcelos, Vitor V.,Levin, Simon A.,et al. Incomplete cooperation and co-benefits: deepening climate cooperation with a proliferation of small agreements[J]. CLIMATIC CHANGE,2017,144(1). |
APA | Hannam, Phillip M.,Vasconcelos, Vitor V.,Levin, Simon A.,&Pacheco, Jorge M..(2017).Incomplete cooperation and co-benefits: deepening climate cooperation with a proliferation of small agreements.CLIMATIC CHANGE,144(1). |
MLA | Hannam, Phillip M.,et al."Incomplete cooperation and co-benefits: deepening climate cooperation with a proliferation of small agreements".CLIMATIC CHANGE 144.1(2017). |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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