Global S&T Development Trend Analysis Platform of Resources and Environment
DOI | 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106657 |
How do resource mobility and group size affect institutional arrangements for rule enforcement? A qualitative comparative analysis of fishing groups in South Korea | |
Shin, Hoon C.1,2; Yu, David J.3,4,5; Park, Samuel3; Anderies, John M.1,2,6; Abbott, Joshua K.6; Janssen, Marco A.2,6; Ahn, T. K.7 | |
2020-05-03 | |
发表期刊 | ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS |
ISSN | 0921-8009 |
EISSN | 1873-6106 |
出版年 | 2020 |
卷号 | 174 |
文章类型 | Article |
语种 | 英语 |
国家 | USA; South Korea |
英文摘要 | Two social feedbacks critical for redressing decline in organizational performance are exit (changing membership to a better performing organization) and voice (members' expression of discontent). In self-governing organizations of common-pool resources (CPRs) experiencing decline from poor rule conformance, the exit option is often unavailable due to a closed membership policy. Thus, members should rely on the voice option to reverse the trend. However, it is poorly understood under what set of conditions members can successfully use the voice option to govern their CPRs. We analyzed 30 self-governing fishing groups in South Korea to generate configurations of institutional and social-ecological conditions linked to the successful voice option. We considered Ostrom's Design Principles for rule enforcement as institutional conditions and resource mobility and group size as social-ecological factors affecting institutional fit. We find that if the informal mechanism for conflict resolution is absent, fishing groups will be unsuccessful; even if rules for monitoring and graduated sanctions are not in use, groups can be successful when they harvest only stationary resources and the informal conflict-resolution is present; and groups managing mobile resources need graduated sanctions to be successful, while those appropriating only stationary resources can achieve the same outcome without such sanctions. |
英文关键词 | Common-pool resources Design principles Voice option Resource mobility Group size Institutional fit |
领域 | 资源环境 |
收录类别 | SCI-E ; SSCI |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000535905400004 |
WOS关键词 | COLLECTIVE ACTION ; SUSTAINABLE GOVERNANCE ; CHALLENGES ; QCA ; OPPORTUNITIES ; MANAGEMENT |
WOS类目 | Ecology ; Economics ; Environmental Sciences ; Environmental Studies |
WOS研究方向 | Environmental Sciences & Ecology ; Business & Economics |
URL | 查看原文 |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/248839 |
专题 | 资源环境科学 |
作者单位 | 1.Arizona State Univ, Sch Human Evolut & Social Change, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA; 2.Arizona State Univ, Ctr Behav Inst & Environm, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA; 3.Purdue Univ, Lyles Sch Civil Engn, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA; 4.Purdue Univ, Dept Polit Sci, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA; 5.Purdue Univ, Ctr Environm, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA; 6.Arizona State Univ, Sch Sustainabil, Tempe, AZ 85287 USA; 7.Seoul Natl Univ, Dept Polit Sci & Int Relat, Seoul, South Korea |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Shin, Hoon C.,Yu, David J.,Park, Samuel,et al. How do resource mobility and group size affect institutional arrangements for rule enforcement? A qualitative comparative analysis of fishing groups in South Korea[J]. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,2020,174. |
APA | Shin, Hoon C..,Yu, David J..,Park, Samuel.,Anderies, John M..,Abbott, Joshua K..,...&Ahn, T. K..(2020).How do resource mobility and group size affect institutional arrangements for rule enforcement? A qualitative comparative analysis of fishing groups in South Korea.ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,174. |
MLA | Shin, Hoon C.,et al."How do resource mobility and group size affect institutional arrangements for rule enforcement? A qualitative comparative analysis of fishing groups in South Korea".ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 174(2020). |
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