Global S&T Development Trend Analysis Platform of Resources and Environment
Long-term transmission rights and dynamic efficiency | |
Georgios Petropoulos and Bert Willems | |
2020-06-16 | |
出版年 | 2020 |
国家 | 欧洲 |
领域 | 资源环境 |
英文摘要 |
This external publication was originally published in Science Direct, Elsevier. Highlights
AbstractWe compare market designs for access regulation of a bottleneck transmission line, and study their impact on investment decisions by an incumbent firm with an existing dirty technology and entrant with an uncertain future low-carbon technology. Nodal pricing, which allocates network access on a short-term competitive basis, distorts investment decisions, as the incumbent preempts the entrant by investing early. Long-term tradable transmission rights restore investment efficiency: the incumbent’s investment timing becomes socially optimal. This is the case for financial and physical transmission rights, but it requires the existence of a secondary market for transmission rights. |
URL | 查看原文 |
来源平台 | Bruegel |
文献类型 | 科技报告 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/276736 |
专题 | 资源环境科学 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Georgios Petropoulos and Bert Willems. Long-term transmission rights and dynamic efficiency,2020. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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