资源环境科技发展态势分析平台

This article analyses how a capacity mechanism can address security of supply objectives in a power market undergoing an energy transition that combines energy efficiency efforts to stabilise demand and a rapid increase in the proportion of renewables. To analyse this situation, power markets are simulated over the long term with a System Dynamics model integrating new investment and closure decisions. This last trait is relevant to studying investment in power generation in mature markets undergoing policy shocks. The energy-only market design with a price cap, with and without a capacity mechanism, is compared to scarcity pricing in two investment behaviour scenarios with and without risk aversion. The results show that the three market designs lead to different levels of risk for peaking unit investment and results thus differ according to which risk aversion hypothesis is adopted. Assuming a risk-neutral investor, the results indicate that compared to an energy-only market with a price cap at 3 000 sic/MWh, an energy-only market with scarcity pricing and the market design with a capacity mechanism are two efficient options to reach similar levels of load loss. But under the hypothesis of risk aversion, the results highlight the advantage of the capacity mechanism over scarcity pricing.