Global S&T Development Trend Analysis Platform of Resources and Environment
DOI | 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.12.004 |
When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services? | |
Messer, Kent D.1; Duke, Joshua M.1; Lynch, Lori2,3; Li, Tongzhe1 | |
2017-04-01 | |
发表期刊 | ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS |
ISSN | 0921-8009 |
EISSN | 1873-6106 |
出版年 | 2017 |
卷号 | 134 |
文章类型 | Article |
语种 | 英语 |
国家 | USA |
英文摘要 | Government agencies that conduct reverse auctions related to the Payment of Ecosystem Services (PES) traditionally provide a significant amount of public information about past auction results. This information includes not only the amount of money spent by the government but also can include various information about the accepted bids. This research uses induced-value experiments to evaluate the effect of past auction information on seller (landholder) rent seeking. Results suggest that sellers use this public information and learn how to secure higher rents. However, when sellers are given information only about the buyer's (government agency's) budget, they secure lower rents. Results also suggest that relative budget size affects rents and that budget stochastic variability in the presence of market information diminishes the effect Thus, in the presence of public information and equivalent total outlays, variable budgets are more likely than stationary budgets to achieve auction fiscal efficiency the measure of whether the auction achieves the greatest PES benefits given its limited budget Finally, this research finds that auctions with greater heterogeneity in seller opportunity costs are likely to be less fiscally efficient than when the distribution is more homogeneous.(C) 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V. |
英文关键词 | Reverse auctions Purchase of ecosystem services Conservation auctions Auction efficiency Land preservation |
领域 | 资源环境 |
收录类别 | SCI-E ; SSCI |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000395219300022 |
WOS关键词 | CONSERVATION RESERVE PROGRAM ; ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES ; WINNERS CURSE ; DESIGN ; POLICY ; ELECTRICITY ; PROCUREMENT ; COMPETITION ; CONTRACTS ; ECONOMICS |
WOS类目 | Ecology ; Economics ; Environmental Sciences ; Environmental Studies |
WOS研究方向 | Environmental Sciences & Ecology ; Business & Economics |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/15601 |
专题 | 资源环境科学 |
作者单位 | 1.Univ Delaware, Dept Appl Econ & Stat, Newark, DE 19716 USA; 2.Univ Maryland, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, College Pk, MD 20742 USA; 3.USDA, ERS, Washington, DC 20250 USA |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Messer, Kent D.,Duke, Joshua M.,Lynch, Lori,et al. When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services?[J]. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,2017,134. |
APA | Messer, Kent D.,Duke, Joshua M.,Lynch, Lori,&Li, Tongzhe.(2017).When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services?.ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,134. |
MLA | Messer, Kent D.,et al."When Does Public Information Undermine the Efficiency of Reverse Auctions for the Purchase of Ecosystem Services?".ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 134(2017). |
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