Global S&T Development Trend Analysis Platform of Resources and Environment
DOI | 10.1016/j.enpol.2017.09.014 |
Baseline manipulation in voluntary carbon offset programs | |
Liu, Xiaoyu1,2; Cui, Qingbin1 | |
2017-12-01 | |
发表期刊 | ENERGY POLICY |
ISSN | 0301-4215 |
EISSN | 1873-6777 |
出版年 | 2017 |
卷号 | 111页码:43725 |
文章类型 | Article |
语种 | 英语 |
国家 | USA |
英文摘要 | Studies of voluntary carbon trading almost exclusively assume the additionality baselines are set by regulators who have either entirely perfect or imperfect information about the costs and emissions of projects. In practice, regulators are often less informed than project proponents; therefore, the baselines are more likely to be privately defined even for sectoral crediting. The primary concern with privately defined baselines is that baseline developers may exert their powers to manipulate the baselines, leading to increases in sectoral emission caps. This study models baseline manipulation behaviors in the context of adverse selection, where participants can self-select into the market. The theoretical results show that the extent to which the baseline is manipulated is highly dependent on who is assigned as the baseline developer. The more the baseline developer emits, the more likely the developer manipulates the baseline. The results are then further discussed in the context of the U.S. commercial building sector, where empirical methods are introduced to characterize cost and revenue functions. The empirical analysis reveals that, because of the notably low price elasticity of the offset supply, baselines are often positively biased even with third-party verifications. If that policymakers wish to allow baselines to be privately defined, they might be advised to implement baseline setting on an invitation-only basis to specific emitters that have relatively lower historical emissions. |
英文关键词 | Baseline manipulation Carbon offset Voluntary trading Adverse selection Buildings |
领域 | 气候变化 |
收录类别 | SCI-E ; SSCI |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000415779700002 |
WOS关键词 | MECHANISMS ; DESIGN |
WOS类目 | Economics ; Energy & Fuels ; Environmental Sciences ; Environmental Studies |
WOS研究方向 | Business & Economics ; Energy & Fuels ; Environmental Sciences & Ecology |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/18003 |
专题 | 气候变化 |
作者单位 | 1.Univ Maryland, Dept Civil & Environm Engn, College Pk, MD 20742 USA; 2.Univ Maryland, Dept Econ, College Pk, MD 20742 USA |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Liu, Xiaoyu,Cui, Qingbin. Baseline manipulation in voluntary carbon offset programs[J]. ENERGY POLICY,2017,111:43725. |
APA | Liu, Xiaoyu,&Cui, Qingbin.(2017).Baseline manipulation in voluntary carbon offset programs.ENERGY POLICY,111,43725. |
MLA | Liu, Xiaoyu,et al."Baseline manipulation in voluntary carbon offset programs".ENERGY POLICY 111(2017):43725. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
个性服务 |
推荐该条目 |
保存到收藏夹 |
查看访问统计 |
导出为Endnote文件 |
谷歌学术 |
谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
[Liu, Xiaoyu]的文章 |
[Cui, Qingbin]的文章 |
百度学术 |
百度学术中相似的文章 |
[Liu, Xiaoyu]的文章 |
[Cui, Qingbin]的文章 |
必应学术 |
必应学术中相似的文章 |
[Liu, Xiaoyu]的文章 |
[Cui, Qingbin]的文章 |
相关权益政策 |
暂无数据 |
收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。
修改评论