Global S&T Development Trend Analysis Platform of Resources and Environment
DOI | 10.1016/j.enpol.2019.04.024 |
Game analysis of carbon emission verification: A case study from Shenzhen's cap-and-trade system in China | |
Pan, Yanchun; Yang, Wen; Ma, Nan; Chen, Zhimin; Zhou, Ming; Xiong, Yi | |
2019-07-01 | |
发表期刊 | ENERGY POLICY
![]() |
ISSN | 0301-4215 |
EISSN | 1873-6777 |
出版年 | 2019 |
卷号 | 130页码:418-428 |
文章类型 | Article |
语种 | 英语 |
国家 | Peoples R China |
英文摘要 | Carbon emission verification is one of the key factors required for proper implementation of a cap-and-trade (C&T) system. However, to obtain more revenue, emission generating companies (GCs) may collude with third-party verifiers (3 PVs) and conceal real carbon emission data. Based on actual practice of Shenzhen's C&T system, a three-player game model has been devised in this paper to analyze the behaviors among GCs, 3 PVs and government. Given the government's current piecewise linear re-verification policy, the optimal reported carbon intensity for GCs has been provided. Our research reveals that if the actual carbon intensity is larger than historical carbon intensity GCs may report less carbon intensity and conceal actual carbon emission. To deal with this issue, a new exponential re-verification policy is proposed. Based on authentic data from Shenzhen's C&T system, the experimental results show that the government should devote more attention to GCs with a decreasing industrial product output value-added (IVA) than to those with high carbon emissions when selecting GCs for re-verification. Our experiments also illustrate that the new policy outperforms the current one on both total concealed amount of carbon emission and total re-verification cost if the initial re-verification probability is set within a specific range. |
英文关键词 | Cap-and-trade Carbon emission verification Game analysis Emission reduction policy |
领域 | 气候变化 |
收录类别 | SCI-E ; SSCI |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000471083700036 |
WOS关键词 | COLLUSION ; QUANTIFICATION |
WOS类目 | Economics ; Energy & Fuels ; Environmental Sciences ; Environmental Studies |
WOS研究方向 | Business & Economics ; Energy & Fuels ; Environmental Sciences & Ecology |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/184511 |
专题 | 气候变化 |
作者单位 | Shenzhen Univ, Coll Management, CMOCMS, Shenzhen, Peoples R China |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Pan, Yanchun,Yang, Wen,Ma, Nan,et al. Game analysis of carbon emission verification: A case study from Shenzhen's cap-and-trade system in China[J]. ENERGY POLICY,2019,130:418-428. |
APA | Pan, Yanchun,Yang, Wen,Ma, Nan,Chen, Zhimin,Zhou, Ming,&Xiong, Yi.(2019).Game analysis of carbon emission verification: A case study from Shenzhen's cap-and-trade system in China.ENERGY POLICY,130,418-428. |
MLA | Pan, Yanchun,et al."Game analysis of carbon emission verification: A case study from Shenzhen's cap-and-trade system in China".ENERGY POLICY 130(2019):418-428. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。
修改评论