Global S&T Development Trend Analysis Platform of Resources and Environment
DOI | 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.12.013 |
Using Game Theory to Resolve the "Chicken and Egg" Situation in Promoting Cellulosic Bioenergy Development | |
Luo, Yi; Miller, Shelie A. | |
2017-05-01 | |
发表期刊 | ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS |
ISSN | 0921-8009 |
EISSN | 1873-6106 |
出版年 | 2017 |
卷号 | 135 |
文章类型 | Article |
语种 | 英语 |
国家 | USA |
英文摘要 | The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requires production of cellulosic biofuel, such as ethanol produced from switchgrass. However, the bioenergy industry faces a well-established "chicken and egg" conundrum where biorefineries cannot be built until adequate farmers' participation in cellulosic biomass production is ensured; on the other hand, farmers will not commit to growing cellulosic biomass until a market is established. We assume that individual farmers in a future biofuel market are boundedly rational, and will endure the risk of growing switchgrass if they are likely to receive a better payoff in the future. After the number of switchgrass farmers reaches a certain threshold, sufficient biomass can be procured to build an economically viable biorefinery. If a biorefinery is built in a region, the reductions of logistics costs and economies of scale lead to the realization of a public good, and all farmers can be benefited from it; otherwise, the efforts of early switchgrass adopters could be unsuccessful. In this paper, an appropriate biorefinery capacity and the corresponding incentives provided to the farmers are determined by balancing the impact and the risk of the public good. Our incentive model is more efficient than a program that incentivizes all switchgrass growers equally. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. |
英文关键词 | Cellulosic Bioenergy Development Incentive Mechanism N-person Public Goods Game Chicken and Egg Problem Evolutionary Dynamics Farmer Behavior Analysis |
领域 | 资源环境 |
收录类别 | SCI-E ; SSCI |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000395597700004 |
WOS关键词 | DISASTROUS CLIMATE-CHANGE ; LIFE-CYCLE ASSESSMENT ; RISK ATTITUDES ; SUPPLY CHAIN ; COOPERATION ; DYNAMICS ; SYSTEMS ; US |
WOS类目 | Ecology ; Economics ; Environmental Sciences ; Environmental Studies |
WOS研究方向 | Environmental Sciences & Ecology ; Business & Economics |
引用统计 | |
文献类型 | 期刊论文 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.173/C666/handle/2XK7JSWQ/15566 |
专题 | 资源环境科学 |
作者单位 | Sch Nat Resources & Environm Univ Michigan, Ctr Sustainable Syst, Ann Arbor, MI USA |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Luo, Yi,Miller, Shelie A.. Using Game Theory to Resolve the "Chicken and Egg" Situation in Promoting Cellulosic Bioenergy Development[J]. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,2017,135. |
APA | Luo, Yi,&Miller, Shelie A..(2017).Using Game Theory to Resolve the "Chicken and Egg" Situation in Promoting Cellulosic Bioenergy Development.ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS,135. |
MLA | Luo, Yi,et al."Using Game Theory to Resolve the "Chicken and Egg" Situation in Promoting Cellulosic Bioenergy Development".ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 135(2017). |
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