资源环境科技发展态势分析平台

We develop a game theoretic model of the role of foresight in games involving users interacting over a public good. Previous research in this area has applied game theory to understand social dilemmas and inform policy initiatives. However, considerations of the "evolving structure" of natural resource games over time and agents' planning horizon raises the complexity of game analysis substantially and has often been overlooked. We analyze a simple model of an irrigation system shared by two users and consider how players will act under different levels of foresight. Without foresight into game changes over time, players are blind to the fact that they are in a game of chicken. We model agents with foresight by interconnecting games across time and show how this creates opportunities for "strategic loss" early on, allowing players with foresight to reduce total costs. High future costs can thus be avoided with foresight if the rising costs of inaction are made apparent. We consider the effect of discounting and differences between players to provide policy recommendations regarding incentives for foresight.