



BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS FOR EFFECTIVELY MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION

Lessons from Asian Countries



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Note:

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With 41% of international migrants originating in Asia, the region is a major source of migrant workers employed around the world. Various motives explain migration in Asia, ranging from employment to education, and permanent immigration for economic, family, or humanitarian reasons. In fact, migration from, to, and within Asia has predominated internationally for decades. Asia also continues to be a source of migration to developed countries outside the region, where migrants often dominate skilled-labor movements. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) data show that almost 2 million Asians immigrated to OECD countries in 2016, twice the corresponding figure in 2000.

With the growing movement of people across borders, there is an increasing need to improve governance and coordination on international migration. In line with these efforts, the first-ever United Nations (UN) Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration was adopted at the Intergovernmental Conference on 10–11 December 2018 in Marrakech, Morocco. In addition, in 2017, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations adopted the Manila Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers, renewing the commitment made in its 2007 Cebu Declaration. The Group of Twenty (G20) acknowledged the global significance of labor migration in the 2018 G20 Leader’s Declaration and indicated a continued dialogue on these issues.

To complement such efforts and facilitate the implementation of effective approaches for labor migration management, the Asian Development Bank Institute, in collaboration with OECD and the International Labour Organization, has organized since 2011 the Annual Roundtable on Labor Migration in Asia. The three organizations produce a joint publication annually. The 2018 theme, a product of the fruitful discussion at the Eighth Annual Roundtable on Labor Migration, is “Building Partnerships for Effectively Managing Labor Migration: Lessons from Asian Countries.” Chapter 1 focuses on labor migration trends and related statistics on migrants and remittances, while Chapter 2 looks at the innovative policy elements particular to the Republic of Korea’s Employment Permit System. Chapter 3 emphasizes the importance of greater bilateral and multilateral partnerships to ensure portability of social security for migrant workers. Finally, Chapter 4 empirically illustrates the influence of labor market intermediaries on labor-migration management in the electrical and electronics industry in Malaysia. The report concludes with a statistical annex providing the most complete comparative data on migration inflows, outflows, and stocks in the region.

Chapter 2 highlights how partnerships are critical to the Employment Permit System in the Republic of Korea, where memoranda of understanding have been signed with 16 countries of origin. Economies facing the challenge of establishing a temporary foreign worker program can draw on the Republic of Korea’s experience and the specific mechanisms it has developed to manage recruitment, employment, and return of temporary foreign workers.

Chapter 3 draws on global evidence to show that multilateral and bilateral agreements play a profound role in protecting migrants’ social security entitlements. Although several Asian countries have concluded bilateral social security arrangements with many countries around the globe, only a handful of these arrangements have been concluded between Asian countries. Formulating such arrangements would be a first step to eventually drafting multilateral arrangements, as has happened in other regions.

Chapter 4 looks at Malaysia’s electrical and electronics industry and stresses the need for stronger collaborative efforts to incentivize labor market intermediaries to follow regulations and provisions embodied in international standards. The establishment of a monitoring system to assess implementation will also facilitate better working conditions for migrant workers.

With this annual publication, we hope to offer useful statistical references and policy guidance for authorities, policy makers, experts, and practitioners, and contribute to the design of policy frameworks that facilitate an equitable environment in Asia’s labor markets and migration processes. We would also like to express our appreciation to the organizing team of this publication and its corresponding event, the Annual Roundtable on Labor Migration, for their dedication and contribution.

Chul Ju Kim

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Finally, David R. Hendrickson, ADBI, coordinated publication of the report, with the support of Ainslie Smith. Expert editing and typesetting were provided by Toby Miller and Alvin Tubio, respectively.

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ABBREVIATIONS

3D	difficult, dirty, and dangerous
ACMW	ASEAN Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers
ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADBI	Asian Development Bank Institute
AFML	ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labour
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
B2B	Business-to-Business
BSA	bilateral social security agreement
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CEM	contract electronic manufacturer
E&E	electrical and electronics
EICC	Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition
EOI	export-oriented industrialization
EPS	Employment Permit System
EPS-TOPIK	test of proficiency in Korean for EPS
EU	European Union
FDI	foreign direct investment
FWPC	Foreign Workforce Policy Committee
G2G	Government-to-Government
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	gross domestic product
GPN	global production network
HRD	Human Resource Development
ICT	information and communication technology
ILO	International Labour Organization
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISSA	International Social Security Association
ITS	Industrial Trainee System
Lao PDR	Lao People's Democratic Republic
MOPM	Malaysia Office of the Prime Minister
MOUs	memoranda of understanding
MSA	multilateral social security agreement
NEP	New Economic Policy
ODM	original design manufacturing
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFWs	Overseas Filipino Workers
PRC	People's Republic of China
RBA	Responsible Business Alliance
RBC	Responsible Business Conduct
ROK	Republic of Korea
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SMEs	small and medium-sized enterprises
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States

Trends in Labor Migration in Asia

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1.1 Introduction


Asia is the source of 41% of the global stock of international migrants. The drivers of migration from Asia range from temporary labor migration to study abroad to permanent migration for economic, family, or humanitarian reasons. These drivers also influence the choice of destination for Asian migrants. Temporary labor migrants largely work in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and some developed Asian economies. In non-European countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Asian migrants dominate inflows of permanent migrants and students. Certain Asian countries have longstanding relationships with European countries, while new channels are developing.

Trends in labor migration from Asia are also shaped by policies and economic circumstances in origin and destination countries. Improvements in the global economy have increased labor migration, and some new channels have opened, even as some traditional destinations have begun to restrict temporary labor migration.

This chapter presents the latest trends in migration to and from Asia as well as intra-regional migration. The first section discusses labor migration flows to Asia and the Middle East. This is followed by a description of Asian immigration to OECD countries in terms of flows and labor market integration, and an overview of the growing role of Asia in international mobility of tertiary students. The chapter ends with an analysis of the trends in remittances sent to Asia.

1.2 How Asia Fits into Global Migration —Medium-term Trends


In 2017, 258 million people lived outside their country of birth (United Nations 2018), with Asia hosting nearly one-third of them (80 million). In these United Nations figures, Asia includes Western Asia. The distribution of migrants across Asian subregions of residence was uneven: more than 40 million were concentrated in Western Asia, an increase of more than 5% annually between 2005 and 2015 (Figure 1.1). This was mostly fueled by labor migration to GCC countries and, more recently, by Syrians fleeing to neighboring countries. Over the same period, the change in stock of migrants in other parts of Asia was more stable. The number of migrants in Asia appears to have grown at a slower pace between 2015 and 2017, when the annual rate of change dropped to 1.9% for Asia as a whole. The migrant population even decreased slightly in South Asia.

Figure 1.1: International Migrant Stock by Region of Destination


Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs. International Migrant Stock 2017. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml>.

2

Asia was also the origin region of 106 million migrants in 2017, 41% of the total (Figure 1.2). As a region of birth, Western Asia accounts for only 9% of the world's migrant population, while the rest of Asia accounts for about one-third since 2010. India and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are the two main Asian origin countries, and their shares were also stable in 2017, at 6.4% for India and 3.9% for the PRC.


Figure 1.2: International Migrant Stock by Region of Origin


Source: United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs. International Migrant Stock 2017. <http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml>.

1.3 Labor Migration Flows from Asia to Non-OECD Countries

After many years of steady growth, labor migration flows from Asia peaked in 2015 and fell in the subsequent 2 years, dropping to 5.2 million in 2017, the lowest level since 2011. The decrease of about 6% in 2017 reverses the upward trend (Figure 1.3). Reduced recruitment in the GCC countries, the top destination for Asian workers, is the main driver behind this downward trend.

Figure 1.3: Total Outflows of Workers from Selected Asian Countries, 2007–2017



Note: Total of the 12 countries presented in Table 1.1.

Source: National authorities.

With about 1.5 million workers deployed annually in the recent years, the Philippines is the main Asian origin country of migrant workers. Available data on deployments (including rehires) show a 9% decline in 2017. However, following record-high outflows in 2016, the stock of Filipino workers abroad reached 2.3 million in 2017, 100,000 more than in 2016. The number of Filipino workers in Saudi Arabia rose by 60,000 and comprised most of the total increase in stock in 2017. The second major provider of migrant labor in the region is now Bangladesh. Outflows of overseas workers increased by one-third between 2016 and 2017, and rose above one million (Table 1.1). This is the highest outflow ever registered from Bangladesh. More than half went to Saudi Arabia. However, preliminary data on outflows from Bangladesh for the first 10 months of 2018 indicate a 26% decline relative to the same period in 2017. The PRC ranks third, with a little more than half a million deployed workers in 2017. This figure has remained stable since 2011. These are largely contract workers employed on PRC-led projects abroad. Pakistan, long second only to the Philippines as a labor provider, saw the number of workers registered for overseas employment fall dramatically in 2017, to just under 500,000 (–41%). This is fully due to the collapse of the number of labor migrants from Pakistan deployed to Saudi Arabia, from almost half a million in 2016 to less than 150,000. This decline continued in 2018; through October, only 80,000 workers from Pakistan had been deployed to Saudi Arabia.

Table 1.1: Outflows of Workers from Selected Asian Countries, 2007–2017 (thousands)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2016/17 % change
Philippines	716	870	991	1,124	1,319	1,435	1,469	1,431	1,438	1,670	1,520(e)	-9%(e)
Bangladesh	820	875	475	391	568	608	409	426	556	758	1,009	33%
PRC	372	427	395	411	452	512	527	562	530	494	522	6%
Pakistan	282	425	396	358	453	635	620	752	947	839	496	-41%
India	809	849	610	641	627	747	817	805	781	521	391	-25%
Nepal	205	249	220	294	355	385	451	520	499	404	383	-5%
Indonesia	690	636	630	567	594	460	469	430	276	235	262	12%
Sri Lanka	218	250	247	268	263	282	293	301	263	243	212	-13%
Viet Nam	64	87	73	86	88	80	88	107	116	126	135	7%
Cambodia	9	9	15	30	26	35	23	25	41	85	96	13%
Lao PDR	3	2	4	19	34	7	23	8	51	58	49	-15%
Myanmar	8	12	6	5	18	68	67	65	95	146	162	11%

e = estimate, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: National authorities.

India issued roughly 400,000 emigration clearances to workers in 2017, a 25% decline compared to 2016. This is also only half the level observed between 2012 and 2015. Emigration clearance is required for certain workers departing for employment in one of 18 countries; the Indian government reported that 1.9 million Indians went to work in these 18 countries in 2017.¹ Many workers, especially those with higher education and occupation qualifications, are exempt from emigration clearance and are not included in this figure. Worker outflows from Nepal have been decreasing since 2014, and fell again in 2017, but only by 5%. There were still more than 400,000 Nepalese workers going abroad in 2017. Labor migration from Indonesia increased by 12% in 2017, but the level (260,000 workers) is far below that seen at the end of the 2010s. The main destination for Indonesian workers is not the GCC countries, but rather Malaysia, followed by Hong Kong, China and Taipei, China. Sri Lanka registered only 210,000 departures for foreign employment in 2017, down 13% compared to 2016. This is the third consecutive drop and the lowest level observed in more than 10 years. Myanmar and Cambodia have become important actors in labor migration in the region. Their annual outflow of workers registered several consecutive years of double-digit growth, so that emigration for employment in 2017 was higher than ever before (160,000 workers from Myanmar, 95,000 from Cambodia). Most migrant workers from these two countries went to Thailand. Labor migration from Viet Nam rose 7% in 2017, and reached a new record after having gradually increased since 2012. Emigration of Lao PDR workers fell slightly in 2017 to about 50,000.

¹ The countries requiring emigration clearances are the six GCC countries and Afghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen.

Table 1.2: Flows of Workers to GCC Countries, 2017 (thousands)

	Philippines (e)	India	Pakistan	Nepal	Sri Lanka	Bangladesh	Indonesia	Total
								2017
Saudi Arabia	419	79	143	73	38	551	6	1,309
United Arab Emirates	251	150	275	58	37	4	2	777
Qatar	129	25	12	121	57	82	1	426
Oman	25	53	42	3	9	89	1	223
Kuwait	100	56	1	13	37	50	1	258
Bahrain	20	10	8	4	3	19	0	64
Total GCC 2017	943	374	481	272	180	795	11	3,057
Total GCC 2016	1,036	507	822	331	208	572	20	3,497

e = estimate, GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council.

Sources: International Labour Organization and national authorities of origin countries.

The Middle East has been the main destination for Asian migrant workers for decades. Every year, more than 3 million Asians leave home to take up employment in GCC countries. In 2017, 3.2 million Asian workers were deployed in these six countries (Table 1.2). This represents a 10% drop compared to 2016, the first drop of this decade. Five GCC countries received fewer Asian workers in 2017 than in 2016. Explanations for this decrease include persistently low oil prices, a political orientation aimed at reducing the reliance on foreign labor, and geopolitical factors within the region.

Lower oil revenues affect investment in sectors where many foreign workers are employed. The initial trends for 2018 indicate a further reduction of Asian worker arrivals despite average oil prices being around 40% higher than in 2017, which suggests that oil prices and labor migration are not in lockstep. That said, the sharp drop in oil prices between the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2016 led GCC countries to diversify their economies and incur budget deficits, both of which hampered the development of infrastructure and construction projects, resulting in lower foreign labor inflows. For example, lower oil revenues led Saudi Arabia to scale back its infrastructure and transport budget in 2016.

The sharpest drop was seen in Oman, which reduced inflows of Asian workers by one-third, to 225,000. Even in absolute terms, this is the largest decline among all GCC countries. Asian labor migration to Bahrain fell to 66,000 persons in 2017, about half of what it was in 2016, constituting the largest relative decline (45%). Saudi Arabia, which remained the main GCC destination, received 1.35 million Asian workers in 2017, down 7% compared to 2016. While the total number of workers coming to Saudi Arabia fell only slightly, there was a dramatic shift in the origin countries of incoming workers. Indeed, inflows of Pakistani workers fell three-fold (to 143,000), and those of Indian and Nepalese workers halved (to 79,000 and 73,000, respectively). Bangladesh sent 550,000 of its citizens to Saudi Arabia in 2017, four times more than in 2016, making this route the new top corridor for migrant labor in Asia. This was due to the end in mid-2016 of a recruitment ban that had been in place for 6 years. The United Arab Emirates is the second main destination country with 800,000 Asian workers, a 4% decline. Unlike Saudi Arabia, the distribution by country of origin did not change in 2017, with Pakistan as the main labor force provider (275,000). Qatar received slightly less than 440,000 Asian workers in 2017, down 11% compared to 2016. Kuwait registered similar inflows of Asian workers in 2017 as in 2016, with about 260,000 new Asian workers.

In addition to the fall in oil prices, a major policy trend affecting foreign labor demand in GCC countries is the expansion of programs and policies to transform their economies, such as Saudi Vision 2030, United Arab Emirates (UAE) Vision 2021, and Qatar’s National Vision 2030. These initiatives share several similarities, including the objective of reducing reliance on foreign workers. Saudi Vision 2030 aims to restructure the economy by reducing dependency on oil and creating a more productive local workforce. Along with this, the Saudi government introduced a “Saudization Program” aimed at encouraging employment of the native population, especially women, and substituting Saudi nationals for foreign nationals in the private sector. Saudization imposes restrictions on the employment of foreign workers in Saudi firms, so that firms with a higher share of foreign employees face limits or even bans on further recruitment.

The UAE has, since 2005, had an “Emiratisation” policy, imposing a minimum share of UAE nationals in firms. This policy has expanded to new sectors of employment. In 2017, the classification system of firms was revised, and a labor market test requiring large firms to first recruit from UAE nationals was imposed. In Qatar, there is also an objective to increase the share of Qatari nationals in employment, and enforcement was stepped up. Qatar was also affected by disruption in trade with other GCC countries. Oman has an “Omanisation” policy that favors recruitment of nationals. Although this is not reflected in available figures, starting in 2018 Oman also imposed bans on recruitment of foreign workers in some sectors.

In addition to demand and policy in the destination countries, recent measures in origin countries to better monitor overseas employment and protect expatriate workers affect deployment, including, for example, the implementation of the e-migrate system in India, and Nepal’s bans on labor migration by certain workers according to gender, age, or occupation.

While migration to GCC countries fell in 2017, migration to Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member countries rose by one-third. Total labor migration flows from the 11 Asian countries of origin presented in Table 1.3 to ASEAN amounted to 635,000 workers. In particular, migrant worker flows from Asia to Thailand almost doubled to 240,000, of which around 150,000 were from Myanmar (35,000 more compared to 2016) and almost 90,000 from Cambodia (+70,000). Malaysia also received 320,000 workers from within Asia in 2017, 35% more than in 2016. Bangladesh became the top labor provider for Malaysia in 2017 (100,000 workers, up 60,000 compared to 2016) and a similar increase is seen in the first 10 months of 2018. Nepal (95,000, up 35,000) and Indonesia (unchanged at 90,000) followed. Labor migration flows to Brunei Darussalam increased slightly (+7%) and only Singapore saw Asian worker inflows diminish (–24%).

The gender balance among migrant workers from Asia varies widely from one country to another (Figure 1.4). It is mostly determined by the specialization of the country of origin in terms of sector, and by national rules limiting emigration. For example, the high percentage of women among migrant workers from the Philippines (57%) and from Indonesia (70%) is attributable to the large proportion of workers in the domestic and care-giving sectors. There are also more women than men among outflows from the Lao PDR (54%). At the other extreme, women account for 12% of labor migrants from Bangladesh, and only 4% of those from Nepal. However, there has been an increase in the share of women in worker outflows in 2017 for all countries of origin except Bangladesh and Cambodia. In particular, the share of women increased by 8 percentage points for Indonesia, 6 percentage points for Myanmar, and 3 percentage points for Viet Nam.


Table 1.3: Flows of Workers to ASEAN Countries, by Origin and Destination, 2017

Destination	Origin										
	Philippines	Indonesia	Nepal	Bangladesh	India	Pakistan	Thailand	Sri Lanka	Myanmar	Cambodia	Viet Nam
	2017(e)	2017	2017	2017	2017	2017	2017	2017	2017	2017	2017
Singapore	150,000	13,379		40,401		54	5,399	1,789	355	138	0
Malaysia	30,000	88,984	95,244	99,787	14,002	7,174	7,141	1,995	3,325	27	1,551
Thailand	10,000	6					0	16	148,942	87,909	0
Brunei Darussalam	10,000	6,623		8,587		212	1,299	9	0	0	0
Total 2017	200,000	108,992	95,244	148,775	14,002	7,440	13,839	3,809	152,622	88,074	1,551
Total 2016	223,612	113,474	61,230	100,692	10,606	10,743	10,567	4,770	139,071	76,643	2,108

e = estimate.

Note: Missing cells indicate no data available.

Source: International Labour Organization and national authorities of origin countries.

Figure 1.4: Share of Women among Labor Migrants, by Origin Country, 2017 or Latest Year, Selected Asian Countries


Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Note: Philippines is stock data for 2016. Nepal is 2016–2017. Indonesia includes informal and formal channels.

Sources: Official data from national authorities (Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka) and International Labour Migration Statistics Database for ASEAN countries.

1.4 Migration Flows from Asia to OECD Countries

Along with the GCC and the ASEAN countries, the OECD area is also an important destination for Asian migrants. In 2016, almost 2 million Asian citizens migrated to an OECD country (Figure 1.5). This represents a small increase (+3%) compared to 2015, but it is the fourth consecutive annual increase since 2012. It also represents exactly twice the level observed in 2000. Asian citizens accounted for 28% of all immigration to OECD countries in 2016, up from 27% in 2015.

Figure 1.5: Migration Flows from Asia to OECD Countries, 2000–2016

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD International Migration database.

The PRC has long been the top origin country of migrant flows to the OECD area (Table 1.4). In 2016, about 540,000 PRC citizens migrated to OECD countries, a fairly stable figure since 2013. This represents 8% of all inflows to OECD countries, and 28% of related migration from Asia. India is the second main Asian country of origin, with emigration flows to OECD countries amounting to 270,000 people in 2016, slightly above the 2015 level (+1%). Migration flows of Vietnamese coming to OECD countries doubled between 2012 and 2016 and reached 186,000 persons, putting Viet Nam ahead of the Philippines for the first time. Indeed, OECD countries received 170,000 new migrants from the Philippines in 2016 (–6%). Flows from Afghanistan to OECD countries, mostly refugees, fell by 9% in 2016, but remain at relatively high levels (126,000). Pakistan follows with just under 100,000 (–4%). Migration flows from Indonesia; Hong Kong, China; Kazakhstan; the Republic of Korea; and Thailand increased sharply in 2016, by more than 10%, and 10 Asian countries sent historically high numbers of migrants to OECD countries in 2016 (Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Myanmar, Nepal, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Viet Nam).

Among the Asian migrants who moved to OECD countries in 2016, one in five chose the United States as their destination (Table 1.5). Indeed, more than 380,000 Asian-born migrants obtained lawful permanent resident status in the United States in 2016, a 9% increase compared to 2015. Immigration of PRC-born, the largest group, rose by 10% to more than 80,000. India is the second main Asian country of birth of new US permanent residents (65,000, stable). The Philippines follows with flows standing at 53,000 in 2016, down 6% compared to 2015. More than 40,000 new immigrants born in Viet Nam were granted permanent resident status in 2016 (+34%), the highest number in two decades.

Regarding temporary skilled labor migration to the United States, the total number of initial H-1B visas was stable in 2017, at 180,000, of which 130,000 (2% more compared to 2016) were given to Indian workers (Figure 1.6). Most of the remaining H-1B visas were issued to citizens of other Asian countries, in particular the PRC (23,000 recipients, +6%), so that the share of Asia as region of origin is now above 90%.

The Republic of Korea has been the second main OECD country of destination for Asian migrants since 2010. In 2016, about 340,000 Asian citizens migrated to the Republic of Korea (6% more compared to 2015).

Table 1.4: Asian Economies of Origin for Migration to OECD Countries, 2015–2016

	Flows 2016 (thousands)	% of Total OECD Inflows 2016	% change 2015–2016	Expatriation Rate 2016 (per million inhabitants)
People's Republic of China	538	7.8	–0	385
India	272	4.0	+1	207
Viet Nam	186	2.7	+23	1,993
Philippines	170	2.5	–6	1,672
Afghanistan	126	1.8	–9	3,748
Pakistan	95	1.4	–4	501
Republic of Korea	74	1.1	+13	1,459
Thailand	73	1.1	+15	1,065
Bangladesh	53	0.8	+4	328
Nepal	50	0.7	+7	1,745
Indonesia	39	0.6	+11	149
Japan	35	0.5	–5	276
Sri Lanka	33	0.5	+6	1,580
Myanmar	29	0.4	+7	556
Taipei, China	26	0.4	+19	...
Uzbekistan	24	0.4	+15	780
Malaysia	23	0.3	+7	754
Cambodia	19	0.3	+14	1,256
Kazakhstan	16	0.2	+42	922
Mongolia	14	0.2	–2	4,864
Georgia	13	0.2	–6	3,270
Hong Kong, China	8.7	0.1	+27	1,204
Singapore	7.2	0.1	+1	1,300
Azerbaijan	7.2	0.1	+26	744
Bhutan	5.3	0.1	–30	6,680
Kyrgyz Republic	4.5	0.1	+15	765
Tajikistan	2.9	0.0	+32	339
Lao People's Democratic Republic	2.6	0.0	–3	389
Turkmenistan	0.5	0.0	–54	82
Brunei Darussalam	0.3	0.0	–1	764
Maldives	0.2	0.0	–10	415
Total Asia	1,949	28.4	+3	

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD International Migration database.


Migration from the PRC dropped by 7% in 2016, but new PRC migrants (165,000) still accounted for almost half of the flows from Asia. As in the US, Vietnamese migration to the Republic of Korea rose sharply in 2016 (+33%) to 40,000. Thai nationals migrated to the Republic of Korea in much larger numbers in 2016 than in 2015 (28,000, +41%). Uzbekistan is the fifth main origin country of new migrants to the Republic of Korea (16,000).

Table 1.5: Top 15 OECD Countries for Asian Migration, 2016

	Number of Migrants in 2016 (thousands)	Difference with 2015 Absolute %		% of inflows from Asia to OECD	Main Asian Countries of Origin			
United States	381	31	9	20	PRC	India	Philippines	Viet Nam
Japan	329	30	10	17	PRC	Viet Nam	Philippines	Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea	323	18	6	17	PRC	Viet Nam	Thailand	Cambodia
Germany	191	-18	-8	10	Afghanistan	India	PRC	Pakistan
Canada	141	-2	-1	7	Philippines	India	PRC	Pakistan
Australia	129	5	4	7	India	PRC	Philippines	Pakistan
United Kingdom	117	-8	-6	6	India	PRC	Pakistan	Malaysia
Italy	61	-3	-5	3	Pakistan	PRC	Bangladesh	India
New Zealand	43	-2	-4	2	PRC	India	Philippines	Republic of Korea
Spain	28	4	14	1	PRC	Pakistan	India	Philippines
Netherlands	25	4	22	1	India	PRC	Afghanistan	Indonesia
France	22	1	6	1	PRC	India	Sri Lanka	Bangladesh
Austria	19	-9	-32	1	Afghanistan	PRC	India	Pakistan
Sweden	17	2	13	1	India	Afghanistan	PRC	Thailand
Poland	15	1	10	1	PRC	Viet Nam	India	Republic of Korea

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD International Migration database.

Figure 1.6: H-1B Visas Delivered, by Region of Origin, 2010–2017


Source: United States Department of State.

Migration of Asian citizens to Japan increased by 10% in 2016 to 330,000 persons, the highest figure ever recorded. This was the third annual double-digit increase, and preliminary data suggests this strong upward trend continued in 2017. The main Asian country of origin in 2016 was the PRC, with a little over 100,000 migrants (+3%). Viet Nam followed with 78,000 new migrants to Japan, a very sharp increase compared to 2015 (+18%). Migration flows from Viet Nam to Japan have risen six-fold from relatively low levels until 2011. The other main origin countries in 2016 were the Philippines and Republic of Korea (26,000 each), followed by Indonesia (15,000) and Thailand (14,000).

With nearly 200,000 new Asian migrants, Germany remained the fourth main OECD country of destination in 2016, despite an 8% drop. This relatively high figure is mostly due to flows from Afghanistan (75,000), which, nonetheless, dropped off sharply in 2017, suggesting that total inflows from Asia were lower in 2017. In 2016, the other main Asian origin countries were India (28,000) and the PRC (27,000). Flows from both these countries have been rising over the last decade.

Since 2000, migration from Asia to Canada has been sustained and relatively stable, comprising between 115,000 and 145,000 persons every year. In 2016, about 140,000 Asian-born migrants arrived in Canada (-1%). Traditionally, the Philippines, India, and the PRC are the main origin countries, but in 2016, following the resettlement of refugees by the government of Canada, Syria rose to third place. The Philippines was still the number one origin country with 42,000 emigrants to Canada, despite an 18% drop in 2016. India was the origin country of 40,000 new migrants to Canada in 2016.

Up to 2013, Australia attracted a growing number of Asian migrants, but inflows plateaued in 2014 and 2015. In 2016, the increase in flows from Asia to Australia resumed to almost 130,000 new migrants (+4%). As is the case for the United States and Canada, the top three origin countries are India (40,000, +11%), the PRC (29,000, +4%), and the Philippines (12,000, stable).

Migration from Asia to the United Kingdom declined in 2016 by 6%, to 117,000 new migrants, placing the United Kingdom lower than Australia for the first time. India and the PRC tied for second place among origin countries, with 35,000 each, behind Romania.

1.5 Labor Market Situation of Asian Migrants in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe

Asian-born migrants continued to perform well in the labor market in the United States in 2017 (Table 1.6). Their unemployment rate has been regularly declining since the economic crisis, and is now extremely low, at 3.1%. This is also 1 percentage point lower than that of all foreign-born and 1.5 points lower than that of the native-born population. Their employment rate increased by 2 points between 2012 and 2017, and stood at around 70.5%, which is still slightly below that of the other foreign-born immigrants (71%), and their participation in the labor market was stable at 72.8%.

In Canada, the situation of Asian-born migrants in the labor market is also relatively favorable. Only 6.2% were unemployed in 2017. This is around 2 points lower than in 2012, and also 2 points below the figure for the other foreign-born and Canadian-born population. Their employment rate (73%) and participation rate (78%) are very close to those of the foreign-born group.

Table 1.6: Labor Market Indicators for Native and Foreign-Born in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the European OECD Countries

Residence	Place of Birth	Employment rate				Unemployment rate				Participation rate			
		2008	2012	2017	Change 2012/2017 (% pts)	2008	2012	2017	Change 2012/2017 (% pts)	2008	2012	2017	Change 2012/2017 (% pts)
United States	A	72.2	68.1	70.5	2.3	3.9	5.9	3.1	-2.8	75.1	72.4	72.7	0.3
	B	70.8	67.7	71.0	3.3	5.9	8.1	4.0	-4.1	75.2	73.7	74.0	0.3
	C	69.4	65.6	68.5	2.9	6.0	8.3	4.6	-3.7	73.8	71.5	71.8	0.3
Canada	A	69.9	69.9	72.8	2.9	7.1	8.1	6.2	-1.9	75.3	76.1	77.6	1.5
	B	70.7	70.1	72.8	2.7	7.2	8.4	6.8	-1.6	76.1	76.5	78.1	1.6
	C	74.3	72.6	73.7	1.1	6.0	7.1	6.3	-0.8	79.0	78.1	78.6	0.5
Australia	A	67.6	67.0	68.1	1.1	5.8	5.7	6.1	0.4	71.8	71.1	72.5	1.4
	B	69.8	70.0	70.8	0.8	4.7	5.4	5.9	0.5	73.2	74.0	75.2	1.2
	C	75.0	73.6	74.3	0.7	4.2	5.3	5.7	0.4	78.2	77.8	78.8	1.0
European OECD countries	Asia	63.2	62.0	64.9	2.9	7.5	10.0	7.5	-2.5	68.3	68.9	70.1	1.2
	B	66.8	62.6	63.4	0.8	9.3	15.5	13.1	-2.4	73.6	74.1	73.0	-1.1
	C	65.8	63.6	66.4	2.8	6.3	10.7	8.1	-2.6	70.3	71.2	72.3	1.1

A = Asia, B = Foreign-born, C = Native-born, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Note: The population refers to working age (15–64) for the employment and participation rates and to the active population aged 15–64 for the unemployment rate. EU28 does not include Germany because 2012 data by region of birth are not available. The regions of birth could not be made fully comparable across countries of residence because of the way aggregate data provided to the Secretariat are coded. The data for European countries refer to the first three quarters only.

Sources: European countries: Labor Force Surveys (Eurostat); Australia, Canada: Labor Force Surveys; United States: Current Population Surveys.


In Australia, Asian-born migrants are slightly more likely to be unemployed (6.1%) than the other groups, as the unemployment rate of all foreign-born migrants is 5.9% and that of Australian-born is 5.7%. Asian-born also have a relatively low employment rate (68%), especially when compared to that of the Australian-born (74%). While less exceptional than in the United States and Canada, these outcomes are still positive.

1.6 International Student Mobility to and from Asia

International student mobility is a growing global phenomenon in which Asia plays an important role, in particular as a region of origin. The overall number of foreign students worldwide rose to just above 5 million in 2016 (Figure 1.7) and in that same year, the share of Asian students among them rose above 50%. As a region of destination for foreign students, Asia is not yet a major player, but its market share is slowly growing. In 2016, 14% of all foreign students were studying in Asia (Figure 1.8).


Among these foreign students enrolled in Asia in 2016, one in four was studying in the PRC (including Hong Kong, China, and Macau, China). Partial data for 2017 suggest this position was further reinforced, with over 200,000 foreign students enrolled in PRC tertiary institutions (+13% compared to 2016) (Figure 1.9).

Figure 1.7: Foreign Students by Region of Origin, Worldwide, 2000–2016




Sources: OECD education database and UNESCO Institute for Statistics education database.

Figure 1.8: Share of Asia in Global International Student Mobility, 2016



Sources: OECD education database and UNESCO Institute for Statistics education database.

Figure 1.9: Top 15 Asian Destination Countries for Internationally Mobile Students, 2016–2017



PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: 2016 or most recent available year.


Sources: OECD education database and UNESCO Institute for Statistics education database.

The second main country of destination is Japan, where the number of foreign students rose by 9% in 2016, to 143,000. Malaysia, with just over 100,000 inbound foreign students, is next and the Republic of Korea (62,000) and Singapore (53,000) follow. India receives an increasing number of foreign students, but the figure remains low (45,000) considering the size of the country's higher education enrolment.

Looking at internationally mobile students in OECD countries, their distribution by region of origin remained fairly stable in 2016, compared to 2015. Three main regions account for about one-quarter each: Europe (25%), the PRC (23%), and the rest of Asia (26%) (Figure 1.10, Panel A). The Americas (9%), Africa (9%), and the Middle East (8%) complete the picture.

The United States remained the main destination country for internationally mobile students from Asia in 2016, hosting about 620,000, an 8% increase compared to 2015. This represents 38% of all Asian students enrolled in OECD countries (Figure 1.10, Panel B), a stable share since 2013. Australia is second with 17%, a steadily increasing share, and the United Kingdom with a share that stood at 11% in 2016, down 3 percentage points compared to 2013.


Figure 1.10: International Students in OECD Countries by Origin and Destination, 2016 (%)



OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD. 2018. Education at a Glance Database. <http://stats.oecd.org>.


Between 2013 and 2016, the share of Asian tertiary students in OECD countries increased slightly from 49% to 50%, but across the sublevels of higher education, their share varied and has evolved in different ways, (Figure 1.11). In 2016, they accounted for 67% of all internationally mobile students in short-cycle tertiary education, a 9 percentage point increase compared to 2013. This sharp increase is driven by the larger numbers of students from India, Viet Nam, and Nepal at this level of education in 2016. The share of Asian students remained stable at the bachelor's level, where they represented 49% of the total, but at the master's level, they reached 53%, up from 49% in 2013. Their share is the lowest at doctoral level, where they represented only 36% in 2016 (-1 point).

Figure 1.11: Share of Asian Students in OECD Countries by Level of Education

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Source: OECD. 2018. Education at a Glance Database. <http://stats.oecd.org>.

Overall, in OECD countries, 48% of internationally mobile students are women (Figure 1.12). This figure varies across OECD countries of destination, but also by region of origin. Women represent 57% of students from Europe studying in OECD countries, 56% of those from North America, but they are only 40% among students from Africa and 38% among students from Middle Eastern countries. In most major destination countries, the share of women among Asian students is often close to that of women among all internationally mobile students. However, in France, 60% of Asian students are women—the highest percentage in all OECD destination countries—while in Germany, women account for only 45% of the total.

Figure 1.12: Share of Women among Internationally Mobile Students in OECD Countries, by Region of Origin, 2015

OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.


Note: Data for the United States are not available.

Source: OECD. 2018. Education at a Glance Database. <http://stats.oecd.org>.

1.7 Remittance Flows to Asian Countries

Between 2000 and 2014, remittance flows to Asian countries rose steadily, with the exception of a dip in 2009. They plateaued in 2015 and declined in 2016. In 2017, remittance flows to Asian countries strongly rebounded and reached \$268 billion in 2017, the highest level ever registered (Figure 1.13). This represents a 6% increase compared to 2016.

Figure 1.13: Remittances to Asia 2000–2017 (\$ billion)



Note: Figures for 2017 are estimates.

Source: World Bank. Migration and Remittances Data.

The main driver behind this rebound is remittance flows to India, which accounted for nearly 40% of the overall increase. India has almost always been the main Asian country of destination for remittances, second only to Pakistan in 1978–79 and 1982–1986, and to the PRC in 2007. In 2017, India received \$69 billion (+10% compared to 2016), representing more than a quarter of all remittances to Asian countries (Table 1.7 and Figure 1.14a). The PRC followed with \$63 billion received (+5%). This accounted for 18% of the overall regional increase. The Philippines ranks third, with \$33 billion received in 2017, up 5% from the 2016 level. This marks two decades of continuously growing remittances to the Philippines. Three other Asian countries received more than \$10 billion in 2017: Pakistan received \$20 billion, as in 2016; Viet Nam received \$14 billion, 16% more than in 2016; and Bangladesh (\$13 billion, stable), which fell behind Viet Nam. Remittance flows to Indonesia (\$9 billion) and to Sri Lanka (\$7 billion) were also stable, but those to Nepal and to Thailand increased by 5% and 7%, respectively, to \$7 billion. Azerbaijan, Georgia, Japan, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic registered remittance flow levels more than 20% higher in 2017 than 2016.

Overall, OECD countries were the source of a little over 60% of the \$613 billion remittances sent throughout the world in 2017 and 53% of the \$420 billion directed to low- and middle-income countries. \$120 billion was sent from OECD countries to Asian countries. These remittances comprised 44% of total remittances received by Asian countries, compared to 80% of remittances received in Europe or 55% of those received in Africa. Remittances from OECD countries represent 94% of total inflows in Viet Nam, 72% in Thailand, 60% in the PRC and 57% in the Philippines.

Table 1.7: Remittances by Receiving Economy, 2000 to 2017 (\$ billion)

Remittance-receiving Country	2000	2005	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
India	12.9	22.1	53.5	62.5	68.8	70.0	70.4	68.9	62.7	69.0
People's Republic of China	0.8	3.3	52.5	61.6	58.0	59.5	62.3	63.9	61.0	63.9
Philippines	6.9	13.7	21.6	23.1	24.6	26.7	28.7	29.8	31.1	32.8
Pakistan	1.1	4.3	9.7	12.3	14.0	14.6	17.2	19.3	19.8	19.7
Viet Nam	1.3	3.2	8.3	8.6	10.0	11.0	12.0	13.2	11.9	13.8
Bangladesh	2.0	4.6	10.9	12.1	14.1	13.9	15.0	15.3	13.5	13.5
Indonesia	1.2	5.4	6.9	6.9	7.2	7.6	8.6	9.7	8.9	9.0
Sri Lanka	1.2	2.0	4.1	5.2	6.0	6.4	7.0	7.0	7.3	7.2
Nepal	0.1	1.2	3.5	4.2	4.8	5.6	5.9	6.7	6.6	6.9
Thailand	1.7	1.2	4.4	5.3	5.7	6.6	6.5	5.9	6.3	6.7
Korea, Republic of	4.5	5.2	5.8	6.6	6.6	6.5	6.6	6.4	6.5	6.3
Japan	0.8	0.9	1.7	2.1	2.5	2.4	3.7	3.3	3.8	4.6
Uzbekistan	2.9	4.3	5.7	6.7	5.8	3.1	2.5	2.8
Kyrgyz Republic	0.0	0.3	1.3	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.2	1.7	2.0	2.5
Tajikistan	...	0.5	2.0	2.7	3.2	3.7	3.4	2.3	1.9	2.2
Georgia	0.2	0.4	1.2	1.5	1.8	1.9	2.0	1.5	1.5	1.8
Malaysia	0.3	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
Azerbaijan	0.1	0.6	1.4	1.9	2.0	1.7	1.8	1.3	0.6	1.1
Myanmar	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	1.6	0.3	0.4	0.7	0.7
Hong Kong, China	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Afghanistan	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
Cambodia	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4
Kazakhstan	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4
Mongolia	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Lao PDR	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
Bhutan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Macau, China	...	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Turkmenistan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Maldives	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	36.5	71.0	194.2	225.1	240.0	251.6	262.7	263.0	252.1	268.1

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Note: Figures for 2017 are estimates.

Source: World Bank Migration and Remittances Data.

\$56 billion, or one-fifth of all remittances to Asia in 2017, were sent from the United States (Figure 1.14b and Figure 1.15). Other important OECD source countries were Canada (\$12 billion), the United Kingdom and Australia (\$9 billion each), and Japan (\$8 billion). Bilaterally, the Republic of Korea is the top source country for Mongolia with \$101 million, and Germany is second for remittances to Thailand (\$635 million), the Kyrgyz Republic (\$280 million), and Kazakhstan (\$73 million).

Figure 1.14a: Share of Asian Remittance by Recipient Country, 2017





Figure 1.14b: Source Countries for Asian Remittances 2017




PRC = People's Republic of China

Note: Figures are estimates.

Source: World Bank Migration and Remittances Data.

Figure 1.15: Remittances Received by Asian Economies, by Main Source Countries, 2017 (Total [\$ billion] and percentage change)



Note: Figures are estimates.

Source: World Bank Migration and Remittances Data.

The GCC countries were the second main source of remittances to Asia, with all six appearing in the top 25. In 2017, taken together, these countries sent \$83 billion remittances to Asia, accounting for 31% of the total and up 7% compared to 2016. In particular, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates accounted for about \$30 billion each. Nepal and Pakistan are strongly dependent on remittance flows from GCC countries, as they receive 70% of all remittances from them (Table 1.8). GCC countries provide more than half of remittances for Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka.

Table 1.8: Distribution of Sources of Remittances Received by Asian Economies, 2017 (%)

	Remittances (\$ billions)	OECD	of which OECD-Europe	Non-OECD Asia	GCC	Russian Federation
India	68.97	33.6	8.9	9.2	55.6	0.0
People's Republic of China	63.86	59.9	9.3	37.3	0.0	0.5
Philippines	32.81	56.6	7.6	10.4	31.5	0.0
Pakistan	19.66	25.1	14.5	4.3	69.7	0.0
Viet Nam	13.78	94.3	16.7	5.0	0.0	0.4
Bangladesh	13.47	10.3	5.5	34.8	54.0	0.0
Indonesia	9.00	11.4	4.7	36.1	51.3	0.0
Sri Lanka	7.19	38.5	20.9	8.7	50.6	0.0
Nepal	6.95	10.2	3.1	19.3	70.4	0.0
Thailand	6.73	72.3	29.2	20.4	4.1	0.0
Korea, Republic of	6.33	86.8	4.9	11.4	0.0	0.1
Japan	4.58	61.7	14.0	20.8	0.0	0.1
Uzbekistan	2.84	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Kyrgyz Republic	2.49	14.6	12.9	4.3	0.0	76.6
Tajikistan	2.22	5.2	4.2	12.8	0.0	76.0
Georgia	1.79	18.2	14.3	4.7	0.0	58.7
Malaysia	1.63	19.6	4.5	79.5	0.0	0.1
Azerbaijan	1.05	7.5	3.4	7.6	0.0	58.1
Myanmar	0.72	7.7	0.9	65.1	27.1	0.0
Hong Kong, China	0.43	87.3	11.7	11.5	0.0	0.0
Afghanistan	0.41	13.0	8.5	30.7	15.4	0.1
Cambodia	0.39	37.2	7.8	62.7	0.0	0.0
Kazakhstan	0.36	23.4	22.2	4.1	0.0	63.5
Mongolia	0.27	61.2	21.2	6.5	0.0	26.4
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.12	26.4	4.3	73.5	0.0	0.0
Bhutan	0.04	5.2	2.4	94.6	0.0	0.0
Macau, China	0.03	16.0	1.6	84.0	0.0	0.0
Turkmenistan	0.01	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100.0
Maldives	0.00	65.9	19.0	15.4	0.0	3.4
Asia	268.1	44.4	9.9	19.0	31.1	3.3
Rest of the world	345.3	73.4	37.8	2.1	7.5	2.2

GCC = Gulf Cooperation Council, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Note: Figures are estimates.

Source: World Bank Migration and Remittances Data.

Table 1.9: Share of Remittances in Gross Domestic Product by Economy, 2017 (% of GDP)

	2000	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Afghanistan	...	2.3	1.0	1.0	1.6	1.2	1.8	1.9	1.8
Azerbaijan	1.1	2.7	2.9	2.9	2.3	2.5	2.4	1.7	2.8
Bangladesh	3.7	9.4	9.4	10.6	9.2	8.7	7.8	6.1	5.4
Bhutan	...	0.5	0.6	1.0	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.6	1.7
Cambodia	2.8	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2	2.3	2.2	1.9	1.7
People's Republic of China	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.2
Georgia	6.7	10.2	10.7	11.2	12.1	12.0	10.4	10.6	11.8
Hong Kong, China	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
India	2.8	3.2	3.4	3.8	3.8	3.5	3.3	2.8	2.7
Indonesia	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.1	1.0	0.9
Japan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Kazakhstan	0.4	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2
Korea, Republic of	0.8	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.4
Kyrgyz Republic	0.2	26.4	27.6	30.8	31.1	30.0	25.3	29.3	32.9
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.0	0.6	1.3	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.7
Macau, China	...	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Malaysia	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.5	0.5
Maldives	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Mongolia	0.1	3.7	2.4	2.6	2.0	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.4
Myanmar	1.1	0.2	0.2	0.5	2.7	2.8	3.4	3.7	3.7
Nepal	2.0	21.6	22.3	25.4	29.0	29.4	31.4	31.3	28.3
Pakistan	1.5	5.5	5.7	6.2	6.3	7.1	7.1	7.1	6.5
Philippines	8.5	10.8	10.3	9.8	9.8	10.1	10.2	10.2	10.5
Sri Lanka	7.1	7.3	7.9	8.8	8.6	8.9	8.7	8.9	8.2
Tajikistan	...	35.8	41.7	42.2	43.5	36.6	28.8	26.9	31.6
Thailand	1.3	1.3	1.4	1.4	1.6	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5
Turkmenistan	...	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Uzbekistan	...	7.3	9.3	11.0	11.6	9.2	4.6	3.7	...
Viet Nam	4.3	7.1	6.3	6.4	6.4	6.4	6.8	5.8	6.2

GDP = gross domestic product, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: Figures are estimates.

Source: World Bank Migration and Remittances Data.

Asian countries also receive a significant amount of remittances from within the region. In 2017, internal remittance flows (excluding those from the two Asian OECD countries, Japan and the Republic of Korea) represented almost one-fifth of remittances to Asia, or \$21 billion (+4%). More than one-third of these remittances originated from Hong Kong, China (\$17 billion), with nearly all of these directed to the PRC. Singapore follows with \$6 billion, with the PRC also constituting a main destination (\$2.8 billion). Singapore provides almost two-thirds of Malaysia's remittances (\$1.1 billion).

Malaysia is the third player as origin country, with \$6 billion going to other Asian countries every year. In 2017, \$2.2 billion was sent to Indonesia, a quarter of Indonesia's incoming remittances, \$2 billion was sent to the Philippines, and \$600,000 to Thailand. India ranks fourth with a little under \$6 billion in remittances sent to the rest of Asia, and is the top country of origin for Bangladesh (\$4 billion).

Among the other significant remittance corridors in the region, two have Nepal as origin: India receives about \$3 billion every year from Nepal, and Bhutan nearly 90% of its remittances. Finally, more than half of the remittances received by Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Myanmar were sent from Thailand.

Remittances coming from the Russian Federation to Asia amounted to \$9 billion in 2017 (+20% compared to 2016). This increase is mostly due to the exchange rate of the ruble to the dollar, which was at a low in 2016 and rebounded slightly in 2017 to ₺58/\$ (+15%). The Russian Federation is a key source of remittances for all Central Asian countries, as Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan rely entirely on Russian Federation-remitted transfers, and Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan receive more than half of their remittances from Russia.

Some of these countries are highly dependent on remittances, in particular the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, which both registered remittances/GDP ratios over 30% in 2017, respectively 33% and 32% (Table 1.9).

Nepal is heavily reliant on remittances, which accounted for 28% of its GDP in 2017. This is less than in 2016 (-3 percentage points) reflecting the strong GDP growth observed in 2017 (+6%), even as remittances were higher than ever. The other Asian countries with remittance-to-GDP ratios above 10% were Georgia at 11.8% (+1.2 percentage points) and the Philippines (10.5%, +0.3 percentage points). Sri Lanka and Pakistan followed, at 8.2% and 6.5%, respectively, both showing a 0.7 percentage points decline in 2017. Expressed as a proportion of GDP, remittances to Viet Nam have been fairly stable since 2011 and stood at 6.2% in 2017, while those received by Bangladesh have been steadily decreasing since 2012 due to strong growth rates (over 6% annually), and only accounted for 5.4% in 2017, half as much as in 2012.

1.8 Conclusion

Migration from Asian countries to GCC destinations has fallen, even as it continues to play an important role in the global economy. Countries in the region continue to jockey for access to deployment opportunities, while many destination countries adjust their policies with an eye to limiting future increases. Migration to ASEAN increased, although it is on a smaller scale and dominated by several bilateral channels. Migration to OECD countries, which tends to be more permanent than migration to other regions, and often driven by family or humanitarian reasons rather than temporary employment, continued to rise. Asian migrants in OECD countries tend to do well in the labor market, often exceeding the native-born and other immigrant groups in terms of employment levels. More than half of the world's international students are now from Asia. Remittances to Asia have rebounded from a slight decline, as the total number of Asia-born international migrants continues to increase.

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The Republic of Korea's Temporary Foreign Worker Program: Innovative Policy Elements

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2.1 Introduction

The management of temporary foreign workers in developed countries—especially in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries—is a policy issue of growing importance. In several countries, labor shortages in occupations requiring little prior training are appearing in many sectors, often exacerbated by the low propensity of native-born workers to take these jobs. With firms struggling to find suitable workers, countries have implemented and expanded programs to recruit workers from abroad, often on a temporary or even seasonal basis (OECD 2014). One such country is the Republic of Korea, whose labor migration policy has evolved in the past few decades such that its Employment Permit System (EPS) is now one of the largest temporary foreign worker programs of any OECD country.

In its series on the Republic of Korea's economic migration policy, *Recruiting Immigrant Workers*, OECD reviewed the country's low-skill temporary foreign worker policy (OECD 2019). This chapter draws on some of the findings and conclusions of the OECD review to contextualize the introduction and implementation of the program, and describe migration to the Republic of Korea. Further, it examines how EPS addresses challenges in program design and identifies some of the Republic of Korea's innovative policy solutions.

Other economies facing the challenge of establishing a temporary foreign worker program can draw on the experience of the Republic of Korea and the specific mechanisms it has developed to manage recruitment, employment and return of temporary foreign workers, and the incentives and sanctions it uses to protect workers and ensure functioning of the scheme.

2.2 The Republic of Korea Context for Temporary Labor Migration

Due to a sharp decline in fertility rates in the 1980s, the Republic of Korea has one of the fastest-aging populations in the OECD. The Republic of Korea also has the highest share of young people enrolling in universities in the OECD and the highest share (70%) of people age 25–34 with tertiary degrees (OECD, *Education at a Glance* 2017). Over the decade 2005–2015, the combined effect of shrinking youth cohorts and higher educational attainment led to a sharp decline in the number of less-than-tertiary educated, from about 4 million people aged 25–34 to 1.4 million. This is by far the sharpest decline of any OECD country.

The less-educated workforce is rapidly aging. In 2010, 88% of the less-educated workforce was over 45 years old. Even if participation levels were to increase among older workers, they cannot compensate for the shortfall in less-educated workers. By 2025, the total number of low-qualified young workers (age 25–34) is expected to fall below 1 million. If there is not a correspondingly drastic decline in the demand for less-skilled workers, it will be increasingly difficult to fill these positions.

Many of these positions are in export-oriented manufacturing, which was the driver of economic growth in the decades through the 1990s. Manufacturing continues to be very important, comprising 15% of total employment. This runs counter to the decline in manufacturing employment seen in most other OECD countries in the past decade. The service sector has grown substantially and now accounts for 70% of employment. Other sectors, such as agriculture and construction, also offer many low-skilled jobs. With few young people aspiring to work in low-skilled jobs, the Republic of Korea faces a crunch.

2.3 Labor Migration to the Republic of Korea: A Short Historical Overview

The Republic of Korea was for many years a country of emigration, which was at high levels in the 1970s and 1980s, especially to North America; in addition, companies in the Republic of Korea contracted labor abroad and deployed local workers temporarily to developed countries. Migration into the Republic of Korea for employment only began in the late 1980s, when full employment in the country was reached. Labor shortages began to be felt in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), especially for the most taxing jobs in so-called “3D” (difficult, dirty, and dangerous) industries (Seol and Han 2004). The number of foreign nationals gradually increased, mainly due to growing inflows from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of PRC nationals and also ethnic Koreans—descendants of those who left in the early 20th century—and in the number of trainees entering from other Asian countries.


It was not until the mid-2000s that immigration flows exceeded the number of Koreans migrating overseas. Since 2005, net migration to the Republic of Korea has been positive. The increase in the foreign population between 2000 and 2015 was about 400%, by far the largest increase among OECD countries, from 0.5% of the population in 2000 to 2.3% in 2015.¹

This increase was concentrated in the active population—those of working age and in the labor force. The foreign population in the Republic of Korea, as a share of the active population age 15 and above, stood at 3.7% in 2016 (Figure 2.1, Panel A).


¹ This excludes temporary residents (those with permits for less than 90 days) and undocumented foreigners.

Figure 2.1: The Foreign Population in the Republic of Korea

Panel A: Foreign population in the Republic of Korea, 2004–2016, thousands, economically active and inactive population and as a share of total population, 2012–2016



Panel B: Foreign population resident in the Republic of Korea, 2016, by category



EPS = Employment Permit System.

Note: Economically active population aged 15 and above. Data from 2012 only. Total foreign population includes short-term stays and overstayers.

Sources: Panel A. Foreign Population, Korea Immigration Service. Economically active population: Foreigners Labour Force Survey, 2013–2016, Korean Statistical Information Service. Panel B. Korea Immigration Service.


In terms of nationality, in 2016 half of all foreigners in the Republic of Korea were Korean PRC nationals, that is, PRC-born ethnic Koreans who hold PRC nationality. Two categories composed almost entirely of Korean PRC nationals accounted for 43% of all foreigners in Republic of Korea: a Work-Visit (19%) and a long-term stay visa for overseas Koreans (24%). Temporary guestworkers comprised 18% of the residents. Permanent migrants—neither ethnic Republic of Korea nationals nor family members of Republic of Korea nationals—accounted for 8%, including family of other migrants and major investors. Skilled workers comprised about 3.2% of foreign residents, although some permanent migrants are skilled workers who have obtained long-term stays.

The share of foreigners employed in the Republic of Korea more than doubled over the past decade, increasing from 1.6% in 2005 to 3.6% in 2016. In relative terms, this was the largest increase in the foreign share of employment in any OECD country (Figure 2.2, Panel A). The Republic of Korea still has a lower share of immigrants in employment than in most OECD countries, however.


Focusing on the manufacturing industry, the increase in the foreign share of employment has been noteworthy across the OECD in recent years (Figure 2.2, Panel B). The share of foreign nationals employed in manufacturing in the Republic of Korea, close to 10%, is among the higher levels in the OECD.

Figure 2.2: The Share of Foreign Nationals in Total Employment

Panel A. Share of Foreign Nationals in Total Employment, 2005 and 2015 or latest year (%)



Panel B. Share of Foreign Nationals in Total Employment in Manufacturing, 2005 and 2015 or latest year (%)



Sources: Europe: Labor Force Survey (LFS) or German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); United States: Current Population Survey (CPS). For Japan, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare Survey of Employers, October 2016, and 2016 LFS. Republic of Korea, 2005 Korea Immigration Service Statistical Yearbook, Foreigners LFS and Economically Active Population Survey, May 2016. Israel, Population, Immigration and Border Authority figures for foreigners (including cross-border workers) and LFS for nationals, 2016.

2.4 The Evolution of Low-skilled Foreign Worker Programs in the Republic of Korea

The Republic of Korea's temporary foreign worker policy has never aimed to counteract or correct the negative demographic trend affecting the size of the working age population; rather, it is meant to address immediate and structural demand for labor in specific sectors. The provision of foreign workers to SMEs reflects a general policy in the Republic of Korea to promote the survival of small firms, rather than higher productivity (OECD 2016). The policy objectives for this program are to support immediate and structural labor needs in small firms, while limiting potential adverse fiscal and labor market impact on residents.

The first organized regulated system for low-skilled workers was created in 1991, as an industrial technical training program, the Overseas Investment Firm Industrial Trainee System (ITS). ITS was nominally for foreigners to work in Korean firms to acquire skills they could bring back to their home countries. It mirrored an Industrial Training visa introduced in Japan in the 1960s. As in Japan, however, it was used largely as a means to fill demand for low-skilled labor. ITS “trainees” in manufacturing increased sharply as firms started to use the program, and by 1997 there were about 90,000.

Trainees were not covered by labor laws and were particularly vulnerable to illegal employment practices. High fees imposed by middlemen in the recruitment process in origin countries meant that trainees were often indebted and under pressure to accept illegal employment practices and to violate their visa conditions. ITS visa-holders had a high rate of violation of visa conditions and overstay, and often worked in sectors for which they were not authorized.

The Republic of Korea decided in 2003 to phase out the program and introduce a temporary labor program without the guise of a trainee program. Non-professional employment visas under the EPS, the E-9 visas, began to be issued in 2005. The objective of EPS was, and remains, to address the labor shortage in low-skilled occupations in firms with certain characteristics (initially, sector and size, as well as level of demand), while maintaining the temporary status of workers and protecting their rights prior to, and during, the employment period.

The entire process of the EPS is funded by the government with almost no cost borne by employers. Employers of foreign workers pay only for the pre-employment training expenses.² While some private agencies assist companies with requesting foreign workers, expenses are not substantial. The government sees EPS as an important service to the targeted sectors and firms.

2.5 Low-skilled Labor Migration under the EPS

The EPS is now the largest temporary foreign worker program operating on a bilateral basis among OECD countries, and has become a reference for practices in this field.


The EPS, designed specifically to ease the labor shortage in SMEs while tackling the shortcomings of the previous systems, allows employers, in manufacturing, agriculture, livestock, fisheries, and construction, to request temporary foreign workers, who are selected, trained, and brought through a government-to-government bilateral program.

The EPS matches employers in the Republic of Korea with workers in origin countries. The selection process is shown in Figure 2.3. Candidates, aged 18 to 39, must pass a basic Korean language exam, the Test of Proficiency in Korean for EPS (EPS-TOPIK), developed specifically for the program. Those who pass are admitted to a pool for consideration by the home country agency, a public employment body, which reviews and authenticates their qualifications. After passing EPS-TOPIK, a medical exam is conducted.

² One-time training costs borne by employers are below US\$150 per worker. Amounts vary by industry: employers pay W195,000 in manufacturing, W210,000 in agriculture and fisheries, and W224,000 in construction.

The sending agency keeps the application in the pool for 1 year, sending information to Human Resource Development (HRD) Korea. HRD Korea translates the job applications and checks and approves the qualification of job applicants. HRD Korea and the Job Centre (the regional public employment service) manage the roster or list of potential candidates.

Figure 2.3: Simplified Flowchart of Candidate and Employer Steps in the Employment Permit System



EPS = Employment Permit System, HRD = Human Resources Development, MoJ = Ministry of Justice.
 Source: OECD Secretariat based on HRD Korea.

On the Republic of Korea side, HRD Korea and the Job Centre manage SMEs with a labor shortage who wish to hire foreign workers. To hire foreign workers, the enterprise must request and receive authorization, which is contingent on efforts made by companies to recruit resident workers; firms must have attempted to fill these positions locally before they are allowed to apply for EPS workers. The Job Centre ranks employers on several criteria and assigns employment permits to firms. For each permit, the Job Centre identifies and sends three possible candidates. The separate pools eliminate opportunities for rent taking in the recruitment procedure: no actor in the process can offer a guarantee to the candidate that selection will occur.

Employers choose workers from this list of candidates. A standard labor contract is written with the same recruitment conditions stated in the employment permit application form the employer submitted. The contract clarifies working conditions including wage, working hours, holidays, and workplace, etc. HRD Korea electronically transmits the contract to the sending agency in the origin country. Any discrepancies between the conditions initially offered and the final contract are resolved between the sending agency and HRD Korea. Workers are able to decline the contract if they wish. Those who accept receive additional training in the origin country prior to departure (38 hours of Korean language and 7 hours of culture). EPS workers arrive throughout the year, in small groups, and are met at the airport by HRD Korea. Once they arrive, they participate in three days of employment training sessions before employers pick up the workers and they start their new jobs.

The duration from the start of the employer application to the arrival of the worker is about four months; this means that the EPS cannot provide workers immediately. To avoid the wait, authorized employers can recruit from the pool of unemployed EPS workers already in the Republic of Korea.

Under the EPS scheme, migrant workers are guaranteed the same basic labor rights as Republic of Korea nationals, with the exception of job mobility, and are eligible for the same social insurance benefits and labor rights as domestic workers, although not the same health insurance scheme.

The EPS has evolved considerably since its inception to incorporate new developments in labor migration management policy and to react to program evaluation as well as changing profiles of local demand. Some of these features, which distinguish EPS from programs in other countries, are identified below.

EPS operates through bilateral agreements

Then EPS is based on bilateral agreements. The recruitment process for the E-9 visa starts with the Ministry of Employment and Labor signing Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with governments of sending countries. Since the EPS was launched, the government has signed MOUs with 16 partner countries (Table 2.1). The government bodies are directly involved and responsible for the selection and admission process of the foreign workers to guarantee transparency and fairness.

The largest supplier of workers to the Republic of Korea is Viet Nam, followed by Indonesia and Sri Lanka. In terms of the number of participants, in 2016, Viet Nam was the first, with 14.5% of all permit holders, followed by Cambodia (13.5%), Indonesia (11.5%), and Nepal (10.6%).

Table 2.1: Bilateral Agreements for Labor Migration under the Employment Permit System

Countries with which the Republic of Korea has bilateral agreements for labor migration under the EPS			
Country	Year of Agreement	Share of Total Present, 2016	Sending Agency
Indonesia	2004	11.5	National Board for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers
Mongolia	2004	3.5	The Labor and Social Welfare Service Office
Sri Lanka	2004	8.6	Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment
Thailand	2004	9.1	Department of Employment
Philippines	2004	9.4	Phillippine Overseas Employment Administration
Viet Nam	2004	14.5	Center for Overseas Labour
Cambodia	2006	13.5	Manpower Training and Overseas Sending Board
Pakistan	2006	1.4	Overseas Employment Corporation
Uzbekistan	2006	5.6	Agency for Foreign Labor Migration Affairs
Bangladesh	2007	3.7	Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Service Limited
PRC	2007	1.4	Investment Promotion Agency, Ministry of Commerce
Kyrgyz Republic	2007	0.4	Information Consulting Center
Myanmar	2007	7.1	Shwe Inn Wa Services Agency Co., Ltd.
Nepal	2007	10.6	Department of Labor Employment Promotion
Timor-Leste	2008	0.6	Overseas Employment Office
Lao PDR	2017	0	Employment Service Center

EPS = Employment Permit System, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: Ministry of Employment and Labour, Ministry of Justice, HRD Korea.


Wages are much higher in the Republic of Korea than in other destinations, and program integrity means that workers pay much lower fees for recruitment and are able to remit a larger share of their earnings.³ This makes EPS one of the most attractive programs for partner countries and workers. There is strong interest in origin countries to reach a bilateral agreement.

Annual quotas are imposed on workers by sector

New recruits admitted to the Republic of Korea are limited to the annual entry quotas, established by the Foreign Workforce Policy Committee (FWPC) under the Prime Minister's office. Every year, the FWPC sets a ceiling on the total number, industry of employment, and countries of origin. The FWPC examines demand from employers and considers the need to protect resident workers, as well as the overstay rate of foreign workers of sending countries; those with higher overstay rates may see their allocation reduced or even suspended. Manufacturing is the main sector receiving employment permits (Figure 2.4). Since 2015, the quota has kept a reserve of unassigned workers to address unexpected shifts in demand during the year. Demand has historically been higher than the quotas, so that some employer requests are not satisfied.

³ EPS workers remitted, on average, 63.5% of their earnings in 2010 and 69.1% in 2013. More than 90% of workers remit.

Figure 2.4: Annual Admission Quotas by Sector for Entry to the Republic of Korea under the Employment Permit System, 2004–2018



Note: Returning workers have been admitted since 2012 with sector assignment. “Flexible” workers may be allocated to sectors during the year depending on demand.

Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor.

EPS candidates must pass a basic language test

The EPS-TOPIK standardized test evaluates Korean language proficiency and understanding of the culture of the Republic of Korea. The TOPIK result is the basic threshold for eligibility for EPS. The local branches of HRD Korea in partner countries collaborate with public organizations (sending agencies) to conduct the examination. From 2007 to 2017, more than 1.7 million applicants took EPS-TOPIK in the sending countries, far more than were admitted to EPS. The pass rate has never exceeded 50%.

The Republic of Korea is unusual in requiring that candidates for temporary low-skilled labor migration submit to a language test; most OECD countries do not do so. Given that the employment period is for several years, and that workers will be placed in small firms where they will not be able to work without speaking Korean, the test is essential for the success of the program.

A points system is used for selecting EPS workers

In the first years of the EPS, selection on the basis of TOPIK scores and qualification on the basis of physical strength was considered sufficient. However, in the pool of TOPIK test participants, some candidates had specific and relevant experience in the fields for which they were applying—especially manufacturing and agriculture—but low scores disqualified them. A points system was introduced in 2014 to allow prior professional experience to be taken into account and compensate for poor TOPIK scores. In 2016, 90% of applicants took the additional skills test (Park and Kim 2016). As a result, the roster now includes candidates with lower Korean language skills, but with the specific experience or qualifications requested by employers. The EPS workers entering from 2017 are therefore better qualified than those who came under the pre-points system.

EPS creates a candidate pool from which some candidates are selected

EPS requires public bodies in origin countries to create a pool from which only some candidates will be selected. The sending agencies translate, check, and approve the job applications. The government bodies in the sending countries draw up a roster of applicants based on their profiles and EPS-TOPIK scores, providing more than twice as many candidates as the designated national quota. HRD Korea uses the roster to choose candidates based on their characteristics. No one in the sending country can predict who will be chosen by HRD Korea, and HRD Korea cannot predict who will be chosen by the employer. This reduces the value of inclusion in the roster and the likelihood that the sending agency can take rents. As a result, EPS represented a sharp decline in recruitment costs, which have generally fallen below \$1,000, excluding the time spent preparing for the EPS-TOPIK exam. Recruitment costs for workers under EPS are very low (Box 2.1).

Box 2.1: Recruitment Costs under the Employment Permit System

The Employment Permit System (EPS) was introduced in part to eliminate the high fees paid to intermediaries under other channels used by labor migrants to come to the Republic of Korea. For example, workers spent more than \$3,000 in recruitment fees alone to come under the ITS program that preceded EPS.^a A survey conducted in 2014 of 119 newly arrived workers under EPS from three countries (Indonesia, Thailand, and Viet Nam) identified the main costs they incurred: an average of \$1,385.^b The average cost of preparing for the language exam was about \$250. The necessary skills and medical tests under EPS cost less than \$100.

ITS = Industrial Trainee System.

^a K. B. Kyung, 2013. Effective Implementation of the Employment Permit System. Paper presented at the ILO/Korea Multi-Country Dialogue, 3–4 December 2013, Bangkok: International Labour Organization.

^b M. Abella and P. Martin. 2014. *Migration Costs of Low-skilled Labor Migrants: Key Findings from Pilot Surveys in Korea, Kuwait and Spain*. KNOMAD. <https://www.knomad.org/publication/migration-costs-low-skilled-labor-migrants-key-findings-pilot-surveys-korea-kuwait-and> (accessed 23 November 2017).

Applicants to EPS are mostly men, but employer selection leads to an even smaller share of women among those chosen by employers and admitted to the Republic of Korea. In 2013, 16.4% of those admitted to the roster were women. Fewer than 10% of those admitted were women in 2013, and in 2016, only 8.6% of the E-9 visa holders in 2016 were women.

A firm-level limit applies to employment of EPS workers. Businesses were originally limited to 20% of their workforce being comprised of EPS workers; this was raised to 30% for businesses with fewer than 10 employees, and a bonus EPS worker was allocated to firms with fewer than 50 employees in “root industries.”⁴ Small firms in particular are authorized to have high shares of EPS workers.

⁴ “Root industries” are SMEs in basic manufacturing industries, defined as using one of six process technologies (casting, die, welding, surface treatment, plastic processing, and heat treatment), under the Root Industry Law of 2012. Until 2014, the firm size was determinant of root industry firms. From 2015, annual sales volume is the criterion; firms with less than W150 billion (about \$135 million) in sales qualify.

Points-based system for employers

The number of work permits issued to employers annually is lower than the number requested. This is an incentive for employers to compete to meet program conditions and secure work permits. At first, employers were served in a first come, first served order, with employers physically queuing outside government offices.

In order to obtain employment permits, employers must submit vacancies to a labor market test. From 2012, they must also score points in a workforce allocation points-based system. Their points score determines how many employment permits they will receive. Under the points-based system, all applications are scored, and the top-ranking are issued permits until the quota is exhausted. Further, since permits are issued during the course of the year, employers with higher scores receive permits earlier, while those with lower scores may have to wait longer.

The points system comprises three elements: basic requirements, bonus points, and penalty points (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2: The Points System for Attributing EPS Workers to Employers, 2018

	Items included	Points
Basic Items (100 points total)	• the ratio of foreign workers employed to the number permitted	22.430
	• ratio of foreign workers whose re-employment contracts have expired/total number of foreign employees	22.430
	• the number of new foreign workers requested	1,920 points
	• the number of people (natives) hired from employment centers during the labor market test	1,420 points
Bonus Points	• full enrolment/payment of return cost insurance and accident insurance of all foreign employees	1
	• establishment and operation of quality dormitories ^a	3
	• employers' completion of training for workers ^a	2
	• no workplace accidents for 5 consecutive years	1
Penalties	• violated any law according to the enterprise guidance and inspection results of the previous year	-0.1 to -0.3
	• failure to pay for departure guarantee insurance on time	-0.5 to -2 per worker, up to 5
	• EPS workers have left due to: (non-cumulative)	
	▶ Sexual violence	-5
	▶ Verbal/physical abuse, sexual harassment	-3
	▶ violation of working conditions	-3
	• Death of a foreign worker in the previous two years	-2

EPS = Employment Permit System.

Note: ^a Points attributed for manufacturing sector are lower, 0.5 for housing and 0.2 for training. Points are attributed for 2 years maximum.

Source: Ministry of Employment and Labor.

The points-based system incorporates a number of limits that were already considered in the distribution of employment permits prior to 2012, such as the firm-level limit on employment of foreign workers. However, it adds several other considerations, such as hiring practices, and compliance with program regulations. This points-based system for work permits is an innovative incentive to increase compliance.

EPS workers and employers are supported and contacted during their stay in the Republic of Korea

Unlike most temporary foreign worker programs, EPS continues to monitor workers after arrival. Three months after arrival, there is a follow-up by telephone to check on the adaptation of the worker. Any issues that emerge in the workplace, such as conflicts or misunderstandings, are mediated by local HRD offices. In addition, training is available. Both workers and employers may request additional training during the workers' stay in the Republic of Korea, which is provided by the local HRD office. Only a small fraction of workers participate in the training. Workplace training provided by employers is partially reimbursed by HRD Korea.

To better serve foreign workers, the Ministry of Employment and Labour established nine regional Support Centers for Foreign Workers. These government-funded centers are operated by NGOs, and offer training courses compatible with the working hours of EPS workers, including Korean language classes and certification. They also organize cultural and sport activities, and, in some centers, a medical clinic. HRD Korea also maintains a call center that serves employers and operates offices around the Republic of Korea, as well as a pool of interpreters in all languages spoken by EPS workers.

EPS workers have limited mobility between employers

Job mobility is an important consideration in any temporary foreign worker program. “Binding contracts” or lack of mobility puts workers in a position of vulnerability relative to their employers. However, allowing temporary foreign workers unrestricted labor market access contradicts the justification for the program, which is designed to supply specific sectors, firms, and occupations with workers. EPS workers are bound to employment in the specific sector for which they were admitted. Job changes within that sector are conditional on employer approval, illegal employment practices by their employer, layoffs, or firm closure.

When first introduced, EPS allowed four grounds for job change:

- The employment contract is annulled (e.g., the worker arrives, but the firm no longer requires the worker) or ends (e.g., the contract was for 1 year)
- The business closes or shuts down temporarily
- The business loses its right to employ the foreign worker
- Workplace injury or disability

Employers with egregious violations of program regulations lose their EPS rights, allowing the workers to change jobs. Workers are also allowed to request a job change for another authorized EPS employer in the same sector, subject to the consent of their prior employer. Voluntary job changes, however, are discouraged; only those who stay with their employer are eligible to renew their visa for a second 58-month term of employment.

The limited voluntary job mobility, and the unrestricted mobility for workers in firms that fail or have their permit revoked, is an attempt to balance employers' needs and those of foreign workers. By giving an advantage to workers when they do not change jobs, and creating and improving the arbitration system in cases where job change is necessary, EPS aligns worker rights with program objectives. One effect of the restrictions is to suppress competition for EPS workers and prevent wage growth for these workers; their relative shortage has not led to any wage premium, and most earn minimum wage throughout their stay in the Republic of Korea.

EPS limits total stay to less than 10 years

The E-9 visa granted to EPS participants does not allow them to bring family members to the Republic of Korea, nor does it allow status change to residence permits, enabling an indefinite stay.

When first introduced, employment under EPS had a maximum duration of 3 years, followed by return to the worker's home country. This was extended to 4 years, 10 months when the first workers reached the end of their term in 2008; when the new limit was first reached in 2010, provisions were introduced to allow some workers to return for a second employment period after a return to their home country. A quota of "returning workers" is established each year for workers who have either been "diligent" (remained with their employer for the entire spell of employment) or have acquired a higher level of skill and Korean language ability.

EPS considers return to the home country

EPS is unusual in that it includes mechanisms to support successful return and reintegration in the home country at the end of employment in the Republic of Korea. HRD offers training in the home country after return. In 2014, about 8.5% of all EPS workers who went home participated in training following their return to the home country. HRD also puts ex-EPS workers in contact with Korean companies in the origin country seeking foremen and local staff managers for their operations in the country. These opportunities are a powerful incentive to return, since a quality job where their new skills can be used is valuable for workers. The opportunities are primarily available where Republic of Korea companies have a strong presence, such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Mongolia, and Viet Nam.

To ensure the quality of home-country, post-migration training, providers are paid in full only if at least 45% of participants find employment; this encourages good cooperation between training institutes and Republic of Korea companies.

HRD Korea also supports successful ex-EPS workers to serve as representatives in their home countries to speak with the local community, to encourage quality candidates, and to provide evidence that return can be positive. For this purpose, HRD Korea maintains a database on returned workers. It also issues work experience certificates to departing workers.

More generally, to promote compliance with the requirement to leave the Republic of Korea at the end of employment, HRD Korea contacts workers in the months leading up to the expiration of their work period, to check on their departure plans and provide administrative support for related procedures.

2.6 Open Questions for the Future of EPS

The Republic of Korea's temporary labor migration program faces several questions regarding the role it plays relative to structural changes in the sectors and firms where EPS workers are employed; the extent to which firms have become dependent on the program; and the way in which EPS can reconcile an increased level of skill—and demand for skill—with a framework designed for unskilled employment.

One of the key questions driving the program is whether the need for labor is structural or temporary. When demand is structural, and there is little complementarity with locally available labor, it is difficult to argue for a temporary migration program if workers are likely to be in demand and remain employable indefinitely. OECD recommendations have noted that temporary labor migration for permanent needs is a contradiction (OECD 2009). In the Republic of Korea, there is a clear current demand; demand exceeds supply of foreign workers. Whether it is truly structural is not evident, since it is also tied to the role of SMEs in export-oriented manufacturing.

The temporary labor program appears to be part of the dual market in the Republic of Korea. About 10% of firms respond to labor shortages by calling on foreign workers; this proportion has been consistent for more than a decade. The firms resorting to foreign workers offer low-quality employment; yet, due to the restrictions on importing foreign workers, they are unable to fill all the positions they otherwise would.

One question going forward is whether the program will remain for the low-skilled. The skill profile of EPS workers has increased over time, as selection criteria have become more detailed. EPS participants are also surprisingly well-educated, given that the program is for nonprofessional work. In 2013, an analysis showed that 20% of those selected and admitted to the Republic of Korea had tertiary level education, 60% at least secondary, and only 20% less than secondary. During their stay in the Republic of Korea, many workers acquire language and professional skills and increase their productivity. A mechanism is in place for the top workers who can demonstrate a higher skill level in their job and who receive a higher salary to apply for, and receive, an indefinitely renewable work permit. Aside from this restrictive channel, however, which has been used by a handful of workers, the program pursues an objective of providing a low-wage workforce for unattractive jobs in SMEs.

2.7 Conclusions

The success of a low-skill and low-wage temporary foreign worker program lies in ensuring that there is equal pay for equal work with resident workers. In turn, this requires the means to enforce wages and working hours, including contract conditions. Most low-wage temporary work programs are considered high-risk for abuse by unscrupulous employers, due to the vulnerability of the worker and the fact working conditions may also be poor for local workers. The EPS provides a framework for training and support and has put in place a number of safeguards.

The selection process has several mechanisms to screen candidates while safeguarding against rent-taking. Recruitment occurs through bilateral agreements and with employers offered a roster of potential candidates, reducing recruitment fees substantially. This is one of the major achievements of the EPS.

The EPS is designed to provide workers at a low wage level to specific types of firms in certain sectors of the economy. The EPS has been able to support firms that might otherwise move production to lower-cost foreign locations. This has come at the cost of constraining workers' bargaining power. Nonetheless, the program has safeguards to ensure that workers earn at least the minimum legal wage.

Since program design limits the possibility for EPS workers to use high demand to bargain for higher wages, the principal safeguard against a negative impact of the program on resident workers is the quota system, which applies to the industry as a whole, rather than individual firms. The EPS allows firms, in principle, to be entirely dependent on migrant workers for their non-professional labor needs.

An additional challenge for such programs is to ensure that workers leave at the end of their stay. EPS has been largely successful in achieving temporary stays.

The EPS has introduced a number of new mechanisms to meet its objectives: it ranks candidates, providing an incentive for them to invest in specific language and skills relevant to the Republic of Korea labor market; it also ranks employers, providing incentives to improve working conditions and compliance with program regulations. The EPS also incorporates best practices for management. It provides ongoing support and builds return into the program so that participating workers are not abandoned during their stay, and so that return to the home country can be productive. Among OECD countries, it is the most closely managed temporary foreign worker program, and can provide useful insights for other countries.

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Portability of Social Security for Migrant Workers in Asia^{*1}

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3.1 Introduction

Asia has made significant progress with extending social security to migrant workers, including the development of portability arrangements. This contribution explores these themes from the perspective of relevant international and regional instruments and their embedded standards. It further discusses the need to overcome challenges faced by migrant workers with regard to their access to social security, and highlights key developments that have taken place in Asia from the perspective of unilateral measures introduced by countries of origin, and the adoption of portability arrangements and conclusion of bilateral social security agreements (BSAs) by five Asian countries, i.e., the People's Republic of China (PRC), India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines. This is followed by perspectives on multilateral social security agreements (MSAs) and their challenges. The conclusion emphasizes harnessing the developing and, at times, rich experience of Asian subregions and countries to achieve further progress regarding extension of social security for migrant workers. This includes the development of a dedicated instrument, at both Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) levels, and for Asia more generally; increased conclusion of BSAs between Asian countries; and the incremental development of MSAs.

3.2 International and Regional Frameworks

In this section, emphasis is placed on key international and regional (ASEAN; SAARC) instruments and standards regarding social security for migrant workers. International standards and regional developments in relation to MSAs and BSAs, and related portability arrangements, as well as the introduction of unilateral measures by countries of origin, are discussed in Section 3.4.

3.2.1 ILO and UN Standards

Several UN and International Labour Organization (ILO) instruments contain key standards relating to the social security of migrant workers. These include the following:²

- ILO Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97)

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¹ Parts of this contribution rely on information contained in a report prepared by the author for the International Labour Organization, with citation as follows: M. Olivier. *Social Protection for Migrant Workers in ASEAN: Developments, Challenges, and Prospects* (ILO 2018).

² The first three emphasize migrant workers' rights, and the last three focus on promoting equal treatment of migrants.

- ILO Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143)
- UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, 1990
- ILO Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention, 1925 (No. 19)
- ILO Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118)
- ILO Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 1982 (No. 157)

Other instruments that are also relevant include ILO Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189), given the large numbers of migrant workers who are working as domestic workers.³ Also, ILO Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181) requires that migrant workers recruited via private employment agencies should enjoy adequate statutory social security benefits (Articles 11 and 12).

Core principles emanating from these standards can be summarized as follows:

- International standards do not distinguish between workers based on nationality: “[A]ll current ILO social security standards define the personal scope of coverage irrespective of nationality and almost all contain similar clauses on equality of treatment between nationals and foreign workers in the host country, and most of them contain special non-discrimination clauses, such as, for example, Convention [No.] 102 of 1952” (Baruah and Cholewinski 2006). This is informed by considerations of migrants’ humanity and vulnerability, and a human rights approach (OHCHR 2012, Weissbrodt 2004, UN Migrant Workers Convention, Article 27). In relation to contributory schemes, Article 68(1) of ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952 (No. 102) stipulates: “Non-national residents shall have the same rights as national residents: Provided that special rules concerning non-nationals and nationals born outside the territory of the Member may be prescribed in respect of benefits or portions of benefits which are payable wholly or mainly out of public funds and in respect of transitional schemes.”
- In fact, the extension of equal treatment is no longer dependent on reciprocity. For example, the ILO Recommendation concerning National Floors of Social Protection, 2012 (No. 202) suggests the extension, in principle, of a national social protection floor to “all residents”.
- Migrant workers (including the undocumented) and members of their families shall have the right to receive any medical care that is urgently required for the preservation of their life or the avoidance of irreparable harm to their health on the basis of equality of treatment with nationals of the State concerned (UN Migrant Workers Convention, Article 28). It has been remarked: “Entering a country in violation of its immigration laws does not deprive migrants of the fundamental human rights provided by human rights instruments...nor does it affect the obligation of States to protect migrants in an irregular situation” (ILO 2006, paras 9–10).

It needs to be mentioned that certain categories of migrant workers in particular are affected by the absence of clear international and even regional standards, in two distinct areas. The first relates to migrant workers covered by free trade and trade in services agreements, while the second refers to the increasingly widespread provision of unilateral social protection by Asian countries of origin to their

³ Article 14 of the Convention requires that domestic workers should enjoy conditions that are not less favorable than those applicable to workers generally, including with respect to maternity.

migrant workers abroad. The second area is discussed in Section 3.4. Regarding the first area, portability implications flowing from labor migration are fraught with complexity, when one bears in mind the emphasis placed on and likely operation of the most-favored nation and national treatment principles embedded in the World Trade Organization's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)⁴ and in Asian (including ASEAN- and SAARC-specific) trade-in-services instruments—effectively reflecting the GATS rules. One of the applicable rules contained in these agreements is the *most-favored nation* rule, which requires affected Member States to grant equal treatment to services and service suppliers of different Member States. Furthermore, one of the obligations imposed on Member States is the *national treatment* principle: Member States must accord to services and service suppliers treatment no less favorable than they accord to their own services and service suppliers.

From a GATS perspective, problems may be experienced if a country's BSAs contain different provisions for different Member States, for example, in providing for the exportability of social security payments to select countries of origin. On the other hand, operation of the national treatment obligation may be of assistance to a temporary migrant worker who contributes to the social security system of a host country; that is, the migrant worker may be entitled to equal treatment with nationals of the host country.⁵

3.2.2 Regional Framework

The ASEAN Charter envisaged enhanced regional cooperation and economic integration. Among the purposes of ASEAN is the creation of a single market and production base that would include facilitated movement of business persons, professionals, talents, and labor, as well as enhancing the well-being and livelihood of the peoples in the region through equitable access to opportunities for human development, social welfare, and justice (ASEAN 2008). However, several subsequent ASEAN instruments restrict intra-ASEAN movement for this purpose to business persons, skilled labor, and talent, thereby excluding most intra-ASEAN migrant workers, in particular *unskilled and semi-skilled migrant workers* (ASEAN 2015b, 2015c, 2015d) and their earlier counterparts of 2009.

The ASEAN Community Vision 2025 emphasizes respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of specified groups in need of protection, including migrant workers (ASEAN 2015a). In addition, the various ASEAN Community Blueprints, as well as the ASEAN Declaration on Strengthening Social Protection and its associated Regional Framework and Plan of Action, stress the extension of social security coverage and access to vulnerable groups, including migrant workers (ASEAN 2013, 2016e).

In turn, the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (the Cebu Declaration) (ASEAN 2007) and the ASEAN Consensus on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (the Consensus) (ASEAN 2017) call on Member States to promote the full potential and dignity of migrant workers, and place certain obligations in this respect on receiving and sending States. The Cebu Declaration and the Consensus respect the fundamental rights of migrant workers and their families residing in countries of destination, preserve the legitimate concerns of countries of origin and destination, and recognize the obligations imposed on sending and receiving States. Some progress in

⁴ GATS is a multilateral negotiated agreement, which aims to liberalize trade in services under conditions of transparency and progressive liberalization.

⁵ Supply of a service at the points of production, distribution, marketing, sale, and delivery, per GATS, article XXVIII. For more information, see Yeates (2005).

the area of social protection has been made, embedded in the operational activities of mandated ASEAN institutional frameworks, in particular the Committee on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (ACMW) (ASEAN 2016b).

ASEAN activities also enhance social protection, including in relation to migrant workers. Expanded social protection has been highlighted as a key result area of the ASEAN Labour Ministers' Work Programme 2016–2020 (ASEAN 2016a), and the ACMW Work Plan 2016–2020 includes projects and activities to promote the social protection of migrant workers. Further support stems from the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (ASEAN 2016b). It is clear, however, that a need still exists for a dedicated standard-setting instrument that will provide a framework for the social protection of migrant workers in ASEAN.

The 18th SAARC Summit Kathmandu Declaration resolved in 2014 to collaborate and cooperate on safe, orderly, and responsible management of labor migration from South Asia, to ensure the safety, security and wellbeing of migrant workers in their destination countries.⁶ Also, the draft SAARC Declaration on Labour Migration emphasizes in its preamble the need to work together for better management of regional labor migration, including protection and welfare of migrant workers in the SAARC region. One of the key commitments contained in the draft Declaration includes improvement of justice mechanisms, support services, welfare and protection (Bhusal 2018). In addition, the draft Social Protection Action Plan for SAARC States (Government of Nepal 2017) foresees as one of its outcome areas migrant workers from (and within) SAARC States being guaranteed non-discriminatory, comprehensive social protection coverage.

Apart from emphasizing the bilateral and multilateral agreements, portability measures, and unilateral arrangements by countries of origin (see Section 3.4), the draft Declaration urges SAARC States to:

- (i) Ratify and apply relevant ILO Conventions and Recommendations, notably in relation to equality of treatment;
- (ii) (Destination countries) ensure that equality of treatment is provided to non-nationals as regards social security coverage;
- (iii) Establish national social protection floors to ensure basic social security also to migrants and their families; and
- (iv) Ensure safe migration for working women and men within and beyond South Asia through a range of measures.

Finally, the Declaration also foresees as a further outcome an agreement to move toward rights based social protection floors.

3.2.3 Ratification and Implementation of ILO and UN Standards and Application

As shown in Table 3.1, Asian countries, with some exceptions, have been slow to adopt UN and ILO instruments that support social security protection for migrant workers. Also, the norms and standards embedded in these instruments are unevenly implemented.

⁶ ILO welcomes landmark SAARC labor migration commitments (accessible from the list of linked documents in Reference E).

Table 3.1: Ratification of Selected ILO Instruments by Asian Countries

	International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 1990	Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97)	Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143)	Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention, 1925 (No. 19)	Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181)	Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189)
Instrument	Legal binding	Legal binding	Legal binding	Legal binding	Legal binding	Legal binding
Country						
Afghanistan						
Bangladesh	Ratified in Force			Ratified in Force		
Brunei Darussalam						
Cambodia	Signatory					
PRC				Ratified in Force		
India				Ratified in Force		
Indonesia	Ratified in Force			Ratified in Force		
Iran				Ratified in Force		
Japan				Ratified in Force	Ratified in Force	
Republic of Korea					Ratified in Force	
Lao PDR						
Malaysia (Peninsula + Sabah + Sarawak)				Ratified in Force		
Maldives						
Mongolia					Ratified in Force	
Myanmar				Ratified in Force		
Nepal						
Pakistan				Ratified in Force		
Philippines	Ratified in Force	Ratified in Force	Ratified in Force	Ratified in Force	Ratified in Force	Ratified in Force
Singapore				Ratified in Force		
Sri Lanka	Ratified in Force					
Thailand				Ratified in Force		
Viet Nam						

ILO = International Labour Organization, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: Blank cells indicate Not Ratified or Signed Yet.

Source: ILO NORMLEX – Information System on International Labour Standards (2018). (Accessible from the list of linked documents in Reference B. Legal instruments excluding bilateral social security/other bilateral agreements).

Twelve Asian countries (including six ASEAN Member States—Indonesia, Malaysia,⁷ Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand; and three SAARC Member States—Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan) have ratified the ILO Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention, 1925 (No. 19), which provides occupational injury protection for non-national workers.⁸ Two related matters need to be raised:

- Although these countries are bound to comply with the provisions contained in Convention No. 19, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has been regularly reporting that this has not been the case for certain countries, e.g., Thailand and Malaysia. In response to the Committee's reports, Thailand has given excluded migrant worker categories increased access to certain social security benefits.
- The ratification by a sizeable number of countries also supports inclusion of occupational injury protection in bilateral agreements concluded between these countries. Also, it provides a starting point for a multilateral arrangement for ASEAN and SAARC respectively.

3.3 Challenges

Migrant workers face significant challenges regarding their access to social security generally and the portability of social security benefits specifically. The following conclusion reached by Tamagno (2008) succinctly summarizes the key challenges—not only in ASEAN but in Asia generally:

In the majority of the world's countries, including many ASEAN members, the legislative barriers limiting migrant workers' access to social security benefits are compounded by the fact that social security systems cover only part of the labour force. Moreover, in some countries, migrant workers are often employed in sectors of the labour market that either are not covered by social security or in which compliance with social security laws is poorly enforced. Even when migrant workers are employed in covered sectors and social security laws are enforced, irregular migrant workers are usually disqualified from social security benefits due to the fact that they are undocumented (Tamagno 2008, 1-2).

Migrant workers in Asia are exposed to *legal* barriers, causing them to be excluded from accessing social security. This could potentially be as a result of their specific *immigration* status (e.g., they may be undocumented migrant workers), which makes them ineligible for accessing benefits. In some Asian countries (e.g., Brunei Darussalam and Singapore), as a rule, only permanent residents have access to most forms of contributory social security. Alternatively, a *social security law* might specifically exclude migrant workers generally or exclude specific categories of migrant workers, and/or their family members. Non-contributory forms of social security support are typically restricted to citizens. Migrant workers are therefore often subject to nationality restrictions, and they may have to comply with residency requirements before certain social security benefits can be accessed. Furthermore, access to long-term benefits such as pensions usually requires a rather long period of contributions, which effectively disqualifies many migrant workers.

⁷ Convention No. 19 has been ratified only by Peninsular Malaysia and the State of Sarawak, while the Malaysian State of Sabah has instead ratified the Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), which overlaps with Convention No. 19.

⁸ This Convention has interim status and is currently open for denunciation.

Also, with some notable exceptions (see the discussion in Section 3.4.2.2), the absence of BSAs between Asian countries adds to the legal exclusion of Asian migrant workers. Such agreements invariably provide for equality of treatment of nationals and non-nationals regarding social security benefits. In addition, they generally provide for portability of benefits and other social security coordination principles.

There are also challenges related to the *labor market status* of migrant workers. In some Asian countries, coverage is denied to all workers, including national workers, in a specified work category. An example would be domestic workers in Indonesia. In addition, informal workers often fall outside the scope of social security laws. This is particularly problematic in developing Asian countries, including many ASEAN countries, given that 60% of intra-ASEAN migrants work informally.

Other shortcomings include challenges related to *administrative practice, immigration policy, and language barriers and related obstacles*. Often, a passport or nationality registration document is required by authorities, which not all migrant workers have. Migrant workers, if they are eligible for social security membership, may also be required to be registered and paid-up members before they are entitled to draw benefits. Furthermore, restrictions may be imposed on the ability of migrant workers to change employers—an existing practice in some Asian countries and in several destination countries, especially in the Gulf States. Closely related to this is the broader issue that migrant workers whose employment contracts have come to an end are often obliged to leave the destination country. The result is that these workers invariably fail to access social security benefits because of time constraints, even in instances where they may otherwise be entitled to them. This highlights the need to better align immigration law and policy with social security protection.

In some countries with available retirement provident fund schemes (e.g., Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore), migrant workers may be eligible to make lump-sum withdrawals of accrued pension contributions upon departure from the country (Ong and Peyron Bista 2015:21). It needs to be pointed out that this provides for limited protection because it does not ensure regular pension payments.

Some countries provide voluntary coverage schemes. In Malaysia, for example, migrant workers can opt in to the Employees Provident Fund, in which case, both employee and employer will be liable to make monthly contributions from then on (Ong and Peyron Bista 2015). Of course, voluntary coverage is necessarily incomplete—in the absence of compulsion, workers, including migrant workers, are unlikely to contribute due to financial considerations. Also, in some Asian countries, separate but less beneficial schemes have been established for migrant workers, increasingly a tendency in some ASEAN countries. This may be the case despite these countries having ratified the ILO Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention, 1925 (No. 19), or other similarly focused international instruments, which require equal treatment of national and foreign workers. Finally, although equality of treatment may be formally recognized as policy, in reality, many migrant workers are often not insured for occupational injuries and diseases, among others. This may be due to their undocumented status, non-compliance by employers, migrants' lack of awareness of their rights, language barriers, onerous administrative procedures, and other factors (Ong and Peyron Bista 2015).

Exacerbating this is the inadequate regulation of: (a) exit arrangements (including regulation of private recruitment agencies); (b) protection while abroad; and (c) arrangements for returning migrants. Also, bilateral labor agreements and memoranda of understanding make limited provision for employment protection while largely ignoring the social security plight of migrant workers (Wickramasekara 2015; Van Panhuys et al. 2017).

Migrant workers are doubly disadvantaged because they receive less social protection both at home and in the host country. In destination countries, they are often excluded from tax-financed schemes, such as social assistance programs or social pension schemes, despite contributing to the host economy through work, consumption, and taxation (Ong and Peyron Bista 2015:51–52). Recognizing these issues, several Asian countries have moved to compensate for this shortfall among their often large labor populations working abroad. Still, most migrant workers “do not have the option of enrolling in their own national social security systems or that of the host country, or they cannot transfer the accrued contributions or entitlements between social security systems (see also the Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 1982 [No. 157])” (Ong and Peyron Bista 2015:53).

3.4 Key Developments in Asia

In addition to those depicted above, two developments are highlighted here: Asian countries’ introduction of unilateral measures to extend protection to their own migrant workers, and the conclusion of BSAs, in particular by the PRC, India, Japan, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea, and the adoption of portability arrangements.

3.4.1 Unilateral Measures Introduced by Asian Countries of Origin⁹

The unilateral extension of social security and supporting measures by countries of origin is a growing reality in Asia, given the weak protection generally available to migrant workers in many countries of destination.

These unilateral extensions take two main forms:

- (a) The adoption of constitutional guarantees and statutory frameworks, for example, the 1979 Emigration Ordinance and the 1979 Emigration Rules of Pakistan; the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines; the 2013 Constitution of Viet Nam; the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act, 1995; the more recent Filipino Overseas Workers Welfare Administration Act, 2015;¹⁰ and the 2006 Law on Vietnamese Contract-based Workers Abroad.
- (b) Establishing special overseas workers’ welfare funds by national and even (as in the case of India) state governments that extend protection to workers and (at times) also their families (as in the case of India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Viet Nam). Examples include:
 - Philippines: Establishment of the Social Security System Programme to Overseas Migrant Workers, based on voluntary membership, and the supplementary Flexi-Fund Programme providing for individual worker accounts.¹¹

⁹ For further details, see Olivier (2017). In relation to Pakistan, see Government of Pakistan (2018).

¹⁰ Section 2 of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration Act of 2015 stipulates: “It is the policy of the State to afford full protection to labour, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment opportunities for all. Towards this end, it shall be the State’s responsibility to protect the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs).”

¹¹ See Olivier (2018) (par 5.2.7) for further details.

- Sri Lanka: The Overseas Workers Welfare Fund offers a compulsory insurance scheme, coverage of the cost of repatriation of migrant workers, scholarships for children, and loan schemes with partner banks to cover migrants' pre-departure costs and start-up of self-employment schemes. The Fund also supports returnees who have been rendered disabled while being employed overseas.¹²
- (c) Voluntary affiliation in national social insurance schemes; for example, those of the Philippines and the Republic of Korea.
- (d) Measures and schemes aimed at supporting the flow of remittances and social insurance contributions to the sending country.
- (e) Exportability of social security benefits and the provision of related services (e.g., medical care) abroad.

International standards and instruments do not regulate this particular phenomenon.¹³ At the regional level, the Cebu Declaration encourages countries of origin to protect their workers when abroad. In the event of SAARC, the draft Social Protection Action Plan encourages the countries of origin to provide basic protection to their nationals working abroad through voluntary insurance, pay benefits abroad, and ensure safe migration through joint efforts of embassies and diplomatic units of SAARC States and a range of support services (Government of Nepal 2017).

Unilateral measures, important as they are, cannot replace those in the destination countries that provide equal treatment to migrant workers and ensure the transfer of benefits.

3.4.2 Adoption of Portability Arrangements and the Conclusion of Bilateral Social Security Agreements

3.4.2.1 Global and Regional Frameworks

BSAs streamline the social security position of a worker who migrates to another country, and are usually based on the following principles:

- the choice of law principle, identifying the applicable legal system;
- equal treatment (in the sense that discrimination based on nationality is prohibited);
- aggregation/totalization of insurance periods (in that all periods taken into account by the various national laws are aggregated for the purposes of acquiring and maintaining an entitlement to benefits, and of calculating such benefits);
- maintenance of acquired benefits (benefits built up by the person are retained);

¹² Sri Lanka Overseas Workers Welfare Fund (accessible from the list of linked documents in Reference E).

¹³ Yet, the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration provides a comprehensive overview of principles and guidelines as to how labor protection for such migrant workers can be improved (ILO 2006).

- payment of benefits, irrespective of the country in which the beneficiary resides (the “portability” principle);
- administrative cooperation (between the social security institutions of the parties to the agreement); and
- sharing of liability to pay for the benefit (i.e., *pro rata* liability of the respective institutions).

Portability must be distinguished from exportability, however. Exportability requires no such cooperation, as the social security institution (supported by the legal framework) of one country alone determines eligibility and the level of benefit, and whether it is payable (i.e., exportable) to other countries (Sabates-Wheeler and Koettl 2010).

BSAs constitute universal worldwide best practice, especially if supported by an overarching multilateral agreement. Together with MSAs, BSAs are the core global intervention for extending social security protection to migrant workers. The first BSA was concluded in 1904; today, there are more than 2,000 worldwide (Sabates-Wheeler and Koettl 2010).¹⁴ In the absence of an agreement, a person may not be covered under the social security system of either the host country or country of origin—or may be doubly covered. Coordination arrangements help to resolve this problem. Also, targeted, country-specific, cross-border bilateral agreements between states have the advantage of incorporating regulations and standards that pertain specifically to the unique migratory patterns that may exist between them, as well as catering to their respective national social security schemes and associated legal systems. Furthermore, the establishment and enhancement of an appropriate array of bilateral arrangements is particularly significant given the extended length of time necessary to develop comprehensive multilateral agreements.

BSAs are strongly promoted in *international* instruments. The first global Convention, which calls upon countries to enter into BSAs, is an ILO Convention widely ratified by Asian countries, i.e., ILO Equality of Treatment (Accident Compensation) Convention, 1925 (No. 19).¹⁵ ILO Equality of Treatment (Social Security) Convention, 1962 (No. 118) covers the equality of treatment and portability of benefits principles indicated above, while ILO Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 1982 (No. 157) provides for totalization of insurance periods and the pro-rated sharing of benefit payments by the countries concerned, based on the ratio of insurance periods. Of particular importance—and assistance—are the ILO model provisions for the conclusion of social security agreements, contained in the relevant annexes to the ILO Maintenance of Social Security Rights Recommendation, 1983 (No. 167).

From a *regional* perspective, the Cebu Declaration (ASEAN 2007) calls for “efforts to promote the welfare of migrant workers” and for States to “facilitate access to ... social welfare services as appropriate and in accordance with the legislation of the receiving state, provided that they fulfil the requirements under applicable laws, regulations and policies of the said state, bilateral agreements and multilateral treaties” as applied to sending countries. The Consensus (ASEAN, 2017) in turn encourages the sharing of best practices including those from the existing bilateral engagements between ASEAN Member States.

¹⁴ See Holzmann, Koettl, and Chernetsky (2005, p. 32), who remark: “The administrative approach to achieve the portability for both pension and health care benefits seems to be reasonable cost-effective after a bilateral or multilateral agreement has been successfully concluded.”

¹⁵ Article 2. See also Article 4(1) of ILO Maintenance of Social Security Rights Convention, 1982 (No. 157) and 2011, Resolution 33(g), para. 35(d).

As regards SAARC, the draft Social Protection Action Plan for SAARC States (Government of Nepal 2017) foresees migrant workers from (and within) SAARC States having non-discriminatory coverage. Emphasis is placed on the conclusion of BSAs between home countries of migrant workers and receiving countries, as well as the initiation of MSAs.

3.4.2.2 Asian Country Experiences

As mentioned above (Section 3.3), bilateral labor agreements make insufficient provision for welfare/social security protection; hence, the need for dedicated BSAs. There is a growing number of BSAs concluded by Asian countries regionally and indeed with many countries in other parts of the world. Yet, such agreements between member countries of Asian sub-regions are still largely absent. In particular, most of the BSAs involving ASEAN Member States have been concluded externally. To date, no BSA has been concluded between any two ASEAN countries, although some countries, such as the Philippines and Thailand, are currently considering them. Similarly, no BSA has to date been concluded between any two SAARC Member States, although India and Sri Lanka are negotiating one (Government of India 2017).

The dramatic recent increase in the number of BSAs concluded by the PRC, India, Japan, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea, and often confirmed by concomitant domestic regulation, is one of the most profound developments in extending protection to Asian migrant workers abroad. The evidence from these five countries speaks for itself (bilateral arrangements appear in chronological order, unless otherwise indicated; where available, the country, and effective date/date in force and/or date signed, have been indicated; BSAs with other Asian countries are indicated in bold):

- **PRC (Gautel 2018; Ecovis 2017)** (7 in force; 2 signed): *In force* – Germany (2002), the **Republic of Korea** (2013), Denmark (2014), Canada (2017), Finland (2017), Switzerland (2017), the Netherlands (2017), France (2018). *Signed* – Serbia, Spain.
- **India (Government of India 2017)** (17 in force; 2 signed; others being negotiated/considered): *In force* – Belgium (2009), Germany (2009), Switzerland (2011), Denmark (2011), Luxembourg (2011), France (2011), the **Republic of Korea (2011)**, the Netherlands (2011), Hungary (2013), Finland (2014), Sweden (2014), the Czech Republic (2014), Norway (2015), Austria (2015), Canada (2015), Australia (2016), **Japan (2016)**, Portugal. *Signed* – Portugal, Quebec; *Being negotiated* – **Sri Lanka**, Brazil; *Being considered* – the **PRC**, the Russian Federation, South Africa, **Thailand**, Mexico, Peru, Cyprus.¹⁶ A limited bilateral social security arrangement (amounting to elimination of dual coverage) is included in India's bilateral comprehensive economic agreement (CECA) with **Singapore** (2008) (PWC 2017).
- **Japan (Japan Pension Service 2018)** (18 in force; 3 signed): *In force* – Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic (under preparation for amendment) France, Germany, the Netherlands, the **Republic of Korea**, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, Spain, Ireland, Brazil, Switzerland, Hungary, **India**, Luxembourg, the **Philippines**; *Signed* – Italy, the Slovak Republic, the **PRC**.¹⁷
- **Republic of Korea (Republic of Korea 2018; Korea National Pension Scheme 2018; Tiwari, Ghei, and Goel 2017)** (35 in force; 3 signed) (**limited information available**): Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, the **PRC**, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,

¹⁶ BSAs with the UK and the US respectively have not yet materialized.

¹⁷ BSAs with the UK, the Republic of Korea, Italy, and the PRC concern “elimination of dual coverage” only (see the discussion below).

India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Quebec, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. A BSA with New Zealand is expected to be signed in 2018.

- **Philippines (See 2018)** (13 in force; 2 signed; others being considered): *In force* – Austria (1982), the UK and Northern Ireland (1989), Spain (1989), France (1994), Canada (1997), Quebec (1998), the Netherlands (administrative BSA, 2001), Switzerland (2004), Belgium (2005), Denmark (2015), Portugal (2017), Germany (2018), **Japan (2018)**. *Signed* – Sweden (2015), Luxembourg (2015); apparently a BSA with the **Republic of Korea** is being considered.

Therefore, from the available information, it appears that these five Asian countries have already signed and/or implemented an impressive total of 102 BSAs.¹⁸ However, significant scope exists to conclude such agreements with other Asian countries, particularly in view of the considerable intraregional labor migration flows.

Asian BSAs are effectively part of a twofold strategy to protect migrant workers, the other part being the adoption/utilization of country-of-origin schemes and measures to extend social security protection (i.e., unilateral measures, discussed in Section 3.4.1) (See 2018).

Of course, extending protection to Asian migrant workers abroad is not the only objective of these agreements. Essentially, they enhance and facilitate labor migration, as they remove critical obstacles: the payment of double contributions (i.e., to the social security systems of both the country of origin and the country of destination) is avoided; periods of contributions or residence are aggregated to ensure access to benefits (the principle of totalization); and benefits are paid irrespective of whether the beneficiary resides in the country of origin or destination or, for that matter, in a third country. In addition, they have a major impact on employer payroll expenses and the considerable financial outlay migrant workers may incur in terms of contributing to the social security systems of host countries. For example, the contribution rates in certain European countries were 41.77% in Poland, 36.25% in Bulgaria, and 48.6% in Slovakia in 2010 (Republic of Korea 2010). Also, Asian BSAs serve the purpose of economic development and of strengthening bilateral trade and long-term economic ties. Almost without exception, the duration of the BSAs is indicated as indefinite, terminable only upon notice by one of the contracting parties. From a regional perspective, Asian BSAs support regional integration.

Asian BSAs mirror international best practices and clearly reflect international standards and universally accepted social security coordination principles, as described in Section 3.4.2.1. Salient features of these agreements include the following:

Asian BSAs guarantee equal treatment, with respect to an often extensive range of benefits covered by the agreements and accommodating identified categories of beneficiaries: The rule adopted in this regard is that those covered by the BSA are entitled to equal treatment under the agreement; in other words, *discrimination* on the basis of nationality, or on another basis, is not allowed. This is, of course, subject to the provisions of the BSA itself, which may contain special provisions in relation to access to certain benefits or, frequently, restrict the *range of benefits* covered by the (material) scope of the agreement. This is particularly true of the provisions in relation to the portability of benefits and the totalization of insurable/

¹⁸ A total of 103, if the CECA-included bilateral social security arrangement between India and Singapore is taken into account.

creditable periods completed in both countries—in these cases, almost all the Asian BSAs are restricted to long-term benefits: old age, disability, and survivors' benefits. Otherwise, Asian BSAs often extend equality of treatment to large parts of their social security systems and, at times, even the whole of their systems for employed workers.¹⁹

The *personal scope* of Asian BSAs are usually formulated in such a way as to include a *wide range of beneficiaries*. Typically, the BSAs cover all persons, or at times, all nationals, who have been subject to the legislation of either of the Contracting States, and other persons who derive rights from such persons—often, but not always, dependent spouses and children. Where nationals are indicated, the scope is sometimes extended to also include permanent residents (see the Japan–Switzerland and the draft Republic of Korea–New Zealand BSAs), or even those who have satisfied a minimum period of residence (e.g., the Republic of Korea–Australia BSA). Sometimes, refugees and stateless persons are specifically included, as is the case with, for example, the Republic of Korea–Belgium, Republic of Korea–Denmark, Philippines–Belgium, and India–Austria BSAs. The India–Austria BSA extends the personal scope of coverage to also include nationals of the European Union. Often, but not always, *self-employed persons* may be included under the scope of an Asian BSA.²⁰

Specific provisions may be made for the *extension* of the range of beneficiaries and/or benefits. Asian BSAs often provide for *new beneficiary groups* identified in the legislation of a contracting party to be automatically included in the scope of the BSA,²¹ although this possibility may be explicitly excluded (as is the case in, among others, the Republic of Korea–Australia BSA). However, it is rare for this extension to be made applicable to *new benefit categories* (although this is provided for in the India–Canada and Republic of Korea–Denmark BSAs), and Asian BSAs usually require modification to the BSAs to address this issue.

Asian BSAs invariably provide for elimination of dual coverage, specify the legal regime applicable to different categories of workers/beneficiaries, and make special provision for posted/detached and other worker categories: All Asian BSAs mentioned in this contribution provide for this important form of protection. In fact, certain BSAs restrict themselves to regulating this matter only, and do not provide for totalization or even portability of benefits. Examples of this more restrictive approach are the BSAs concluded by the PRC (e.g., with Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland), as well as certain of those concluded by India (e.g., with the Netherlands, and Switzerland, and the bilateral arrangement contained in the comprehensive economic agreement with **Singapore**), by Japan (with **the PRC**, Italy, the **Republic of Korea**, and the UK) and by the Republic of Korea (e.g., with Chile, the **PRC**, **Iran**, Italy, **Japan**, **Mongolia**, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the UK, and Uzbekistan).²²

Also, the avoidance of dualization provisions may apply to a *wide or a narrow range of social security benefits*. Again, in the case of the PRC, the schemes/benefits so covered are restricted to long-term benefits and (with the exception of the BSAs with Canada and Denmark) unemployment benefits. Whereas previously this exemption was also extended to PRC health insurance benefits, this is seemingly no longer the case; expatriates in the PRC invariably must contribute to the PRC health insurance system. Thus, the position

¹⁹ At times, provision is made for indexation of benefits—see the India–Finland BSA.

²⁰ See, among others, Japan's BSAs with Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, and the UK; India's BSAs with Canada, Denmark, Finland, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland (as well as the bilateral arrangement with Singapore indicated above), and the Republic of Korea's BSAs with Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, India, and Slovenia.

²¹ Provided for in several of the Indian BSAs, for example with the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Quebec, and Sweden.

²² The Republic of Korea's Social Security Agreement (accessible from the list of linked documents in Reference E).

is that an expatriate worker may be exempted from paying contributions to certain social security schemes in the host country, but must participate in other ones. In addition, the worker could still be required to pay contributions toward certain social security benefits in their home country, which could render this particular area particularly difficult to appreciate and manage, by workers and employers alike.²³

Contributions toward *public social security schemes* are usually covered by Asian BSAs. Exceptionally, however, employer-sponsored and private arrangements are also included, especially in the case of some of Japan's BSAs (e.g., with Belgium, France, and the US); in these cases, the benefits may not be exportable. Usually the benefits are restricted to *cash benefits*; exceptionally non-monetary benefits may be included, such as for rehabilitation (see the Japan-Switzerland BSA), but may not be exportable.²⁴ Invariably however, *non-contributory (social assistance)* benefits are not covered by BSAs and are, consequently, not portable. This follows from the defined scope of the BSAs, but may also be specifically mentioned, such as, for example, in the case of the Philippines–Sweden BSA, the Indian BSAs with the Czech Republic and Denmark, and the Republic of Korea–PRC and Republic of Korea–Denmark BSAs.

As far as *employees* are concerned, the BSAs typically indicate the legal system of the host country as the applicable system. This would also imply that, as a rule and unless the host country social security system provides otherwise, migrant workers would have to contribute to that system. For the reasons given, this may not be appropriate in the case of a migrant worker who works in the host country for a limited duration. Therefore, with few exceptions, Asian BSAs stipulate that *detached/posted/seconded workers* who work in the host country for a specified period of time, would be exempted from contributing to the host country social security system (or at least certain of its schemes), as long as the worker remains covered under their home country system and has obtained a certificate to this effect from the home country social security authority (often referred to as a certificate of coverage). The period for which the exemption applies is specifically indicated in the BSAs and ranges from 2 to 6 years; in many cases, the period may be extended for an indicated further period, or by agreement between the contracting parties. Special arrangements are made for the position of self-employed persons, civil servants, members of diplomatic missions and consular posts, and persons employed on seagoing vessels.

Most Asian BSAs provide for totalization of insurance (or otherwise creditable) periods, primarily in relation to long-term social security benefits: While not all Asian BSAs provide for totalization, with the exception of the PRC's BSAs, the majority of BSAs concluded by the other Asian countries discussed in this part of the contribution do indeed provide for this.²⁵ It has also been indicated above that the range of benefits are usually restricted to *long-term benefits*, in particular (contributory) old age, survivors' and disability benefits. While the totalization is, as a rule, effected on a reciprocal basis, this is not always the case. For example, the Japan-Switzerland BSA provides that totalization is only possible in relation to Japanese, and not Swiss benefit payments. Importantly, Asian BSAs invariably indicate that totalization rules will only be invoked if the worker concerned does not qualify for a benefit from one of the contracting parties without recourse to matching periods completed in the other contracting party.

²³ Being compelled to contribute to the social security system of a host country, either before the conclusion of the BSA or even as a result of it, may cause the worker concerned not to be able to draw a benefit in case a minimum period of contributions is required. In cases such as this, provision is at times made for contributions paid to be *refunded*, as is evident from, among others, the Japan–US, India–Switzerland, and Republic of Korea–Switzerland BSAs.

²⁴ The India–German BSA explicitly provides that German employment promotion laws will apply to Germans working in the Republic of Korea.

²⁵ Other BSAs that exclude totalization include India's BSAs with the Netherlands, Singapore, and Switzerland, and the Republic of Korea's BSA with Switzerland.

Of considerable importance is the approach adopted by Asian BSAs as regards the reality that some social security systems essentially provide contribution-based benefits, while others link benefit entitlements to periods of (employment-related) *residency, or presence*, in the country concerned. Other systems use a pension points-based framework for determining entitlement. This issue has typically arisen in the context of BSAs, in particular with Australia and (partly) Canada, but also in some respects in relation to Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway. The Australian approach regarding access to Australian income support benefits has been aptly described in the following terms (Australia also has specific arrangements in place regarding healthcare benefits, contained in BSAs with countries with highly developed social security systems; authority omitted):

Any portability of such rights depends principally on the provisions of bilateral agreements. Bilateral agreements operate on the ‘totalisation’ model of recognising overseas residence or contributions as qualifying residence in Australia (and vice versa) Under the agreements, entitlements in each country are portable and payable pro rata in accordance with the respective proportion of the ‘working life’ spent in each country.... Bilateral social security agreements modify prior residence and portability rules under mutual arrangements for accessing and portability of those designated payments (sometimes just one payment) where such reciprocity proved acceptable to both countries, and subject to the specific modifications set in that agreement.

Boucher and Carney 2014, p. 208

Detailed rules are contained in several Asian BSAs to appropriately match periods of *residence/presence/“working life residence” and/or pension points* with periods of contribution in the other contracting party—see in particular Japan’s BSAs with Australia, Canada, and the Netherlands, India’s BSAs with Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Norway, and the Republic of Korea’s BSAs with Australia and Denmark. Significant scope exists to expand these arrangements also to other benefit categories, in particular healthcare benefits.

Equally important are the provisions in the BSAs of the five Asian countries in relation to considering for purposes of totalization so-called *third-country periods*, i.e., periods of contribution, or even residence, in countries other than the two contracting parties. Usually the stipulation in this regard is that the liabilities that arise from social security instruments with third states will be considered in so far as they determine aggregation of insurance for entitlement to a pension. Widespread use is made of this critical protection enhancement mechanism, as appears in, among others Japan’s BSA with the Czech Republic, the Philippines’ BSA with Sweden, India’s BSAs with Austria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Portugal, and the Republic of Korea, and the Republic of Korea’s BSAs with Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Luxembourg, and New Zealand (in the making).²⁶ Sometimes the requirement is that both contracting parties must have concluded a BSA with that particular third country providing for totalization (see, for example, the India-Germany and the India–Republic of Korea BSAs); at other times, only one of the contracting parties needs to have a BSA with such a third country (e.g., the Republic of Korea–Australia BSA and the Japan–Czech Republic BSA).

²⁶ However, certain Asian BSAs explicitly exclude considering third-country periods; see the Japan-Philippines BSA and the Republic of Korea–Canada BSA.

These provisions aimed at arranging for third-country periods have a particular application in the *European* context, as reflected in certain Asian BSAs with EU countries (e.g., the India–Austria, India–Germany, and India–Hungary BSAs). Through the operation of EU law, in particular the European Court of Justice ruling in *Gottardo*,²⁷ national agreements with third countries must apply in the same manner to all persons covered by EU Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of social security among EU Member States (see Section 3.5.1). The result is that EU Member States must extend the benefit of considering periods of insurance in Asian and other third countries on the basis of totalization agreements, as well as to other persons who may be subject to the EU social security coordination regime. This arrangement does not impose obligations on Asian and other third states, but is nevertheless an issue that needs to be carefully considered by Asian countries when concluding BSAs with EU members; the effect of *Gottardo* is that it may also be of benefit to nationals of Asian countries that are residing in *other* member countries if they are subject to the EU MSA (Section 3.5.1), and if the particular conditions in this regard (not discussed here) are satisfied. Asian BSAs with EU countries could therefore, in principle, be of benefit to nationals of these Asian countries even if they reside in another EU member country.

It has to be further noted that the BSAs generally *prohibit the double counting* of (overlapping) periods of contribution to the host and home country social security systems (e.g., India’s BSAs with Germany, Finland, Luxembourg, and Norway). In fact, in certain BSAs, it has been stipulated that where a beneficiary would be entitled to a double benefit, the country effecting the payment will reduce the benefit paid by it correspondingly (see Japan’s BSAs with Australia, Belgium and the US, and the India–Austria BSA). At times, it is indicated that *lump-sum benefits* are not to be considered for purposes of totalization (e.g., the Republic of Korea–Bulgaria BSA).

Finally, Asian BSAs often require that totalization is only possible if the migrant worker concerned has contributed, or resided, for at least a *minimum period* of time in the country concerned (see, among others, the Japan–Spain, Japan Hungary, India–Austria, India–Australia, India–Canada, and India–Czech Republic BSAs); usually, but not always, a minimum period of one year of contributions is required.

With some exceptions, Asian BSAs provide for exportability of social security benefits: As a rule, Asian BSAs stipulate that benefits, long-term benefits in particular, are exportable to beneficiaries, irrespective of whether the beneficiary *resides in the host or home country* contracting party to the BSA. Invariably, this portability is extended to beneficiaries *even if they reside in other, i.e., third countries*. Portability of benefits to a third country may be made subject to verification procedures (e.g., that the person drawing a pension benefit is still alive); see, among others, the India–Belgium and the India–Netherlands BSAs.

Exceptionally, a BSA may provide for benefits under national legislation to be exported *unilaterally* by the country of origin, even though these benefits may not necessarily be exportable on a reciprocal basis (e.g., the India–Quebec BSA).

Asian BSAs foresee shared responsibility and cooperation, also regarding implementation: The principle of shared/joint liability for the payment of benefits is reflected in Asian BSAs. The agreements contain (at times complex) arrangements for the calculation of *proportional benefit payments* to be made to beneficiaries.

²⁷ *Gottardo v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS)* ECJ January 2002, no. C-55/00, paras 33–34. See also Vonk 2014: 60–61.

Administrative cooperation is specifically provided for in all BSAs. Most Asian BSAs require the development of a separate administrative arrangement between the contracting parties, to guide implementation. In some cases, the arrangement has already been developed and attached as a protocol or an annex to the BSA itself, as in the case of, for example, the Philippines–Sweden, India–Czech Republic, India–Denmark, Republic of Korea–PRC, and Republic of Korea–Denmark BSAs. Most Asian BSAs also explicitly provide for *data exchange*, qualified by the need to heed privacy concerns.

Finally, the specific establishment of *joint implementation, consultative and/or supervisory bodies* is not generally provided for in Asian BSAs. Exceptions include some of Japan’s BSAs, in particular with Brazil, India, and the Philippines. This is an area in which Asian countries can meaningfully invest.

Evaluation and some remaining challenges: The existing Asian BSAs of the PRC, India, Japan, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea have risen to the occasion and undoubtedly provide *best practice experience* to other Asian countries. These BSAs compare well with their counterpart instruments adopted by countries with a long history of them.

Nevertheless, some *challenges* remain. First, administrative and other processes involved, in particular those of legislative bodies, to support and ensure ratification of Asian BSAs that have been concluded may delay implementation. Second, there is a need to ensure that administrative and technical capacity is available, and the cross-border cooperation mechanisms, including linked databases, are in place and capable of streamlined interfacing. Third, as mentioned above, migrant workers may be exempted from paying contributions to certain host country social security schemes, but may be required to contribute to other host country schemes, as well as to certain home country schemes; this could complicate arrangements for both employers and workers, and even for social security administrators. Fourth, this complexity is made even more burdensome by Asian countries having concluded a host of BSAs, which may contain different technical and other provisions.

In the fifth instance, as indicated above, more can be done to enhance joint implementation, ongoing consultation, and regular supervision and monitoring of Asian BSAs. Finally, as indicated above, as a rule, only long-term benefits (in particular, old age, survivors’, and disability benefits) are made subject to totalization and portability arrangements. There is significant scope for Asian countries to extend this range. For example, in several Asian countries, health insurance arrangements have developed significantly, and could provide a basis for more elaborate inclusion in Asian BSAs.

3.5 Multilateral and Bilateral Social Security Agreements

3.5.1 Multilateral Social Security Agreements

As indicated above, one or more multilateral arrangements at the regional level(s) are, despite their worldwide prevalence, sorely lacking in Asia, notwithstanding the emphasis in core regional instruments of, in particular, ASEAN and SAARC, on regional integration and promoting the welfare of peoples of the region. As with BSAs discussed above, a key principle in relation to MSAs is their inclusion of a social security coordination regime, primarily eliminating the restrictions that national schemes place upon the

access rights of migrant workers.²⁸ Coordination rules leave national schemes intact and only supersede such rules where they are disadvantageous for migrant workers (Pennings 1993). In other words, MSAs do not in any way affect the freedom of participating countries to determine the content of their own social security schemes. It is not even required that social security schemes be harmonized for purposes of coordination, although it could be argued that there should at least be some compatibility to render coordination effective.

MSAs have a more recent origin than BSAs. The first such agreements were entered into soon after the Second World War (Roberts 2009). Currently, worldwide, several MSAs exist. In addition to regional frameworks in Africa, the following examples may be pertinent for Asia:

European Union. Today, the EU arrangement is the most comprehensive in the world. The current extensive regulation (EU Regulation 883/2004) ensures far-reaching portability of social security entitlements/benefits and access to social security within the EU. It is essentially informed by an economic rationale, i.e., to support free movement of persons, and is accompanied by a critical implementation regulation (Regulation 987/2009). Bilateral arrangements between individual European states are still applicable to the extent that they contain more favorable provisions than those of Regulation 883/2004.

One of the EU's main characteristics is the incremental development of the coordination regime, in particular concerning the categories of persons and contingencies covered, which have gradually expanded over the years, as is the case with the type of social security schemes falling under the purview of the regulatory framework. Currently, all persons who are or have been subject to the social security legislation of the Member States and members of their families and their survivors are included. In addition, the Regulation also applies to stateless persons or refugees residing in one of the Member States. Regarding the material scope of the coordination rules, Regulation 883/2004 applies to all legislation concerning the following branches of social security (see Article 3): sickness benefits; maternity and equivalent paternity benefits; disability benefits; old-age benefits; survivor's benefits; benefits with respect to accidents at work and occupational diseases; death grants; unemployment benefits; pre-retirement benefits; and family benefits.

Regulation 883/2004, read with implementing Regulation 987/2009, contains detailed rules pertaining to the coordination of social security schemes, invoking principles indicated earlier in this chapter.

Caribbean countries – CARICOM Agreement on Social Security. In 1996, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) entered into an Agreement on Social Security that facilitates the free movement of labor within the CARICOM Single Market, and applies to all persons who are moving to work or who have worked in two or more contracting countries (i.e., countries that have signed and ratified the Agreement) (CARICOM Secretariat 2010). Barring certain provisions, the Agreement also allows for contributions to voluntary insurance schemes to be considered. The Agreement provides for essential coordination arrangements, including exportability of benefits, the aggregation of insurance periods that migrant workers would have spent in different CARICOM Member States, and the application of the laws of the country where the person concerned is employed. Unlike the EU regulation, the CARICOM agreement does not cover short-term benefits, instead providing for the coordination and portability regime to be applicable to invalidity, disability, old age, and survivors' and death benefits.

²⁸ Pennings (1993, p. 6) defined coordination as follows: "Coordination rules are rules intended to adjust social security schemes in relation to each other (as well as to those of other international regulations), for the purpose of regulating transnational questions, with the objective of protecting the social security position of migrant workers, the members of their families and similar groups of persons."

Latin America, including the Ibero-American Social Security Convention of 2011. Latin American countries are involved in several MSAs, including the more limited (in terms of geographical scope) Mercosur Multilateral Social Security Agreement of 2004 and, most recently, the Ibero-American Social Security Convention of 2011 (Fernández 2014). This latter agreement is particularly noteworthy as it involves 18 Latin American countries and two European countries (and EU members), Portugal and Spain. The Convention is applicable to persons who are or were subject to the legislation of one or several Member States, as well as their family members, beneficiaries, and rights holders, referring both to dependent and non-dependent workers. Regarding the material scope, the Convention covers disability, old age, and survivors' and employee injury benefits (occupational injuries and diseases), but excludes healthcare and non-contributory benefits.

Noteworthy is the fact that the Convention includes countries with vastly different social security models; “there are individual capitalization systems,²⁹ PAYG systems and mixed systems applying both schemes –but also between nations where the coverage, scope or intensity of benefits vary greatly, all of which makes coordination of legislations extremely difficult” (Fernández 2014, p. 73). For the rest, the Convention employs various coordination principles discussed in this contribution.

Finally, in **Eastern Europe and Central Asia**, there are also developments toward enhanced social security protection for workers in Eurasia. As indicated by Van Ginneken: “These led, in 2005, to the adoption of the so-called Baku Declaration on ‘Enhancing Social Protection of Migrant Labour’, signed by social security directors, administrators and experts from 24 countries” (2013: 215; ISSA and IAPSF 2005). The need for an MSA and portability was specifically endorsed in a follow-up declaration (ISSA 2012 – para 7).

In conclusion: According to Baruah and Cholewinski (2006, p. 156), multilateral agreements “have the advantage that they generate common standards and regulations and so avoid discrimination among migrants from various countries who otherwise might be granted differing rights and entitlements through different bilateral agreements.” Therefore, MSAs can address the very shortcomings of BSAs, in relation to problems experienced with a plethora of such bilateral agreements, as discussed above. A multilateral approach also eases the bureaucratic procedures by setting common implementation standards (Baruah and Cholewinski 2006). Furthermore, an MSA can establish a standardized framework for more detailed, context-sensitive, and country-specific bilateral agreements (Olivier 2010).

Of particular relevance for the debate on social security for Asian migrants is MSAs' ability to serve the purpose of regional integration, and the values and core principles associated therewith, such as freedom of movement, free trade, and equal treatment of residents of the region. Regional adjudicative bodies have held that instruments that draw a distinction between nationals of particular countries bound together in a regional framework (such as the European Union) are, in principle, permissible. This is on the basis that Member States of a particular regional entity form a special legal order, which has effectively established its own “citizenship” (Weissbrodt 2004). This could imply that an approach that adopts specific (i.e., more preferable) arrangements for migrants from specific Asian regions (e.g., ASEAN; SAARC), and perhaps later for the whole of Asia, might be acceptable.

²⁹ In the event of individual capitalization systems, all accumulated balances in the personal accounts finance the corresponding pension. However, the Convention does not provide for exportability of benefits in this case, although Member States could conclude bilateral agreements and mechanisms for this purpose (Fernández 2014).

However, the challenges facing BSAs in relation to administrative and technological capacity, the limited applicability of the principle of equal treatment, and the absence of a broader human rights focus are equally relevant here. For these reasons in particular, MSAs are unlikely to extend any meaningful coverage to informal workers and undocumented migrants. To this may be added that effective MSAs—as is the case with bilateral agreements—would require that the relevant social security schemes should be compatible, at least to some extent. This may pose particular challenges in the Asian context. For example, it would be difficult, although not impossible,³⁰ to develop a coordination regime for the portability of retirement benefits if some countries have pension-oriented arrangements in place, while others provide for lump-sum payments. Similar considerations apply to healthcare benefits.

Of course, the asymmetrical nature of certain social security benefit regimes in Asia might be the very reason why an incremental approach regarding the countries and types of schemes and benefits covered by the agreement is called for, as discussed in the final part of this chapter. This may be particularly relevant in a context where social security may be underdeveloped in a particular region, or, as in Asia, countries may have vastly different social security regimes in place, or may be at different stages of development.

There are several other challenges associated with MSAs. These include the following:

- These agreements are time-consuming to develop, as they involve multiple countries, the need to set standards for a whole region, and the need to deal with the coordination of many social security systems.
- Political determination on the part of all contracting parties is crucial for the successful negotiation, conclusion, and adoption of a multilateral agreement.
- Despite its incorporation in constitutive instruments of Asian regional frameworks (e.g., the ASEAN Charter), the principle of freedom of movement is rarely recognized with regard to unskilled and semi-skilled migrant workers.
- The principle concerning the prohibition of nationality discrimination is also crucial. However, nationality discrimination still appears in the legal systems of several Asian countries, and impedes the conclusion and implementation of regional coordination regimes.

3.5.2 Bilateral Social Security Agreements

Considerable scope exists for the conclusion of BSAs within Asia, bearing in mind, however, that several challenges persist. First, as indicated above, it is difficult to coordinate provident funds with social insurance (retirement) schemes, given their asymmetrical nature. Second, the administrative and technical capacity to conclude such agreements may be lacking. Third, the principle of reciprocity needs to be honored, i.e., the origin and destination countries should extend same protection on a basis of reciprocity and equality. Currently, this is not always the case in Asian countries.

³⁰ Solutions to the asymmetrical nature of portability between a provident (lump sum) fund and a regular pension fund scheme have been suggested, and are in fact also provided for in other regions in the world, for example, in the Economic Community of West African States (Pasadilla and Abella 2012, p. 25).

Although entering into BSAs is generally seen as the preferred way to guarantee entitlements to migrants, this practice, as noted by Holzmann, Koettl, and Chernetsky (2005, p. 25), “necessarily results in a highly complex and hardly administrable set of provisions on the portability of social security benefits”. In addition, such agreements may end up granting differing rights and entitlements to migrants, which could undermine regional integration. One way to counteract this is to establish common standards in a regional or multilateral framework against which all bilateral agreements can be measured, as discussed above.

In order to achieve full portability, some cooperation between the social security institutions of the origin country and the host country is required, to ensure a joint determination of benefit levels for a particular migrant. However, the administrative and technological capacity to achieve this may be lacking. There may also be compatibility problems regarding similar social security schemes in the countries concerned, a matter discussed in the previous section in relation to MSAs.

Furthermore, while equality of treatment is a core principle, it should be noted that it generally operates within the framework of, and for purposes of, giving effect to the bilateral agreement. Only those (potentially) covered by the terms of the agreement—and, as a rule, only to the extent of the agreement—can benefit from the operation of the equality of treatment principle. In other words, bilateral agreements do not provide a general guarantee of equal treatment for migrants in the social security system of the host country. These agreements therefore do not create a foundation for invoking a human rights basis for the treatment of migrants, including particularly vulnerable groups such as informal workers and the undocumented. In fact, in Asia, given the preponderance of informal workers, bilateral agreements are unlikely to extend any meaningful coverage to these groups.

Nevertheless, Asian countries could build on their experiences concluding bilateral labor agreements, as well as those of some Asian countries in concluding BSAs, as discussed in Section 3.4.

In theory, it should be possible to follow an incremental approach, and to commence with a social security component that is prevalent in most countries in Asia, or in a particular Asian subregion, with employment injury benefits being an auspicious starting point. As indicated in Section 3.2.3, a sizeable number of Asian countries have already adopted minimum international standards for employment injury benefits, as they have all ratified ILO Convention No. 19. This should inform and support the conclusion of BSAs between different countries and also potentially a multilateral arrangement.

3.6 Conclusions and Recommendations

At a subregional level, in ASEAN and SAARC specifically, increasing provision has been made for regulating and enhancing the social security position of migrant workers. ASEAN and SAARC instruments also indicate the importance of social security agreements and portability arrangements. Yet, there is a clear need for a dedicated instrument, at both ASEAN and SAARC levels, and for Asia more generally, to provide a concrete framework for the social protection of migrant workers.

Asian countries have also increasingly attended to the social security plight of migrant workers. However, several barriers and challenges remain. In this regard, it is necessary to better regulate the interfacing between immigration law, labor rights, and social security entitlements of migrant workers, as immigration status severely impacts their social security position. It is also necessary to deal with discriminatory provisions in law and practice, based on the nationality or residence of migrant workers, and to ensure that social security is extended on the basis of equality, as required by international and regional standards.

Although not yet fully ratified by Asian countries, international and regional standards related to social protection and labor migration can further strengthen the social security systems of Asian countries and their coverage of migrant workers.

The worldwide evidence is that multilateral and bilateral agreements play a profound role in protecting migrants' social security entitlements. To illustrate the point, had it not been for the incorporation of the portability principle into most multilateral and bilateral agreements, fewer than the 30% of migrants worldwide who return to their home country would have done so (Paparella 2004). This has important implications for both host and home countries in Asia.

As regards bilateral arrangements, the rich experience of several Asian countries in concluding BSAs with many countries around the globe clearly reflects international best practice. This experience could improve protection of Asian migrant workers working in other Asian countries, as only a handful of such BSAs have been concluded. In fact, it may be prudent to consider the conclusion of such arrangements as a first step, which could then develop into/give rise to multilateral arrangements, as happened in some other regional jurisdictions (e.g., the EU).

In this regard, attention could be given to build on and use existing social security areas that are common to Asian countries, also in terms of their ratification of relevant ILO instruments. One potential area is that pertaining to occupational injuries, given the fairly widespread ratification by Asian countries of ILO Convention No. 19. In fact, a phased and incremental approach in relation to the following matters may be apposite, as the worldwide experience with the development of MSAs tends to confirm:

- *The types of schemes covered* – as noted, the existence of occupational injury schemes in all ASEAN countries, and the presence of common elements within these schemes make them the ideal first candidate for coordination. This could then be extended to include other schemes, e.g., pension-oriented public retirement fund schemes.
- *The benefits provided* – monetary benefits that are, in principle, portable should enjoy priority status. Related benefits, such as healthcare and integration services, could be incrementally introduced, as institutional and professional capacity to render these services develops.
- *The categories of persons covered by such an agreement* – provision could initially be made for extending cross-border social security arrangements to certain categories of persons only (for example, lawfully residing/employed migrant workers and their dependents), which could over time be extended to include other categories, such as self-employed workers (note should be taken of the already existing experience in this regard reflected in the BSAs of several Asian countries).

- *The countries included in the agreement* – given the political, administrative, and other difficulties involved in the establishment of multilateral agreements, it might be necessary to initially include within the sphere of operation those countries which at this stage have both the capacity as well as the most urgent need to enter into appropriate arrangements. Other countries could from time to time be added as the need to do so arises.
- *The social security principles covered* – in addition, certain core social security coordination principles may be introduced, or implemented, progressively, rather than at once, assuming that a rationale for doing this exists in Asia. For example, it may be prudent to arrange for the avoidance of double contributions as a first step, and then to extend this to cover totalization and portability arrangements as well. Again, the experience in this regard reflected in the BSAs of several Asian countries may be particularly helpful.

Finally, unilateral arrangements emanating from countries of origin are important to achieve meaningful protection and coverage, as the considerable evidence in this regard in Asia confirms. This is true despite the shortcomings of unilateral arrangements. In fact, there may indeed be a clear need for one or more international instruments that contain a clear set of norms to be adopted and applied unilaterally by both destination countries and countries of origin, and that are applicable to both social security and, to the extent relevant, labor law.

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Migrant Workers in Malaysia's Electrical and Electronics Industry

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4.1 Introduction

The electrical and electronics (E&E) industry continues to be a key driver of Malaysia's industrial development, contributing significantly to GDP growth, export earnings, investment, and employment. Malaysia's economic shift to export-oriented industry secured its position as a low-cost and labor-intensive base for global production networks, which in turn keeps the demand for labor in the domestic market continuously high. With its outstanding position for low-cost production, Malaysia became very attractive for contract electronic manufacturers (CEMs) aiming to consolidate further the global production networks. CEMs act as one-stop shops, offering a wide range of manufacturing capabilities, including other supply chain workstreams, such as logistics management, that can be standardized and used by brand-name electronics producers. Through outsourcing, CEMs offer lower-cost contracts that are made possible by cheap labor.

When migrant workers began arriving in Malaysia to fill the demand for cheap labor, those who were initially recruited by third-party labor contractors were signed on with contract manufacturers. However, this situation changed when the contractors started hiring migrant workers themselves, not just recruiting. Many CEMs outsourced not just the recruitment but the hiring to the contractors. This meant that, for many migrant workers, they signed contracts with the contractors, but not directly with the manufacturers. This situation pushes migrant workers, especially those hired by unregistered labor contractors, into disadvantaged and vulnerable positions characterized by long hours, absence of social protection, and, in many cases, confiscation of their passports and other working papers.


While the Malaysian government has stressed the importance of effective management for labor migration through regulations, many contracted and subcontracted migrants in the E&E industry still work in less than favorable conditions. By focusing on the E&E industry in Malaysia, this chapter will examine how supply chains and the outsourcing of labor have impacted migrant workers, as well as assess the policies the government has rolled out to address these issues.

This chapter will first look at how the manufacturing sector has contributed to Malaysia's economy. We begin by discussing the growth of the sector, reflecting Malaysia's shift from agriculture to industry. Much of the country's income comes from E&E, and we trace this growth by exploring how Malaysia has evolved into a low-cost and labor-intensive base for global production networks. In the next section, we illustrate how the changing patterns of trade and production have created a need for cheap labor which is being supplied by migrant workers. Using Malaysia's case, we address the impacts of third-party labor contracting on the well-being of migrant workers. Finally, we assess different policies and regulations implemented to protect migrant workers and regulate labor contractors.


4.2 Malaysia's Economic Growth and Manufacturing Industry

The steady growth of the country's economy has been attributed to its manufacturing sector (Kanapathy 2006). In the second quarter of 2018, Malaysia's manufacturing sector contributed 23.6% to its gross domestic product (GDP) (Department of Statistics Malaysia 2018). This is a 4.9% increase from 2017. Figure 4.1 shows increasing trend of gross output value of the manufacturing sector. The Department of Statistics Malaysia (2018) reported that the manufacturing sector output rose by 4.3% in August 2018 after recording a growth of 5.2% in July 2018. The major subsectors recording an increase in August 2018 included E&E (4.5%), petroleum, chemical, rubber and plastic products (3.5%), and non-metallic mineral products, basic metal and fabricated metal products (4.9%).

Figure 4.1: Gross Value Output, Manufacturing Sector, 1959–2015 (in thousands)



Source: Department of Statistics Malaysia, Official Portal 2014.

Figure 4.2: Employed Persons, by Industry, 1982–2017 (in thousands)


Source: Department of Statistics Malaysia, Official Portal 2014.

The sector also employs a large portion of Malaysia's labor force, having overtaken agriculture by the 1990s and continuing to dominate until 2015 (Figure 4.2). The total number of employees engaged in the manufacturing sector in August 2018 was 1,074,099, an increase of 1.9% from August 2017. Salaries and wages rose by 9.7%, meaning that the average monthly wage per employee was RM3,606 in August 2018 (\$893.02).¹

E&E is among the key manufacturing industries that contribute to the country's growth, with Malaysia remaining among the top global exporters of information and communication technology (ICT), especially microchips. Data from the Malaysia External Trade Development Corporation show that manufactured goods accounted for RM695.43 billion (\$172.2 billion) (footnote 1), or 83.8%, of total exports from January to October of 2018 (2017). E&E products account for 38.2% of total exports amounting to RM316.83 billion (\$78.46 billion) (footnote 1). This is a 1.6% increase in the share of E&E products to total exports as compared to 2017 when they amounted to RM282.62 billion (\$69.9 billion).² Bardan (2018) also noted that computer, electronics, and optical products accounted for around 87% of the total production value of Malaysia's E&E sector and that the United States, Germany, Mexico, India, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates are top export destinations for Malaysia's electronic products.

¹ US\$1 = RM4.0380 based on historical exchange rates for the second quarter of 2018 from the Bureau of Fiscal Service, US Department of the Treasury.

² US\$1 = RM4.0440 based on historical exchange rates for the fourth quarter of 2017 from the Bureau of Fiscal Service, US Department of the Treasury.

4.2.1 Malaysia's Economic Growth

How did the manufacturing sector, in particular the E&E industry, come to fuel Malaysia's economic growth? While the First Malaysia Plan (1966–1970) saw the growth of manufacturing as oriented toward the domestic market (Malaysia Office of the Prime Minister [MOPM] 1966), it was becoming clear at this point that industries, including rubber, tin, timber, and palm oil, were increasingly moving to the export markets (MOPM 1971). Exports of manufactured goods, though relatively small in absolute amounts, steadily grew at an annual average of 14.1% during the 1960s (MOPM 1971). Seeking growing opportunities in exporting industries, it was in the Second Malaysia Plan (1971–1975) where the Malaysian government officially began to emphasize export production. The Second Malaysia Plan introduced the so-called “New Economic Policy” (NEP), the aim of which was redistribution via growth in output and employment (Kuruville and Arodsothy 1995).

With the population increasing, and given the slowing down of the rubber industry, the Malaysian government increasingly focused on manufacturing. With output and the number of employed workers increasing, manufacturing, E&E, and the assembly of motor vehicles were among the industries that grew two to three times as rapidly as food, wood products, and chemicals, then the leading industries. To achieve annual growth of 17% for gross value of manufacturing exports, the government estimated about \$1.85 billion would be needed, as stipulated in the Second Malaysia Plan.

Several economic and trade strategies were undertaken: first, the Investment Incentive Act of 1968 aimed at attracting foreign investments; second, the government established Free Trade and Exporting Zones in select parts of Malaysia in 1972. Seeing an opportunity in E&E, the Special Incentive for the Electronics Industry was enforced in 1972 (Rasiah 2010), attracting electronic firms from Japan and the US (Phillips and Henderson 2009). This industrialization strategy, like those of other East and Southeast Asian countries, can be understood as the transition from import-substitution to export-orientation (Anazawa 1985). However, the outpouring of government revenues to sustain the NEP, combined with recessions in 1982 and 1985, drastically increased Malaysia's external debt, which led to a series of austerity measures, including privatization, and accelerated the shift to export-oriented industrialization (EOI) (Kuruville and Arodsothy 1995). In 1985, Malaysia implemented the Plaza Accord of 1985, signifying the liberalization of the economy (Phillips and Henderson 2009).

Following this, foreign direct investment (FDI) grew dramatically (Table 4.1). The sources of FDI also shifted, as Japan and other newly industrializing countries began to supplant the United States as the largest investor. Much of the growth in FDI in the last two decades has come from East Asian firms (Phillips 2009). The focus of these investments had been primarily on the “low-cost labor-intensive export-oriented manufacturing sector” (Kuruville and Arodsothy 1995). As a result, E&E had a 26.8% average annual growth rate between 1986 and 1990 (Rasiah 2010). This boom created demand for cheap labor that Malaysia addressed by recruiting migrant workers in the 1990s (Bormann, Krishnan, and Neuner 2010). This expansion continued even during the Asian financial crisis in 1997–2000, as the weaker ringgit lowered production costs even further in the economy.

Table 4.1: Key Economic Indicators of Malaysia, 1970–2017

	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	2017
GDP (\$ billion)	...	26.40	46.60	100.70	255.00	314.50
GDP per capita (\$)	...	1,900.00	2,549.60	4,286.80	8,920.50	9,812.80
Population (million)	...	34.90	35.40	28.00	23.40	25.50
Agriculture (% of GDP)	32.60	23.00	15.20	8.60	10.10	8.80
Industry (including manufacturing, % of GDP)	30.30	41.80	42.20	48.30	40.50	38.80
Manufacturing (% of GDP)	13.80	21.90	24.20	30.90	23.40	22.30
Service (% of GDP)	44.20	46.30	48.50	51.00
FDI net (\$ billion)	0.09	0.93	2.33	3.79	10.89	9.51
FDI net/GDP (% of GDP)	2.40	3.80	5.30	4.00	4.30	3.00

FDI = foreign direct investment, GDP = gross domestic product.

Sources: GDP, GDP per capita, population from IMF; World Economic Outlook Database (2017); Agriculture, Industry, Manufacturing, Service, Foreign Direct Inflow data from the World Bank; World Development Indicators (2017).

4.2.2 Malaysia in Global Production Networks

The growth of Malaysia's economy as a result of E&E FDI has secured its position in the global manufacturing value chain. Global production networks (GPNs) are becoming a key feature of the world economy and have increased in recent years. Criscuolo and Timmis (2017) argued that GPNs can stimulate productivity through different channels: specialization, foreign inputs, knowledge spillovers and upgrading, and upscaling. The outsourcing of different products consumed by buyers from the North has spurred different industries in the South, in particular in labor-intensive industries such as manufacturing, agriculture, and services (Barrientos 2013; Barrientos, Gerefi, and Rossi 2011).

Malaysia's shift to EOI has opened a window of opportunity for the country to secure its longstanding position as a low-cost and labor-intensive production base for GPN activities. The easing of trade and regulatory barriers coupled with advancements in ICT have greatly facilitated outsourcing and subcontracting. According to the literature, segmenting the production process is advantageous for three reasons: first, processes done abroad have become highly profitable. Product fragmentation facilitates international trade flows, generating value added to goods at every border crossing (van Liemt 2007). Second, using abundant local resources and removing importation costs can reduce production costs. Third, product fragmentation spreads risk, as not just one entity carries the full burden of the production.

By the 1990s, an emergent form of production organization called contract electronic manufacturers (CEMs) appeared, often cited in the literature as being "less interested in developing local capabilities and more interested in exploiting the pre-established functions performed by local firms and their workers" (Phillips and Henderson 2009). CEMs first appeared in the US and have been associated with the "internationalization of capabilities that can be standardized to fit with global production services strategies", which are now an important element in the GPN. CEMs act as a one-stop shop, offering a wide range of manufacturing capabilities that can be standardized and used by brand-name electronics producers.

They are different from the traditional subcontractors who perform original equipment manufacturing or original design manufacturing (ODM). This is because these new breeds of subcontractors also offer a range of supply chain management functions, including logistics management (Phillips and Henderson 2009). In Malaysia, CEMs were able to overtake the more traditional ODMs as they offered contracts with much lower costs, as much as 15% less than ones offered by ODMs. Underlying this model is the use of cheap labor (Phillips and Henderson 2009), in particular, cheap foreign labor, or migrant workers. We will turn to this concept in the next section.

4.3 Migrant Workers in Malaysia's E&E Industry


4.3.1 Evolution of Migrant Workers in Malaysia's E&E Industry

The shift of the Malaysian economy to EOI led to a labor shortage, especially along the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, where most of the manufacturing firms are situated. The demand for cheap labor was addressed via migrant workers in 1990s (Bormann, Krishnan, and Neuner 2010).

Number of foreign workers dropped after peaking in 2010 due to freezing of hiring and recruitment in manufacturing and specific industries.


To maintain its longstanding position as a low-cost and labor-intensive base for the manufacturing GPN, especially E&E, the Malaysian government facilitated the hiring and recruitment of foreign labor. Following Malaysia's economic liberalization in 1980s, the country saw a surge in migrant workers by the 1990s. Figure 4.3 shows total migration stock in millions. The growth in the stock of migrants had been rapid until reaching its peak in 2010. The number, while still growing, had slowed down compared to years previous, with events leading to 2010 contributing to the decline. In 2005, the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Workers issued guidelines requiring companies intending to recruit fewer than 50 migrant workers to use outsourcing companies. This created a system that "flourished on rent-seeking behavior... [spawning] a range of abusive practices" (Devadason and Meng 2013). As a response, the government froze licenses for outsourcing companies in 2009 and hiring of workers in manufacturing in the same year, imposing levy charges on contractors. In the last quarter of 2009, migrant protests erupted after employers continued deducting wages to cover the levy charges, leading to the government further freezing hiring and recruitment in specific industries (Devadason and Meng 2013). In 2013, the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Workers and Illegal Migrants decided to phase out the outsourcing system. Based on the United Nations Technical Paper on Labour Migration in Malaysia (2018), fewer than 70,000 workers are currently employed under outsourcing and the government aims to completely close the system by 2021.

Contributing to this continued decline are the reduction targets set by the government to encourage economic restructuring. The Eleventh Malaysia Plan (2016–2020) envisages limiting the employment of low-skilled migrant workers.

Figure 4.3: Migrant Stock in Malaysia (in million)


Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2017.


Data from 2011 to 2018 from the Government of Malaysia show that migrant workers in the country are largely employed in manufacturing (Figure 4.4). The numbers peaked from 2013 to 2015 and had since fallen, but have remained unchanged since. In 2015, 32.5% of the employees employed in the manufacturing sector were migrant workers; however, the numbers declined to 28% in 2017. Nevertheless, the proportion of migrant workers remains substantial.

Figure 4.4: Distribution of Migrant Workers, By Sector and Year, 2011–2018


Source: Malaysia's Open Data Portal (data.gov.my), 2016.

In 2014, migrant workers in Malaysia came largely from Indonesia and Nepal. The trend remained similar through 2017, as reflected in Figure 4.5. Major sources of migrant workers also included Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, and Pakistan. From the 2017 data, we see that majority of the workers in the manufacturing sector come from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, and Viet Nam.

Figure 4.5: Distribution of Migrant Workers, by Country, by Sector, 2017 (in thousands)



Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: Malaysia's Open Data Portal (data.gov.my), 2016.

Malaysia is among the largest importers of labor in Asia (Devadason and Meng 2013). While migrants' impact on the economy is obvious, the policies governing migration have tended to shift in response to the economy. Following the shift to EOI, Malaysia's migration policy encouraged foreign recruitment in the 1970s. The legalization of foreign recruitment further cemented labor importation in the 1980s, but the recessions in 1985 and 1986, coupled with the more pronounced visibility of Indonesian migrants, restricted it in the 1990s. The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997–98 further restricted labor importation and regularization of temporary migrants. However, the effort to keep Malaysia's position in the GPN as a base for low-cost production has stimulated the growth of migrant workers in labor-intensive industries such as E&E.

Limiting the share of migrants in the Malaysian labor force has become a policy objective. As mentioned, the Eleventh Malaysia Plan (2016–2020) introduced the first-ever cap on migrant workers at 15% of the total workforce by 2020. The government-imposed levies on employers discourage hiring migrants, but,

as was demonstrated earlier, many employers deducted these costs from wages. In 2013, this levy was transferred to the workers (UN 2018). Attempts in 2016 to increase these levies were met with protests and were subsequently reversed (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] 2016). In 2018, the levy charges were shifted back to employers under the Employer Undertaking Policy (UN 2018). Malaysia has also bolstered regulations covering the employment and conditions of migrant workers, although compliance is dependent on specific businesses. Nonetheless, the absence of a comprehensive and consistent migration policy has placed stakeholders in a continuous state of uncertainty and limited their cooperation (OECD 2016).

4.3.2 Migrant Workers and Third-Party Labor Contractors

Demand for migrant workers increased in Malaysia due to its shift to EOI and its effort to integrate with the GPN.

According to the dual labor market theory (Massey et al. 1993), migration is a result of labor demand rather than supply. A segmented labor market where the primary segment is capital-intensive, and the secondary segment is labor-intensive, such as what is being facilitated by GPNs, has created opportunities for migrants and women to be employed. According to Massey et al. (1993), capital, a fixed factor of production, can be idled by lower demand, but cannot be laid off, while labor, a variable factor of production, can be easily released when demand falls. Therefore, capital-intensive factors of production are used to meet basic demand while labor-intensive methods are used to meet seasonal, variable demand. This leads to a dualism in the market, with capital-intensive primary industries providing stable and skilled jobs and labor-intensive sectors offering unstable and unskilled jobs prone to layoffs at little or no cost for the employer during low-demand seasons.

While these labor-intensive industries have become an important source of employment, the main cause of concern arises in issues of migrant rights. The nature of jobs in the secondary segment can leave many workers in less than satisfactory conditions, with the involvement of third-party labor contractors further heightening their vulnerability. Third-party labor contractors are the underlying mechanism that makes CEMs cost-effective. CEMs compete for brand-name electronics contracts with significant cost reduction. As capital is scarce while labor is abundant, cheap labor becomes a means by which CEMs can undercut the cost of contracts by as much as 15% (Phillips and Henderson 2009). Though this is cited more commonly in other GPNs such as agriculture and textile, the E&E industry has employed the largest proportion of Malaysia's migrant workers.

The resulting demand for cheap labor created an increase in the flow of migrant workers. In 1990s, Malaysia was the top exporter of microchips, and while there had been efforts to make the industry "cleaner", with fewer migrant workers, the focus has still been on the assembly rather than on upgrading and production of key technological components. Malaysia's inability to keep up with the growth of neighboring economies Singapore and Taipei, China elevated demand for cheap labor, keeping Malaysia in the base of the manufacturing GPN (Bormann, Krishnan, and Neuner 2010). Bormann, Krishnan, and Neuner (2010) also noted that wages increases slowed from 2000 to 2006 to an annual average of 2.6%, compared to the 8.4% per annum increase from 1990 to 1997. Wages were kept low especially during the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 through labor contracting.

A rise in CEMs and third-party labor contractors could put migrant workers in Malaysia in a vulnerable position.

Labor contracting is not a new feature that appeared with the rise of GPNs and CEMs; rather, it is a feature that has contributed to CEMs' ability to consolidate the GPNs (Phillips and Henderson 2009). Even in the context of Asia, specifically Malaysia, labor contracting has been a part of the developing landscape even before and especially during the period Malaysia came under British rule (Kaur 2012). Although there is no commonly agreed definition of labor contracting, as noted by Barrientos, Gerefi, and Rossi (2013), the International Labour Organization (ILO) characterizes it as a triangular employment relationship where the legal employer is not the same as the person for whom the work is carried out (2006). Having a direct employer-employee relationship is important in defining reciprocal rights and obligations, with the ILO (2006) deeming it the "main vehicle through which workers gain access to the rights and benefits associated with employment in the areas of labor law and social security" (p. 3). It is important, however, to distinguish registered companies who provide staffing services from unregistered labor contractors, as the former are subjected to various industry codes, laws and legal requirements, while the latter are not (Barrientos 2009). While traditional forms of recruitment have also led to problems of indebtedness for many migrants due to high recruitment fees, the current increase in the number of third-party labor contractors has created side effects on the plight of workers.

The change in third-party labor contractors' relationship with migrant workers must be highlighted to conceptualize the impact of recruitment. When migrants began arriving in Malaysia to fill labor demand, they were initially recruited by third-party labor contractors, but were signed on with the employers, implying better protection, wages, job stability, and social security. However, when the third-party labor contractors started to hire, and not just recruit, migrant workers, many migrants held contracts with the third-party labor contractors instead of directly with the employers, leading to loss of accountability for employers. What resulted was a lack of incentive to provide better welfare for migrants.

This practice was institutionalized when the Malaysian government endorsed a model of labor brokerage or labor subcontracting through the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Workers in 2005 (Kaur 2014). This model favored outsourcing recruitment by shifting the responsibility of managing the workers to a third party, thus turning third-party labor contractors into agents, which was illegal, as stated in the 1955 Employment Act. In other words, this practice abolished the direct employer-worker employment relationship, which is required to ensure protection of worker rights (Kaur 2014). While this removed high placement agency recruitment fees, the problem of lack of monitoring quickly became apparent. This reduced costs, an essential element in the GPN, and made many CEMs more competitive, but also brought to light the question of accountability. CEMs, according to Phillips and Henderson (2009), utilized this flexibility in times of market volatility. When economic slowdowns happen, migrant workers are the first to be laid off, and when an issue of abuse surfaces, employers remain unaccountable, as it is easy for them to deny any connection with it. This is related to the oft-cited advantage of GPNs—spreading risks.


Kaur (2014) highlighted the inadequacy of regulation and monitoring measures for behavior of third-party labor contractors, as well as for labor contracting between CEMs and contractors. The government obligates third-party contractors to provide specific jobs for migrant workers they bring in, i.e., for the purpose of visa issuance on behalf of the outsourcing companies. Regardless, many labor contractors act as speculative contractors who bring in large groups of workers without definite contracts, which makes "excess" workers,

those who cannot find jobs, illegal. After the 2005 legalization of labor brokerage, rent-seeking behaviors and a range of abusive practices became more evident. Bormann, Krishnan, and Neuner (2010) noted that this change in the recruiting/hiring situation further reduced costs for employers, since migrants hired by labor contractors were often excluded from bonuses and other allowances. Working long hours, unable to receive social protection, and, in many cases, with their passport and other working papers withheld, many migrant workers, especially those hired by unregistered labor contractors, remain in a vulnerable position.

Verité (2014) reported that about 32% or 350,000 migrant workers employed by Malaysian factories were trapped in their jobs. In 2014, the United States' annual Trafficking in Persons Report³ classified Malaysia as a Tier 3 Level (most problematic) country engaged in human trafficking through these jobs (US Department of State 2014, 2018). In 2016, Malaysia's position improved from Tier 3 to Tier 2 Watchlist (US Department of State 2016), though it still does not fully comply with the minimum standards set by the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. In 2018, Malaysia's status was still Tier 2 Watchlist (US Department of State 2018), which still affects the overall image of the country. In response to protests, the government finally decided to phase out the system in 2013, which would see the last of permits given to contractors by 2021.

However, several issues relating to regulating migrants' entry remain as the country tries to move out of the middle-income trap. Malaysia has bolstered regulations covering the employment and conditions of migrant workers, although compliance is dependent on business. Nonetheless, such frequent policy changes and the absence of a comprehensive migration policy have placed stakeholders in a continuous state of uncertainty about the future direction of migrant worker policy and have limited stakeholder support and cooperation (OECD 2016). As a result, Malaysian regular migration channels remain highly ineffective compared to irregular channels in terms of average time and costs to migrate as well as problems experienced, as seen in Figure 4.6 (ILO & IOM 2017).

Figure 4.6: Effectiveness of Migration Channels of Malaysia



Source: International Labour Organization and International Organization for Migration 2017.

³ The TIP report is published yearly by the US Government to engage other countries in combating human trafficking (US Department of State 2018). The TIP Report categorizes countries in three tiers, with Tier 1 being the highest and Tier 3 being the most problematic. Tier 1 countries are those that acknowledge the existence of human trafficking and have made efforts to address it and comply with the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.

4.4 Addressing Migrant Protection at Different Governance Levels

Initiatives at different levels of governance are being implemented to address the problems faced by migrant workers, especially because of unregistered third-party labor contractors. The main focus is on the initiatives for monitoring and regulating third-party labor contractors. In this section, we outline policies and programs aimed at protecting migrants' welfare at different levels of governance.

4.4.1 National Level

Migration in Malaysia is regulated through three instruments: the Immigration Act, the Employment Act of 1955 and 1998, and the Penal Code (Kaur 2014). Initially, the regulation of entry of migrant workers was under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home Affairs; however, lobbied by employer groups, the Ministry of Home Affairs began to allow employers to recruit migrant workers through third-party labor contractors in 2005, as previously mentioned. This reduced the duration of the recruitment process from a couple of weeks to one day (Kaur 2014) and canceled the initial technical working group scrutiny of migrant workers. Nonetheless, the resulting dominance of third-party labor contractors and agencies, as highlighted in the previous section, has negatively impacted the position of migrant workers.

The government implemented the Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Anti-Smuggling of Migrants Act in 2007 to provide a venue for migrants to seek redress if they are forced to work under conditions not stipulated in their contracts (Kaur 2014). Currently, the government is urging CEMs and other companies to only hire from accredited agencies. The government is also implementing criteria for employment in different sectors. This means that the number of working permits granted to employers depends on the type of industry, export or non-export orientation, paid-up capital, sales value, and the ratio of local to migrant workers. The required ratio is specified for all industries and is put in place to assure employment of the native population; however, in E&E, the ratio is two migrant workers for every one local worker, regardless of whether the company is export-oriented or not. This reflects the importance of the E&E industry in sustaining the country's economic growth.

The shortcomings of governing labor migration at the national level become salient when it comes to the regulations imposed on third-party labor contractors. Kaur (2014) noted the lack of an institutionalized process with regard to regulating labor-hire firms or third-party contractors. Because government agencies do not communicate with each other, policy changes can often be interpreted differently by individual departments. Recruitment firms can exploit this asymmetric information and non-standardization to their own advantage.

However, with recent policy reforms, the Malaysian government is trying to overcome these challenges. Amending the Private Employment Agencies Act 1981 in 2017 enabled stricter monitoring of employment agencies. The government can now suspend and revoke licenses if agencies do not behave in accordance with the revised Act (ILO 2018c). The recruitment fees imposed on migrant workers are capped to no more than one month of the basic wage. In addition, the Employer Undertaking, which was introduced in Malaysia in 2018, requires employers hiring migrant workers to pay the full levy cost, provide an employment contract in accordance with the 1955 Employment Act, and comply with minimum wage requirements (ILO 2018c).

To compensate for the weak regulatory regime on third-party labor contractors, several employers and civil society organizations initiated self-regulation on recruitment practices to facilitate safer labor migration by only hiring from government-accredited agencies (ILO 2015). For instance, a semi-conductor company in Malaysia in 2014 tried to reduce malpractices by recruiting from countries where the governments regulate and license the local recruitment agencies, and by only using accredited agencies (ILO 2015).

There are also some organizations' initiatives on self-regulation. Formerly known as Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC), the Responsible Business Alliance (RBA) was founded in 2004 by a small group of electronics companies seeking to create an industry-wide standard on social, environmental, and ethical issues in the electronics industry supply chain. The RBA initiated the Factory Worker Protection Program in 2015 as part of its program on Developing Grievance Mechanisms for Foreign Migrant Electronics Workers Worldwide (EICC 2015). The program "Suara Kita", Malay for "Our Voice", aimed at improving worker-management communication in factories; building on existing company training, grievance and helpline efforts; informing the larger EICC grievance management strategy globally; and complementing other efforts to implement new standards governing migrant workers. However, these self-regulations are anecdotal at best in the case of Malaysia's E&E industry.

4.4.2 International Level

Malaysia has signed and implemented many agreements or memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with various worker-exporting partners, notably Indonesia, Bangladesh, and Nepal, at different levels to ensure protection of migrant workers.

Bilateral Agreements and Signing of MOUs

As described earlier, most migrant workers travelling to Malaysia to work in manufacturing, not just in the E&E industry, come from Indonesia. Cases of abuse and death of Indonesian workers have prompted Malaysia and Indonesia to sign an MOU in 2004, 2006, and 2009 (Wickramasekara 2006; Kaur 2014). The MOU ensures annual leave for workers, retention by workers of their passports, a revised pay scale, and a requirement for employers to pay foreign employees through their bank account. Another highlighted clause was the right of workers to lodge complaints with the Labor Office and seek assistance from non-government agencies and other enforcement agencies.

In 2016, Malaysia also signed an MOU with the Bangladesh government, using the Government-to-Government (G2G) Plus system (Carvalho and Rahim 2016), as an attempt to eliminate middlemen from the recruitment process. Private recruitment agencies have been criticized for the increasing debt burden on migrant workers. Nevertheless, Malaysia is scheduling a review of the MOU in 2018, as there have been allegations that several privately run recruiting agencies have been monopolizing the system, resulting in many workers still being charged higher recruitment rates (Nabi 2018).

Malaysia has also been negotiating with Nepal over a new labor agreement in the form of an MOU. On 21 May 2018, the Malaysian government shut down the Immigration Security Clearance and One Stop Center because its operators were levying additional charges for visa processing fees on Nepali migrant workers (Poudel 2018). Since then, the two governments have been in negotiations over the terms of the MOU, more specifically over provisions that will protect Nepali migrant workers in Malaysia.

These include stipulations that Malaysian employers would be responsible for visa processing fees for Nepali migrant workers, as well as better/fair payment. The negotiations also include a discussion on whether the migration of Nepali workers be managed under a G2G or Business to Business (B2B) system (Khadka 2018).⁴ The negotiations seem to favor a B2B system, which, in effect, will formalize the role of labor contractors. This follows the argument that the sheer number of Nepali migrant workers may not be manageable under the G2G system (Mandal 2018), which tends to cover several countries with quotas subject to an annual ceiling, effectively suppressing large-scale labor migration.

Regional and Multilateral Agreements

At the regional level, the ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labour (AFML) is the major platform where ASEAN countries can coordinate labor migration. The AFML was first organized as a result of the first meeting of the Committee on the Implementation of the ASEAN Declaration on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers (ACMW). The ACMW's tripartite plus platform allows member states, employers, and workers, together with various civil society organizations, to discuss regional migration. The AFML agreed to and adopted a set of conclusions and action points to promote and protect the rights of migrant workers and facilitate evidence-based migration policies. The ASEAN Member States and other stakeholders laid out several measures to regulate recruitment agencies as summarized in Table 4.2.

Table 4.2: Recommendations of the ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labour

**The Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers:
Towards Effective Recruitment Practices and Regulations (9–10 October 2012)**

Promote effective monitoring and complaint mechanisms

- Regulate recruitment agencies and practices by laws, regulations and policies that clearly define the migration cost structures in ASEAN Member States;
- Effectively monitor recruitment agencies and practices in ASEAN Member States with clear mechanisms, heavy penalties for infringements and positive ratings for ethical recruitment agencies. In this regard, communities, tripartite partners, civil society and other stakeholders should be involved towards effective monitoring;
- Develop and implement a licensing system of recruitment agencies and, where applicable, an accreditation system of foreign employers of direct recruitment agencies to effectively monitor their practices in ASEAN Member States;
- Enhance the functions of labour attaches and consular officials in ASEAN Member States to verify information of job offers and employment contracts, as feasible, in receiving countries;

Establish effective complaint mechanisms in ASEAN Member States that should be widely disseminated to and accessible by migrant workers with legal aid and assistance.

Source: ASEAN Forum on Migrant Labour (AFML) Background information booklet (ILO 2018b).

The recommendations clearly focus on regulating third-party labor intermediaries. AFML recently reviewed that the implementations of the recommendations have been made in terms of fair recruitments, especially regarding the regulation of agencies despite the non-binding nature of the AFML recommendations (ILO 2018c). Moreover, these regulatory efforts culminated in the adoption of the 2017 ASEAN consensus on the protection and promotion of the rights of migrant workers. Article 52 articulates ASEAN Member States' commitment to *“license, regulate, and supervise public and private recruitment agencies with a view to eliminate recruitment malpractices and to ensure compliance with the law, regulations, and policies of the respective ASEAN Member States.”*

⁴ A B2B system pertains to the exchange of products or services between businesses, instead of between businesses and consumers. Services are sold by businesses to other businesses, including recruitment.

At the global level, the ILO has been encouraging destination countries to ratify the conventions under the ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration, aimed at protecting and ensuring the rights of migrant workers. Also, in principle, all international labor standards, unless otherwise stated, are applicable to migrant workers. These include the eight fundamental rights conventions, which are legally binding. In this regard, Malaysia also has ratified five fundamental conventions out of the eight, including the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1925 (No. 100). However, with the exception of the Migration for Employment Convention, 1949 (No. 97), Malaysia has yet to ratify most of the ILO conventions that are specifically relevant to migrant workers, in particular, the Migrant Workers Convention, 1975 (No. 143). The details are summarized in Table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Malaysia's Ratification Status of the ILO Conventions

Eight fundamental ILO Conventions pertaining to migrant workers' rights		
ILO convention	The number of ratified countries out of 187 Member States	Malaysia
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87)	155	Not ratified
Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98)	165	Ratified in 1961
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)	178	Ratified in 1957
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)	175 (2 Denounced)	Ratified in 1958, but denounced in 1990 ^a
Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100)	173	Ratified in 1997
Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111)	175	Not ratified
Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138)	171	Ratified in 1997
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182)	182	Ratified in 2000
Migrant-specific ILO conventions		
Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97)	49 (0 Denounced)	<input type="checkbox"/> Ratified in 1964 <input type="checkbox"/> Ratified by Sabah Malaysia, but not by Peninsular Malaysia. <input type="checkbox"/> Has excluded the provisions of Annexes I to III
Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) Convention, 1975 (No. 143)	23 (0 Denounced)	Not ratified
Other ILO conventions that apply to migrant workers		
Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181)	33	Not ratified
Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189)	25	Not ratified
Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No. 188)	12	Not ratified
Maintenance of Migrants' Pension Rights Convention, 1935 (No. 48)	12 (4 Denounced)	Not ratified

ILO = International Labour Organization.

^a The Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) was ratified in 1958 and later denounced in 1990 "due to divergences with the ILO in the interpretation of national legislation".

Source: ILO. 2018a. Ratification by Convention. <https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:12001:::NO::>

The Migration for Employment Convention (Revised), 1949 (No. 97), which is the only migrant-specific ILO convention Malaysia ratified, focuses on sharing information on national emigration and immigration policies, with the goal of ensuring equal labor rights and benefits comparable to native-born workers, including remuneration, hours of work, and unionization. However, Malaysia's exclusion of Annexes 1 to 2, in particular, has created a regulatory vacuum in monitoring actions of contractors.⁵ Nonetheless, Malaysia's non-ratification status could have been remedied by complementary provisions in its MOUs and bilateral agreements with migrant-sending countries.

A couple of challenges need to be highlighted here. The first comes from the lack of provisions to promote fair recruitment practices in the MOUs and bilateral agreements with Malaysia. The references to "ethical recruitment", or "ethical practice" were mentioned in only 8 out of 65 migrant worker agreements identified in Asia (Wikramasekara 2015), and Malaysia is not an exception to this. The second challenge is due to the lack of national laws to support the commitments made through the bilateral MOUs and its ratification of ILO conventions to protect migrant workers' welfare. This is a crucial challenge, especially when there is little evidence that Asian destination country recruitment systems, including Malaysia's, have fundamentally changed following the introduction of MOUs (Wikramasekara 2015). The third challenge is to put in place a more rigorous monitoring system for the implementation of the MOUs, with the responsibility shared equally between Malaysia and its country partners. Without a rigorous and transparent monitoring system, it is difficult to determine the MOUs' social value.

Furthermore, to regulate the other players in the GPN, the OECD plays a crucial role. The OECD's "Responsible Business Conduct" (RBC) is a comprehensive international instrument endorsed by governments (Gillard 2018). The efforts were consolidated into the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Also, the OECD runs the National Contact Points, which is the only international RBC instrument incorporating an implementation mechanism. Furthermore, the RBC is part of the OECD's Policy Framework for Investment, which helps governments evaluate and improve their investment policies. However, most of Malaysia's E&E investors, apart from Japan and the US, are not from OECD member countries. Many of the lead economies that heavily invested in E&E in Malaysia in the 1990s, such as Hong Kong, China; Singapore; and Taipei, China, are not signatories to the Convention on the OECD. This could imply no significant improvement for the protection of migrant workers' rights.

4.5 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

As migration increased to fill the demand for cheap labor in Malaysia's manufacturing sector, especially in the E&E industry, the implementation of regulations in response to the rise of GPNs and CEMs changed the recruitment and hiring behavior of third-party labor contractors, putting migrant workers in disadvantaged and vulnerable positions. At the same time, although the Malaysian government signed bilateral agreements and MOUs, and ratified a few key ILO instruments, the lack of public knowledge is still a barrier to

⁵ Annexes 1 and 2 regulate "recruitment, placing and conditions of labor of migrants for employment recruited otherwise than under government-sponsored arrangements for group transfer (Annex 1)", and "---- under government-sponsored arrangements for group transfer (Annex 2)".

implementing the enclosed provisions in these agreements and frameworks. Furthermore, despite the ILO Conventions' supervisory mechanism, a system to track the implementation of MOU provisions in a transparent and rigorous manner has yet to be established. Such a system can be one of several useful tools to improve migrant workers' rights and social welfare and promote more effective management of labor migration.

Taking into account these challenges and the lessons learned from Malaysia's E&E industry, a number of policy recommendations are addressed in this section for consideration of authorities and policy makers:

First, to alleviate the negative impact on migrant workers caused by third-party labor contractors, negotiations for both bilateral and multilateral agreements should encourage provisions of ethical recruitment or ethical practice. This is essential to promote fair recruitment for migrant workers. To translate such provisions into real practices, the existing domestic legislations should be reviewed, and probably adjusted, to accommodate the implementation/enforcement process.

Second, a *monitoring system* for implementation of the provisions in the existing MOUs and other regional and bilateral agreements is proposed. This will help to ensure effective labor migration management by verifying employment and recruiting practices of third-party contractors against the existing national and international regulations and increasing coherence among policies. Coordination and collaboration among relevant government agencies is required to set up this system, which, moreover, should be a shared responsibility between the host country and its partners, particularly when it comes to bilateral agreements and/or MOUs. At the regional level, the AFML could facilitate this monitoring process for multilateral agreements and international standards and also be utilized as a peer review among the member countries to encourage further implementation of its recommendations. The monitoring system is not only proposed to help track malpractices of the third-party labor contractors, but also to improve the country's status in the Report of Trafficking in Persons conducted by the US State Department. On a related note, to determine which recruitment approach should be adopted, a comprehensive assessment of G2G versus B2B must be conducted.

Third, because of the enabling role of labor contractors as outsourcing companies in managing cross-border labor migration, especially when the influx of migrant workers is large, as with Malaysia's E&E industry, it is crucial to design an incentive structure where labor contractors can be motivated to follow the international standards and frameworks of labor migration. Self-regulation initiatives such as those mentioned earlier in this chapter can be promoted and utilized as a basis for the government of Malaysia or other developing countries to encourage an establishment of a regulatory and monitoring agency for hiring and recruiting process.

Next, in response to the lack of awareness, understanding, and knowledge about the bilateral agreements, MOUs, and the international labor standards and frameworks, the government should organize public outreach programs, possibly in collaboration with relevant international organizations or partners, to educate employers, labor contractors, and migrant workers. To complement this, policy makers should take some action to counter misconceptions about migrant workers. Fostering positive public attitudes toward migrant workers by highlighting their contribution to the economy can help.

Finally, the dual labor market theory tells us that the demand migrant workers fill is built into modern post-industrial societies; for governments to influence this, major changes in economic organizations are probably needed (Massey et al. 1993). Escaping the middle-income trap also requires major changes in economic organizations, with a possible key to that being economic upgrading. Economic upgrading, which has both capital (for example, the use of new machinery and technology) and labor (for example, skills development or increased productivity on the part of the workers) dimensions, may lead to social upgrading: as a worker gains a skill, he or she will be able to move to better jobs in other links in the GPN (Barrientos, Gerefi, and Rossi 2011). However, to ensure that economic upgrading leads to social upgrading, standards must be set. Promoting labor skill and/or training of the migrant workforce can be considered one important factor in Malaysia's effort to escape from the middle-income trap and to provide labor protection. With improved overall productivity, companies will look into opportunities to invest in economic and social upgrading.

All these recommendations can be taken on by authorities/policy makers of developing countries, not just the Malaysian government. These recommendations are only part of policy responses to help put in place a system of protecting migrant workers' rights and welfare while an economy is in the development phase to reach sustainable growth.

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ANNEX 1

ECONOMY-SPECIFIC NOTES

BANGLADESH

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)				
2007	147.1	666	7.1	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017		54.0		
2017	164.7	1,093	7.3	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017				
Immigration in Bangladesh								
	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)				
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated	
2000	988	0.75	49	17.14	79.7	n.a.	n.a.	
2015	1,423	0.88	50	24.1	73.4			
2017	1,501	0.91	50	20.5	76.2			
Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2010								
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)								
% of Total Employment								
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	1.6							
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Emigration from Bangladesh to OECD Countries								
Stocks of Persons Born in Bangladesh Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	161.9	123.6	285.5	306.3	226.6	532.9		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	33.0	24.4	57.4	75.1	50.6	125.7		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	17.2	23.1	19.7	12.9	14.7	13.7		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	78.2	73.3	76.1	82.8	80.1	81.6		
Total Emigration Rates (%)	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.5		
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	2.7	2.0	2.4	3.6	3.6	3.6		
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	50.6	49.4	49.3	41.7	43.5	48.8	50.8	50.8
United States	16.7	14.8	16.7	14.7	12.1	14.6	13.6	18.7
Italy	8.9	9.7	10.3	10.1	10.5	12.7	12.4	10.7
Canada	2.1	4.7	2.7	2.6	3.8	2.2	3.3	3.2
Australia	2.2	2.1	2.3	2.5	2.9	2.7	3.4	3.1
Republic of Korea	1.4	2.9	2.3	1.9	2.5	2.3	2.9	2.9
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	12.0	13.8	15.3	16.6	16.8	17.9	20.3	21.4
United States						3.7	4.8	5.4
Australia						3.6	3.9	4.4
United Kingdom						4.2	4.9	3.6
Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations								
Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total			4,046.2					
Saudi Arabia	1,000.0		1,315.6					
United Arab Emirates	500.0		1,176.5					
Malaysia		307.4	453.8					
Kuwait			214.9					
Oman			226.7					
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total	390.7	568.1	607.8	409.3	425.7	555.9	757.7	1,008.5
Saudi Arabia	7.1	15.0	21.2	12.7	10.7	58.3	143.9	551.3
Malaysia	919.0	742.0	804.0	3.9	5.1	30.5	40.1	99.8
Oman	42.6	135.3	170.3	134.0	105.7	129.9	188.2	89.1
Qatar	12.1	13.1	28.8	57.6	87.6	124.0	120.4	82.0
Kuwait	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	17.5	39.2	49.6
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	-0.44	-1.42	-1.21	-2.24	-4.83	-3.23	-2.84	-1.72
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	10,850	12,071	14,120	13,867	14,988	15,296	13,544	13,469

CAMBODIA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2007	13.7	726	10.2	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017	84.5
2017	16.0	1,135	6.8	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017	0.2

Immigration in Cambodia

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	146	1.20	51	38.8	56.5		
2015	74	0.47	46	18.3	76.2		
2017	76	0.48	46	15.6	78.3		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2015	Total	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing			Manufacturing	Construction	Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles		Accommodation and Food Service		Administrative and Support Service Activities		Other
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	49.2	18.7		2.6	5.5	12.5		2.4		1.2		6.2	
% of Total Employment	0.1												
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2006	2011			2012	2013	2014	2015	2016				
	0.1												
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016					

Emigration from Cambodia to OECD Countries

Stocks of Persons Born in Cambodia Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)			239.1	127.3	150.0	277.3		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)			15.2	6.4	11.9	18.4		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)			11.8	5.2	5.3	5.3		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)			81.1	84.2	82.7	83.3		
Total Emigration Rates (%)			3.2	2.6	2.9	2.8		
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)			52.7	13.0	17.5	14.7		
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	9.5	9.9	12.3	15.0	16.4	16.4	17.0	19.5
Republic of Korea	2.6	3.7	6.4	9.5	10.5	9.5	9.6	10.2
Japan	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.3	2.3	3.7	4.2
United States	3.8	3.0	2.7	2.5	2.6	2.5	1.9	3.2
Australia	0.7	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
France	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total						2.3	2.6	2.9
Australia						0.6		0.8
France						0.4		0.6
United States						0.4		0.5

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total			133.3					

Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total	29.8	26.2	34.8	22.6	24.7	40.8	85.5	96.3
Thailand	11.2	16.8	26.4	13.5	15.8	31.0	76.4	87.9
Republic of Korea	2.1	5.0	8.1	8.5	7.4	7.5	7.4	6.0
Japan	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.5	1.4	1.6	2.3
Singapore	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Malaysia	16.4	4.4	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.8	0.1	0.0

Net Migration Rate (per '000)

	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	–1.87	8.34	6.11	–0.55	–4.29	–2.01	–1.86	–1.74

Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	153	160	172	176	377	400	371	386

HONG KONG, CHINA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2007	6.9	31,082	6.5	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017	58.5
2017	7.4	37,927	3.8	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017	3.2

Immigration in Hong Kong, China

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	2,669	40.05	54	7.7	67.7		
2015	2,839	39.18	61	10.4	65.2		
2017	2,883	39.15	61	9.9	66.5		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector

Total
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)
% of Total Employment

Stocks of International Students ('000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	10.3	18.0	21.1	26.7	30.0	32.0	32.0	34.3

Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016

Emigration from Hong Kong, China to OECD Countries

Stocks of Persons Born in Hong Kong, China Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	188.5	199.9	388.4	243.5	270.0	513.5
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	6.3	7.7	14.0	6.3	7.7	14.0
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	24.8	20.7	22.7	12.6	10.7	11.6
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	69.7	73.7	71.8	79.0	81.0	80.1
Total Emigration Rates (%)	6.5	6.6	6.6	7.8	7.5	7.7

Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)

Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	6.4	8.7	7.2	5.6	9.4	6.7	6.9	8.7
United States	2.7	2.4	2.3	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.1	2.5
Australia	1.6	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.2	1.3	1.4	1.7
Japan	0.9	1.1	0.6	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.3	1.6
Canada	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.6	1.2
Republic of Korea	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.9	0.8	1.0

Stock of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total							32.8	34.3
United Kingdom							12.9	14.7
Australia							9.2	9.1
United States							8.6	8.5

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total								

Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total								

Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	7.96	5.25	11.74	1.92	2.59	2.10	3.96	2.37

Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	340	352	367	360	372	387	399	430

INDIA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2007	1,179.7	1,130	9.8	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017	51.9
2017	1,339.2	1,964	6.6	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017	3.5

Immigration in India

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	6,411	0.61	48	7.3	59.8	73.1	3.0
2015	5,241	0.40	49	9.5	70.0		
2017	5,189	0.39	49	9.6	70.4		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2015	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing		Manufacturing	Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles	Transport and Storage	Public Administration and Defence, Compulsory Social Security			
	Total					Education	Construction	Other	
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)									
% of Total Employment									
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
			27.5	28.3	34.4	39.0	42.0	44.8	
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	

Emigration from India to OECD Countries

Stocks of Persons Born in India Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	1,027.6	943.0	1,970.6	1,914.3	1,700.5	3,614.8		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	264.2	226.6	490.8	487.6	399.0	886.5		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	10.2	11.0	10.6	10.4	9.2	9.8		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	80.0	77.7	78.9	78.6	78.7	78.7		
Total Emigration Rates (%)	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4		
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	2.9	3.8	3.2	3.1	4.1	3.5		
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	234.1	260.7	245.7	229.1	240.7	285.4	268.9	271.5
United States	57.3	69.2	69.0	66.4	68.5	77.9	64.1	64.7
Canada	29.5	34.2	27.5	30.9	33.1	38.3	39.5	39.8
Australia	25.3	23.5	21.9	27.9	38.2	39.7	34.7	38.6
United Kingdom	64.0	68.0	61.0	36.0	30.0	46.0	36.0	35.0
Germany	12.0	13.2	15.4	18.1	19.5	22.4	26.1	27.7
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	162.7	181.1	186.3	181.6	168.3	163.3	186.4	222.7
United States						92.6	102.4	112.7
Australia						16.2	25.6	36.9
United Kingdom						22.2	19.6	18.2

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total								
Saudi Arabia							3,004.6	3,255.9
United Arab Emirates							2,803.8	2,803.8
Kuwait							923.3	919.4
Oman							796.0	784.0
Qatar							600.0	697.5
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total	641.4	626.6	747.0	817.0	805.0	781.0	520.9	391.0
Saudi Arabia	275.2	289.3	357.5	354.2	329.9	306.0	165.4	78.6
United Arab Emirates	130.9	138.9	141.1	202.0	224.0	225.5	163.7	150.0
Kuwait	37.7	45.1	55.9	70.1	80.4	66.5	72.4	56.4
Oman	105.8	73.8	84.4	63.4	51.3	85.0	63.2	53.3
Qatar	45.8	41.7	63.1	78.4	76.0	59.0	30.6	24.8
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	0.01	–0.12	–0.14	–0.36	–0.49	–0.41	–0.36	–0.28
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	53,480	62,499	68,821	69,970	70,389	68,910	62,744	68,968

INDONESIA									
KEY INDICATORS									
	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)					
2007	233.0	2,751	6.3	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017					63.4
2017	264.0	4,131	5.1	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017					4.3
Immigration in Indonesia									
	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)					
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated		
2000	292	0.14	48	30.5	68.1	33.0	46.0		
2015	338	0.13	42	25.1	68.4				
2017	346	0.13	42	22.8	70.3				
Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2016	Total	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing		Industry		Services			
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	84.8	31.081		12		42			
% of Total Employment	0.1								
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
	6.4		7.2					5.9	
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
	65.2	77.3	72.4	70.1	73.6	77.1	80.4	86.0	
Emigration from Indonesia to OECD Countries									
	2000			2010/11					
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total			
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	162.3	177.3	339.6	158.6	196.5	355.0			
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	22.0	26.4	48.4	16.6	26.0	42.6			
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	13.7	11.3	12.4	13.0	8.7	10.6			
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	65.4	61.8	63.5	64.3	68.7	66.8			
Total Emigration Rates (%)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2			
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	3.2	4.2	3.6	2.3	2.9	2.6			
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
Total	22.6	25.0	28.8	30.5	36.3	35.3	34.7	37.5	
Japan	7.5	8.3	8.4	9.3	9.6	11.8	14.3	16.8	
Republic of Korea	3.3	5.3	8.1	8.3	11.8	10.5	8.5	9.0	
Germany	1.8	1.8	2.0	2.2	2.8	2.5	2.5	2.7	
United States	3.7	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.7	2.1	2.1	2.1	
Australia	2.9	2.4	2.9	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.1	
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
Total	24.4	24.5	24.6	24.5	25.4	27.5	27.8	32.3	
Australia						9.5	9.5	10.2	
United States						7.3	7.2	8.9	
Japan						2.2	2.4	2.5	
Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations									
Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
Total			3,256.0			3,256.0	4,300.0		
Saudi Arabia			1,500.0			1,500.0			
Malaysia			917.9			917.9	17.8	20.0	
Taipei, China			146.2			146.2			
Hong Kong, China			140.6			140.6			
Singapore			106.0			106.0			
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Total	567.1	594.2	459.9	468.7	429.9	275.7	234.5	261.8	
Malaysia	116.1	134.1	134.0	150.2	127.8	97.7	87.6	89.0	
Hong Kong, China	33.3	50.3	45.5	41.8	35.1	15.3	14.4	68.1	
Taipei, China	62.0	78.9	81.1	83.5	82.7	75.3	77.1	62.8	
Singapore	39.6	47.8	41.6	34.7	31.7	20.9	17.7	13.4	
Brunei		10.8	13.1	11.3	11.6	10.0	8.2	6.6	
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	
	–0.19	–0.40	–0.34	–0.78	–0.64	–0.67	–0.62	–0.50	
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e	
	6,916	6,924	7,212	7,614	8,551	9,659	8,891	8,997	

JAPAN

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)
2007	128.0	45,687	1.7	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017
2017	126.8	48,557	1.7	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017

Immigration in Japan

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	1,687	1.32	53	17.8	75.4		
2015	2,232	1.74	55	19.8	71.4		
2017	2,321	1.82	55	19.8	71.4		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector

	Total							
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)								
% of Total Employment								
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	141.6	151.5	150.6	135.8	132.7	132.0	143.5	
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	90.5	130.9	144.1	142.0	160.3	190.0	208.8	237.5

Emigration from Japan to OECD Countries

	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Stocks of Persons Born in Japan Living in OECD Countries						
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	215.6	348.7	564.3	239.9	414.2	654.2
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	68.4	93.5	161.9	45.8	70.8	116.6
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	15.0	12.7	13.6	13.8	9.5	11.1
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	81.0	73.3	76.2	79.4	75.4	76.9
Total Emigration Rates (%)	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.4	0.7	0.6
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	0.7	1.0	0.9	0.6	1.1	0.9

Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	36.5	33.3	34.6	36.6	37.0	34.0	37.0	35.3
Germany	5.5	5.6	6.8	6.6	6.8	6.7	6.9	7.0
United States	7.7	6.3	6.2	6.1	5.9	5.5	5.4	5.2
United Kingdom	6.0	4.0	3.0	5.0	5.0	4.0	7.0	5.0
Republic of Korea	4.4	4.7	5.5	5.8	5.9	4.7	4.6	4.7
New Zealand	1.9	1.9	1.8	1.8	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.4
Stock of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total						28.9	29.2	28.6
United States						16.0	15.5	15.1
United Kingdom						3.1	3.1	3.1
Germany						1.7	1.8	1.8

Immigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total								
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total								

Net Migration Rate (per '000)

	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	–0.48	0.07	–0.16	0.26	0.43	0.56	0.39	0.40
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	1,684	2,132	2,540	2,364	3,734	3,325	3,819	4,578

LAO PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2007	5.9	952	7.6	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017	77.7
2017	6.9	1,730	6.9	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017	0.7

Immigration in the Lao People's Democratic Republic

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total (‘000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% High Educated
2000	22	0.41	47	24.7	70.2	49.5	8.2
2015	45	0.67	46	14.4	80.8		
2017	45	0.66	46	14.4	80.1		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2016	Total	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing		Industry	Services
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	38.3	14.9		11.3	12.1
% of Total Employment					

Stocks of International Students	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.5

Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
							6.9	

Emigration from the Lao People's Democratic Republic to OECD Countries

Stocks of Persons Born in the Lao People's Democratic Republic Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	132.8	131.4	264.1	127.9	134.8	262.7
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years (%)	4.4	5.8	10.2	2.4	4.9	7.3
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	13.8	13.7	13.8	2.9	3.5	3.2
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	81.2	79.0	80.1	88.0	86.4	87.2
Total Emigration Rates (%)	8.3	8.1	8.2	6.0	6.2	6.1
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	23.8	29.2	25.9	13.8	16.6	15.0

Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	3.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.2	2.7	2.6
Japan	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.7	1.2	1.2
United States	1.7	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.9	0.9
Republic of Korea	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.2
France	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Australia	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	0.72	0.69	0.75	0.73	0.7	0.7	0.77	0.75
Australia							0.2	0.22
Japan							0.2	0.20
Republic of Korea							0.1	0.07

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total								110.0

Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total	18.6	33.6	7.4	22.5	8.3	50.7	58.3	49.4
Thailand		8.4		13.6				

Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	0.01	–2.66	–5.29	–5.35	–3.68	–5.50	–2.13	–1.99
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	42	110	59	60	40	93	116	124

MALAYSIA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)					
2007	26.6	8,636	6.3	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017					62.3
2017	31.6	11,521	5.9	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017					3.4
Immigration in Malaysia									
	Stock of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)					
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated		
2000	1,277	5.45	44	26.8	70.6	91.3	5.9		
2015	2,651	8.63	40	20.2	77.8				
2017	2,704	8.55	40	16.1	81.1				
Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2017									
	Total	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing		Construction	Manufacturing	Mining	Services		
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	2,235	610.2		295.0	514.1	11.2	802.4		
% of Total Employment	15.5	37.4		23.6	20.5	12.5	8.9		
Stocks of International Students ('000)									
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
	64.7	63.6	56.2		99.6	111.4	124.1	100.8	
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)									
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
	29.1	62.7	79.3	69.8	79.8	77.8	70.7	45.6	
Emigration from Malaysia to OECD Countries									
	2000			2010/11					
Stocks of Persons Born in Malaysia Living in OECD Countries	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total			
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	98.6	115.7	214.3	131.9	161.3	293.2			
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	16.9	18.8	35.7	28.0	32.9	60.9			
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	23.9	19.0	21.2	18.6	14.8	16.5			
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	71.2	75.3	73.5	72.8	76.4	74.8			
Total Emigration Rates (%)	1.2	1.5	1.4	1.3	1.5	1.4			
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	5.7	6.7	6.2	5.1	5.3	5.2			
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)									
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
Total	20.7	22.5	17.7	20.8	23.3	19.8	21.7	15.2	
United Kingdom	7.0	9.0	4.0	6.0	9.0	6.0	8.0	n.a.	
Australia	5.4	4.9	5.0	5.4	5.6	4.5	4.0	4.1	
United States	2.0	1.7	2.3	2.6	2.5	2.6	2.7	3.4	
Japan	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.5	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.5	
Republic of Korea	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.3	1.5	
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
Total	40.8	43.3	46.6	46.7	46.1	44.1	45.8	49.3	
United Kingdom						13.3	15.6	17.0	
Australia						15.5	15.4	15.0	
United States						6.5	6.2	7.9	
Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations									
Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)									
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Total									
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)									
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Total									
Net Migration Rate (per '000)									
	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	
	5.18	3.10	4.53	5.29	5.29	5.31	1.57	1.48	
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)									
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e	
	1,103	1,211	1,294	1,423	1,580	1,644	1,585	1,634	

MONGOLIA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2007	2.6	2,426	10.2	Employment-Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017	55.2
2017	3.1	4,071	5.9	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017	7.0

Immigration in Mongolia

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15-24 Years	% Age 25-64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	8	0.34	44	15.7	80.8		
2015	18	0.59	40	12.2	84.2		
2017	18	0.59	40	11.8	83.6		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2015					Agriculture and Fishing	Manufacturing	Construction	Services
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)					6.8	0.9	1.9	
% of Total Employment					0.6	1.2	2.1	

Stocks of International Students ('000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.2	1.5	1.5

Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017

Emigration from Mongolia to OECD Countries

	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Stocks of Persons Born in Mongolia Living in OECD Countries						
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	1.8	2.6	4.4	8.5	14.1	22.6
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)						
Age 15-24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)			27.2			23.6
Age 25-64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)			70.3			75.3
Total Emigration Rates (%)		0.3	0.3		1.4	1.1
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)		1.5	1.3		3.9	2.9

Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	9.8	9.9	8.8	10.5	8.9	9.3	14.8	14.5
Republic of Korea	5.3	5.4	4.3	5.7	4.3	4.0	8.3	8.2
Japan	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.5	1.5	2.0	2.3	2.5
Germany	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	1.0	1.3	0.8
United States	0.8	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6	0.8
Czech Republic	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.6	0.7

Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total					6.6	6.6	7.2	7.4
Republic of Korea							2.5	2.1
United States							1.3	1.5
Japan							1.1	1.1

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total								

Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total								

Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985-1990	1990-1995	1995-2000	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020	2020-2025
	0.00	-7.89	-4.47	-1.22	-1.15	-1.06	-0.97	-0.91

Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	266	250	324	257	255	261	260	269

NEPAL

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2007	26.2	525	3.4	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017	81.9
2017	29.3	728	7.5	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017	2.7

Immigration in Nepal

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	718	3.02	66	22.9	70.8		
2015	510	1.78	69	10.7	78.8		
2017	503	1.72	69	10.3	78.5		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2011

	Total	Agriculture and Fishing	Manufacturing	Construction	Services
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)					
% of Total Employment					

Stocks of International Students ('000)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	0.1		0.1					

Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016

Emigration from Nepal to OECD Countries

	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)			23.9	86.0	66.6	152.5
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)			8.7	45.8	35.9	81.6
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)			24.0	25.4	26.6	25.9
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)			75.0	72.9	72.1	72.5
Total Emigration Rates (%)			0.2	1.0	0.8	0.9
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)			2.2	7.5	11.9	8.8

Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	23.3	25.0	29.9	33.4	38.7	42.6	46.7	48.0
Japan	3.6	2.9	3.5	4.8	8.3	11.5	13.4	14.1
United States	4.5	7.1	10.2	11.3	13.0	12.4	12.9	12.9
Republic of Korea	2.6	2.7	4.3	6.9	6.0	6.8	6.5	8.7
Australia	1.0	1.3	2.1	2.5	4.1	4.4	4.2	5.1
United Kingdom	8.0	6.0	5.0	2.0	1.0	1.0	2.0	n.a.

Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total						23.9	26.2	30.8
Australia						7.2	9.2	11.8
United States						8.5	7.8	7.9
Japan						2.4	3.1	5.1

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2016
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Total

Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)

	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17
Total	294.1	354.7	384.7	450.9	519.6	499.1	403.7	382.9
Malaysia	111.4	106.0	96.3	158.7	210.0	196.2	59.0	95.2
Qatar	25.6	35.9	44.9	103.9	128.6	124.0	127.9	121.1
Saudi Arabia	59.5	62.5	68.1	96.9	86.6	96.8	134.8	72.9
United Arab Emirates	17.8	24.0	34.5	58.6	55.4	53.1	52.1	57.9
Kuwait	2.3	8.0	9.2	17.4	20.2	9.6	9.9	13.1

Net Migration Rate (per '000)

	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	-2.44	0.76	-4.12	-6.46	-7.78	-2.68	-2.38	-1.93

Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	3,464	4,217	4,793	5,589	5,889	6,730	6,612	6,947

PAKISTAN									
KEY INDICATORS									
	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)					
2007	160.3	1,041	4.8	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017					52.2
2017	197.0	1,223	5.7	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017					4.0
Immigration in Pakistan									
	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)					
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated		
2000	4,182	3.02	46	10.2	79.2				
2015	3,629	1.92	49	9.6	80.2				
2017	3,398	1.72	49	8.0	82.8				
Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2010									
Total									
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)									
% of Total Employment									
Stocks of International Students	2003	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016		
	0.4								
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
Emigration from Pakistan to OECD Countries									
Stocks of Persons Born in Pakistan Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11					
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total			
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	375.0	293.7	668.7	669.6	514.4	1,183.9			
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	79.8	60.4	140.2	147.6	105.4	253.0			
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	13.9	15.4	14.5	14.3	13.7	14.0			
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	80.3	78.2	79.3	79.5	79.0	79.3			
Total Emigration Rates (%)	0.9	0.7	0.8	1.1	0.9	1.0			
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	3.1	3.6	3.3	6.1	7.0	6.5			
Legal Migration Flows to OECD (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
Total	73.7	95.9	101.9	83.9	73.2	80.0	99.6	94.9	
United States	21.6	18.3	15.5	14.7	13.3	18.6	18.1	19.3	
Italy	7.9	10.8	7.5	8.8	7.8	9.6	11.4	14.7	
Germany	2.8	3.3	5.4	6.5	8.0	9.5	24.5	12.2	
Canada	7.2	6.8	7.5	11.2	12.6	9.1	11.3	11.3	
United Kingdom	17.0	30.0	43.0	19.0	10.0	11.0	8.0	11.0	
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
Total	20.6	23.2	25.8	27.3	28.1	24.4	26.8	31.3	
Australia						4.8	6.3	8.2	
United Kingdom						7.2	6.6	6.1	
United States						4.6	4.7	5.2	
Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations									
Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
Total		3,290.5						9,610.9	
Saudi Arabia	1,200.0	1,500.0		1,700.0				4,892.1	
United Arab Emirates	738.0	1,014.1		1,200.0				3,180.9	
Oman	152.0	162.7		200.0				797.8	
Kuwait	150.0	149.1		150.0				182.2	
Qatar	83.0	85.0						135.1	
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Total	358.2	453.4	634.7	620.1	752.5	946.6	839.4	496.3	
United Arab Emirates	113.3	156.4	182.6	273.2	350.5	327.0	295.6	275.4	
Saudi Arabia	189.9	222.3	358.6	270.5	312.5	522.8	462.6	143.4	
Oman	37.9	53.5	69.4	47.8	39.8	47.8	45.1	42.4	
Qatar	3.0	5.1	7.3	8.1	10.0	12.7	9.7	11.6	
Bahrain	5.9	10.6	10.5	9.6	9.2	9.0	8.2	7.9	
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	
	0.28	-1.74	-1.12	-0.92	-1.72	-1.31	-1.08	-0.80	
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e	
	9,690	12,263	14,007	14,629	17,244	19,306	19,761	19,665	

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)
2007	1,317.9	3,488	14.2	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017
2017	1,386.4	7,329	6.9	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017

Immigration in the People's Republic of China

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	508	0.04	50	16.2	74.0	n.a.	n.a.
2015	978	0.07	39	15.3	72.4		
2017	1,000	0.07	39	14.4	72.5		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2012

	Total
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	246.4
% of Total Employment	

Stocks of International Students ('000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	71.7	79.6	89.0	96.4	108.2	123.1	137.5	157.1

Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017

Emigration from the People's Republic of China to OECD Countries

Stocks of Persons Born in the People's Republic of China Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	976.3	1,089.8	2,066.1	1,650.1	1,981.8	3,631.9
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	217.0	250.7	467.7	352.3	439.2	791.5
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	12.3	11.4	11.8	18.8	18.1	18.4
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	73.1	73.4	73.3	68.7	69.7	69.3
Total Emigration Rates (%)	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	1.5	2.3	1.8	1.4	2.2	1.7

Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	455.9	503.8	525.7	503.7	547.3	555.9	542.5	538.3
Republic of Korea	117.6	155.3	149.2	127.3	178.6	192.9	177.0	165.5
Japan	121.2	107.9	100.4	107.0	93.0	98.6	100.6	103.3
United States	64.2	70.9	87.0	81.8	71.8	76.1	74.6	81.8
United Kingdom	22.0	28.0	45.0	41.0	46.0	39.0	43.0	35.0
Australia	22.9	25.0	29.0	25.6	28.1	27.3	27.9	29.1
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	409.2	451.9	500.5	580.5	624.8	643.2	686.1	745.9
United States						225.5	263.8	291.1
Australia						88.0	90.2	97.4
United Kingdom						81.8	86.2	91.5

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total	847.0	812.0	850.0	853.0	1,006.0	1,027.0	969.0	979.0

Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total	411.0	452.0	512.0	527.0	562.0	530.0	494.0	522.0

Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	–0.08	–0.13	–0.06	–0.31	–0.36	–0.25	–0.23	–0.23
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	52,460	61,576	57,987	59,491	62,332	63,938	61,000	63,860

PHILIPPINES

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)					
2007	89.3	1,971	6.6	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017					60.6
2017	104.9	2,891	6.7	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017					2.8
Immigration in the Philippines									
	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)					
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated		
2000	318	0.41	49	20.3	68.5	54.8	11.9		
2015	212	0.21	48	16.4	69.1				
2017	219	0.21	48	16.6	69.1				
Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2014									
	Total								
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	91.4								
% of Total Employment	0.1								
Flows of International Students ('000)									
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
			4.3	3.3					
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)									
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
	12.2	14.3	17.1	21.0	22.7	24.3	28.4	42.0	
Emigration from the Philippines to OECD Countries									
	2000			2010/11					
Stocks of Persons Born in the Philippines Living in OECD Countries	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total			
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	745.8	1,192.1	1,938.0	1,141.4	1,872.3	3,013.7			
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	107.5	168.8	276.4	170.4	275.4	445.8			
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	13.9	9.6	11.3	12.6	8.0	9.7			
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	75.7	80.5	78.6	75.9	80.0	78.4			
Total Emigration Rates (%)	3.1	4.8	3.9	3.6	5.8	4.8			
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	5.3	8.1	6.8	6.2	9.6	8.1			
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)									
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
Total	164.8	167.4	161.3	159.6	151.9	160.3	181.2	167.1	
United States	60.0	58.2	57.0	57.3	54.4	50.0	56.5	53.3	
Canada	28.6	38.6	36.8	34.3	29.5	40.0	50.8	41.8	
Japan	15.8	13.3	13.6	15.4	16.4	19.9	24.0	26.2	
Australia	8.9	10.3	10.7	12.8	11.0	10.3	11.9	12.0	
Republic of Korea	8.9	9.1	9.6	9.9	12.0	10.7	9.9	9.5	
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)									
	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
Total	7.1	7.8	8.8	9.8	10.3	9.8	10.9	12.4	
Australia						2.8	4.2	4.4	
United States						3.1	2.9	3.0	
New Zealand						0.4	0.6	1.1	
Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations									
Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)									
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	
Total	2,043.0	2,158.0	2,220.0	2,285.0	2,320.0	2,447.0	2,240.0	2,338.6	
Saudi Arabia	451.5	487.7	457.3	505.0	575.4	604.4	533.1	594.0	
United Arab Emirates	308.5	315.1	330.8	351.9	361.9	379.3	356.2	357.8	
Kuwait	837.6	92.8	93.2	105.1	123.0	141.9	143.4	156.7	
Hong Kong, China	116.5	114.4	122.1	118.8	116.0	144.4	125.4	152.0	
Qatar	128.7	148.9	144.3	134.8	123.0	134.6	138.9	128.6	
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)									
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	
Total	991.1	1,123.7	1,318.7	1,435.2	1,469.2	1,430.9	1,437.9	1,669.5	
Saudi Arabia	291.4	293.0	316.7	330.0	382.6	402.8	594.0		
United Arab Emirates	196.8	201.2	235.8	259.6	261.1	246.2	227.1		
Singapore	54.4	70.3	146.6	172.7	173.7	140.2	141.5		
Qatar	89.3	87.8	100.5	104.6	94.2	114.5	133.2		
Hong Kong, China	100.1	101.3	129.6	131.7	130.7	105.7	85.7		
Net Migration Rate (per '000)									
	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025	
	-1.03	-1.53	-2.07	-2.67	-3.33	-1.33	-1.23	-0.88	
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)									
	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e	
	21,557	23,054	24,610	26,717	28,691	29,799	31,145	32,808	

REPUBLIC OF KOREA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2007	48.7	20,385	5.5	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017	60.3
2017	51.5	26,152	3.1	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017	3.8

Immigration in the Republic of Korea

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	244	0.52	41	27.9	69.2		
2015	1,143	2.26	44	19.2	79.1		
2017	1,152	2.26	44	13.5	83.7		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector

	Total							
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)								
% of Total Employment								
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	50.0	59.2	62.7	59.5	55.5	52.5	54.5	61.9
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016

Emigration from the Republic of Korea to OECD Countries

Stocks of Persons Born in the Republic of Korea Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	628.9	817.2	1,446.1	757.8	1,015.4	1,773.2		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	88.0	105.3	193.3	81.9	102.6	184.6		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	16.8	15.4	16.0	15.2	12.3	13.5		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	74.6	74.9	74.8	71.9	74.2	73.3		
Total Emigration Rates (%)	2.2	2.9	2.6	3.5	4.7	4.1		
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	2.9	4.8	3.7	3.5	5.8	4.5		
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	80.3	76.9	71.4	70.7	75.1	70.3	65.4	71.8
Japan	27.0	27.9	23.4	25.7	24.2	21.1	22.6	25.6
United States	25.9	22.2	22.8	20.8	23.2	20.4	17.1	21.8
Germany	3.8	4.1	4.8	4.9	5.5	6.3	7.2	7.7
Canada	5.9	5.5	4.6	5.3	4.5	4.5	4.1	4.0
Australia	5.2	4.3	4.3	5.0	5.4	3.8	3.6	3.3
Stock of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total						111.0	107.9	102.7
United States						70.5	67.6	64.0
Japan						16.5	15.0	13.5
Australia						6.8	6.6	6.2

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total								
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017

Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	0.82	0.32	0.69	0.34	-0.64	0.68	0.78	0.77
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	5,836	6,582	6,571	6,455	6,551	6,444	6,504	6,332

SINGAPORE

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)
2007	4.6	44,191	9.1	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017
2017	5.6	55,236	3.6	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017

Immigration in Singapore

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	1,352	34.54	55	15.8	72.8		
2015	2,544	45.95	56	12.5	78.1		
2017	2,623	45.95	56	13.0	77.2		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2016	Total	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	Industry	Services
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	1,393.0	4.8	618.3	769.9
% of Total Employment	0.5			

Stocks of International Students	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	40.4	48.6	47.9	53.0	48.9			53.1

Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016

Emigration from Singapore to OECD Countries

Stocks of Persons Born in Singapore Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11		
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	48.5	58.1	106.6	60.9	75.8	136.7
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	9.1	10.8	19.9	11.2	13.9	25.1
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	19.3	17.0	18.0	18.2	16.2	17.1
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	76.2	78.0	77.2	75.2	76.1	75.7
Total Emigration Rates (%)	3.0	3.6	3.3	2.9	3.4	3.2
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	8.6	11.3	9.9	8.3	10.9	9.5

Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	5.1	5.9	8.8	9.4	7.8	8.7	7.2	6.2
Australia	2.1	1.9	1.5	1.8	2.0	1.9	1.9	1.7
United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	4.0	4.0	2.0	3.0	1.0	
United States	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Republic of Korea	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7
Japan	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.7

Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	17.5	17.7	18.8	19.2	20.0	21.3	21.8	23.1
Australia						9.1	8.8	8.8
United Kingdom						5.9	6.8	7.3
United States						4.4	4.3	4.7

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	180.7	184.4	192.2	200.0	207.0	212.2	212.5	213.4

Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total								

Net Migration Rate (per '000)

	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	8.38	15.34	13.81	20.73	18.79	12.74	10.41	4.94

Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e

SRI LANKA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)	
2007	19.8	2,417	6.8	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017	51.4
2017	21.4	3,842	3.1	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017	4.1

Immigration in Sri Lanka

	Stock of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	40	0.21	45	3.8	68.0	41.8	13.4
2015	39	0.19	48	28.4	54.5		
2017	40	0.19	48	28.4	57.1		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2016	Total	Professional	Middle Level	Clerical	Skilled Labor	Unskilled Labor	Housemaids	
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	242.9	6.6	8.3	10.9	80.4	71.7	65.1	
% of Total Employment								
Stocks of International Students	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
		0.4	0.4	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.3	1.3
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016

Emigration from Sri Lanka to OECD Countries

Stocks of Persons Born in Sri Lanka Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	169.2	147.7	317.0	303.4	275.1	578.5		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	26.7	30.5	57.2	54.8	54.3	109.1		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	14.6	15.2	14.9	10.6	10.2	10.4		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	79.8	76.8	78.4	82.5	80.7	81.7		
Total Emigration Rates (%)	2.4	2.1	2.3	3.8	3.4	3.6		
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	27.2	28.7	27.7	8.0	5.6	6.7		
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	33.7	41.7	36.0	34.7	30.1	30.3	39.9	29.7
Republic of Korea	1.7	4.2	5.9	4.7	5.3	4.8	5.5	7.1
Japan	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.5	1.5	2.2	3.1	4.7
Italy	6.3	7.1	6.8	7.1	6.3	5.3	4.8	4.0
Australia	5.3	5.8	4.9	6.1	5.7	4.6	3.9	3.8
United Kingdom	7.0	11.0	6.0	4.0	1.0	2.0	3.0	
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	11.1	12.2	13.2	13.4	13.2	12.2	12.4	12.5
Australia						4.0	4.4	4.9
United States						2.9	2.8	2.8
United Kingdom						2.9	2.5	1.8

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Total	1,221.8	1,446.1	1,642.5	1,792.4	1,831.4	1,932.2		
Saudi Arabia	380.8		517.7		600.0			
Kuwait	202.1		308.5		200.0			
United Arab Emirates	171.6		238.6		150.0			
Qatar	118.6		133.4					
Lebanon	93.4		117.0					
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016e
Total	247.1	267.5	263.0	282.4	293.2	300.7	263.4	242.9
Saudi Arabia	77.8	70.8	68.6	98.0	80.8	80.5	74.9	63.4
Qatar	43.9	54.7	52.6	57.5	80.7	84.6	65.1	59.5
United Arab Emirates	39.6	42.3	39.3	38.3	48.5	50.3	43.7	40.1
Kuwait	42.4	48.1	50.7	44.2	42.7	43.5	38.5	32.4
Oman	5.3	6.4	5.4	4.9	5.3	5.8	7.1	9.7
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	-1.64	-2.88	-4.99	-4.69	-5.24	-4.74	-4.31	-3.54
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	4,123	5,153	6,000	6,422	7,036	7,000	7,257	7,190

TAIPEI, CHINA

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)
2007	23.0		5.7	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017
2017	23.6		2.9	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017

Immigration in Taipei, China

	Stocks of Foreign Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	400	1.8	52				
2010	474	2.0	62				

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2016	Total	Agriculture	Manufacturing	Construction	Social Workers (nurses and homemakers)			
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	624.8	10.9	370.2	6.4	237.3			
% of Total Employment								
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
	8.8	10.1	11.6	12.6	14.1	15.8	17.8	21.2
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017

Emigration from Taipei, China to OECD Countries

Stocks of Persons Born in Taipei, China Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	191.6	238.3	429.9	203.6	266.8	470.4		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	42.5	54.0	96.4	42.9	58.9	101.8		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	22.4	17.4	19.6	12.1	8.8	10.2		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	73.7	78.5	76.4	79.4	83.7	81.8		
Total Emigration Rates (%)	2.2	2.7	2.4	2.2	2.6	2.4		
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	5.3	7.0	6.0	4.0	4.9	4.4		
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	24.3	20.7	18.2	17.5	22.2	18.2	21.7	25.9
Japan	5.4	6.6	5.6	6.6	6.6	7.7	10.8	12.2
United States	8.0	6.7	6.2	5.3	5.4	4.7	4.9	5.1
Republic of Korea	1.5	1.4	1.6	1.6	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.3
Australia	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8	1.0	0.9	1.0	1.1
Canada	2.5	2.6	1.7	1.0	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.8
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	31.0							
United States								
United Kingdom								
Australia								

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total								
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total								

Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
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Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
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THAILAND

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)
2007	66.2	4,744	5.4	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017
2017	69.0	6,126	3.9	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017

Immigration in Thailand

	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)			
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated
2000	1,258	2.00	49	36.7	56.0	84.7	9.9
2015	3,487	5.08	50	18.6	75.9		
2017	3,589	5.20	50	15.6	78.7		

Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2016	Total	Manufacturing	Construction	Other Service Activities	Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing	Wholesale and Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles and Motorcycles	Real Estate Activities	Activities of Households as Employers
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	1,476.8	618.9	254.8	223.0	149.7	69.3	42.7	42.5
% of Total Employment	3.9	11.9	18.0	20.0	0.9	1.5	51.7	8.4
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	16.4	19.1	20.2	20.3				31.6
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
	64.8	79.8	91.2	107.7	117.9	120.6	125.1	129.0

Emigration from Thailand to OECD Countries

Stocks of Persons Born in Thailand Living in OECD Countries	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	90.8	180.0	270.8	147.9	374.7	522.6		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	15.8	33.9	49.7	22.7	82.9	105.7		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	38.7	21.8	27.5	27.6	12.1	16.5		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	59.6	76.3	70.7	68.9	84.8	80.3		
Total Emigration Rates (%)	0.4	0.7	0.6	0.6	1.4	1.0		
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	2.4	3.1	2.8	2.0	3.3	2.7		
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	47.4	51.0	53.6	58.8	61.4	86.8	63.6	67.1
Republic of Korea	5.8	6.9	10.3	13.8	18.3	48.3	20.1	28.5
Japan	9.9	10.9	13.6	15.4	15.4	14.3	14.5	15.4
United States	10.4	9.4	10.0	9.5	7.6	6.2	7.5	7.0
Germany	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.3	3.2	3.1	6.1	3.4
United Kingdom	4.0	6.0	3.0	4.0	4.0	3.0	6.0	
Stocks of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	22.9	22.7	23.1	23.8	23.2	21.2	21.5	23.6
United States						7.0	7.1	7.1
United Kingdom						6.0	6.2	6.1
Australia						3.2	2.9	4.8

Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations

Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2016	2017
Total	450.0				997.3	1,039.0	153.3	168.4
Taipei, China							74.2	77.0
Singapore								4.3
Malaysia								3.5
United Arab Emirates								3.1
Hong Kong, China								2.7
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total	143.8	147.6	134.1	130.5	119.5	117.3	114.4	115.2
Taipei, China	40.9	47.8	39.1	34.6	37.1	34.7	35.0	35.2
Malaysia	3.6	4.3	4.4	3.9	3.2	3.3	3.3	7.1
Singapore	12.7	11.5	11.9	10.7	8.2	7.3	5.8	5.4
United Arab Emirates	8.3	9.6	7.2	5.5	5.0	4.6	4.0	3.3
Hong Kong, China	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.2	2.3

Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	1.89	-2.09	2.27	1.16	0.18	0.49	0.28	0.28
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	4,433	5,256	5,657	6,585	6,524	5,895	6,270	6,729

VIET NAM

KEY INDICATORS

	Population (million)	GDP per Capita (constant 2010 \$)	GDP Growth Rate (annual, %)	Labor Market Indicators (%)				
2007	85.9	1,139	7.1	Employment–Population Ratio (age 15+ years), 2017				
2017	95.5	1,835	6.8	Unemployment (% of labor force), 2017				
Immigration in Viet Nam								
	Stocks of Foreign-Born Population (age 0+)			Foreign-Born Population (age 15+ years)				
	Total ('000)	% of Population	% Women	% Age 15–24 Years	% Age 25–64 Years	% Low Educated	% Highly Educated	
2000	57	0.07	42	27.6	66.4			
2015	73	0.08	42	16.0	77.6			
2017	76	0.08	42	14.7	78.0			
Stocks of Foreign Workers by Sector, 2011								
Total								
Number of Foreign Workers ('000)	78.4							
% of Total Employment								
Stocks of International Students ('000)	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
	3.2	3.4	4.2	3.3	3.7	4.0	3.6	2.5
Inflows of Foreign Workers ('000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
	43.0	52.6	55.4	56.9	74.0	78.4	76.3	83.6
Emigration from Viet Nam to OECD Countries								
	2000			2010/11				
	Men	Women	Total	Men	Women	Total		
Emigrant Population Age 15+ Years ('000)	747.4	768.6	1,515.9	922.8	1,016.1	1,938.9		
Recent Emigrants Age 15+ Years ('000)	63.0	86.1	149.1	55.1	85.1	140.2		
Age 15–24 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	12.5	12.1	12.3	8.3	8.2	8.2		
Age 25–64 Years (% of population age 15+ years)	81.1	79.9	80.5	81.3	80.5	80.9		
Total Emigration Rates (%)	2.8	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.9	2.8		
Emigration Rates of the Highly Educated (%)	17.1	19.8	18.2	10.1	11.1	10.6		
Legal Migration Flows to OECD Countries (5 main destinations, '000)	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Total	77.1	88.0	94.8	93.7	102.3	126.5	152.1	185.5
Japan	10.9	11.9	13.9	19.5	31.7	43.0	65.9	77.5
United States	29.2	30.6	34.2	28.3	27.1	30.3	30.8	41.5
Republic of Korea	16.4	22.9	27.9	24.7	22.2	28.0	30.2	40.1
Germany	4.5	4.3	4.2	3.9	4.1	5.1	6.1	7.0
Australia	3.3	3.9	4.8	4.8	5.7	5.2	5.1	5.4
Stock of International Students (3 main destinations, '000)	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Total	24.6	29.5	37.3	41.3	46.3	50.9	53.6	63.7
United States						15.4	15.0	19.3
Australia						12.4	12.9	13.1
Japan						4.2	6.1	10.6
Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations								
Stocks of Workers Overseas (5 main destinations, '000)	2007	2008	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2017
Total	500.0							
Taipei, China	90.0						200.0	206.2
Malaysia	75.0		74.8			70.0		
Russian Federation	72.0							
Lao People's Democratic Republic	14.5				30.0			
Saudi Arabia	11.5							
Flows of Workers Deployed (5 main destinations, '000)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Total	85.5	88.3	80.3	88.2	106.8	116.0	126.3	134.7
Taipei, China	28.5	38.8	30.5	46.4	62.1	67.1	68.2	67.0
Malaysia	11.7	10.0	9.3	7.6	5.1	7.4	2.1	1.6
Algeria	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.5	2.0	1.2	0.8
Macau, China	3.1	2.0	2.3	2.3	2.5	0.5	0.3	
United Arab Emirates	5.2	1.2	1.7	2.1	0.8	0.3	0.1	
Net Migration Rate (per '000)	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
	-1.03	-1.10	-0.56	-1.63	-2.03	-0.44	-0.42	-0.40
Remittance Inflows (current \$ million)	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017e
	8,260	8,600	10,000	11,000	12,000	13,200	11,880	13,781

GENERAL NOTES

1. All tables with top three/five destinations are ranked by decreasing order of frequency for the last year available.
2. Data on remittances for 2016 are estimates.
3. "n.a." data not available.
4. Educational attainment levels are defined according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997).
 "Low-educated" persons have completed at best lower secondary education (ISCED 0/1/2).
 "Medium-educated" persons have completed at best post-secondary non-tertiary education (ISCED 3/4).
 "Highly-educated" persons hold at least a first stage tertiary degree (ISCED 5/6).
5. The definition of non-citizen students was only used for the countries for which no data on non-resident students were available.
6. Data on international students in the Asian countries are only for degree programs (undergraduate and upward) and do not include short-term language courses.
7. Stock of foreign workers in [country] by sector reports figures for the four largest employers of foreign workers.

DATA SOURCES

Data	Source
Key Indicators	World Bank, World Development Indicators
Immigrant Population in [Country]	
Total Immigrant Population Age 0+ ('000)	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2017. International Migrant Stock: The 2017 revision.
% of Total Population Age 0+	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2017. International Migrant Stock: The 2017 revision.
Age Structure (2000, %) (population age 15+ years):	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. 2017. International Migrant Stock: The 2017 revision.
Education (2000, %) (population age 15+ years):	DIOC-E 2000.
Emigrant Population: Persons Born in [Country] Living in OECD Countries	DIOC-E 2000, DIOC 2000, DIOC 2010, Barro and Lee (2010), and Lutz et al. (2010).
Stocks of International Students	UIS Education database unless otherwise specified. Break in series in 2013.
Inflows of Foreign Workers	ILO-ILMS
Legal Migrant Flows	OECD International Migration Database (IMD).
International Students from [Country] in OECD Countries	OECD Education and Skills database.
Net Migration Rate	United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2017. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, custom data acquired via website.
Remittance Inflows	World Bank, Migration and Remittances Data

METADATA		
Emigration to Non-OECD Destinations	Comments	Source
Bangladesh		
Stocks of Workers Overseas in Non-OECD Countries		Population and Housing Census 2011; <i>Policy on Labour Migration for Cambodia</i> , ILO and Department of Employment and Manpower Cambodia, June 2010 (original source: Community Welfare Attache of the respective Middle East country).
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries	All totals include the category “others.”	Bureau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET)
Cambodia		
Stocks of Workers Overseas in Non-OECD Countries		<i>Policy on Labour Migration for Cambodia</i> , ILO and Department of Employment and Manpower Cambodia, June 2010 (original source: Community Welfare Attache of the respective Middle East country).
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		ILO ILMS
Hong Kong, China		
Emigrant Population Living in OECD Countries	Some destination countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States are not included.	
Stock of Foreign Workers		
Stock of Workers in Non-OECD Countries		
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		
India		
Stocks of Workers Overseas in Non-OECD Countries		Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (MOIA). Annual Reports.
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		MOIA Annual Reports. Ministry of External Affairs, Department of Overseas Employment database. emigrate.gov.in ; Country wise Emigration Clearances (ECs) obtained by RAs and Direct Recruitment by Fes, 2015–2016. E-migrate (https://emigrate.gov.in/ext/home.action)
Indonesia		
Stocks of Foreign Workers	Trade includes wholesale and retail trade, hotels, and restaurants.	Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration.
Stocks of Workers in Non-OECD Countries		(i) ILO News 17 December 2010, based on BNP2TKI, available at http://www.ilo.org/jakarta/info/public/pr/WCMS_150358/lang--en/index.htm ; (ii) Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration, cited in IOM Report. 2010. <i>Labour Migration from Indonesia</i> ; (iii) World Bank. Presentation Malaysia–Indonesia Remittance Corridor; News reports.
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries	All totals include the category “others.”	BNP2TKI (Placement and Protection Agency)
Japan		
Inflow of Foreign Workers		Statistics on Legal Migrants, Immigration Bureau of Japan

Lao People's Democratic Republic

Stocks of Foreign Workers		IOM, available at http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/where-we-work/asia-and-the-pacific/lao-pdr.html .
Inflows of Foreign Workers	Number of work permits issued in 2011.	Department of Skills Development and Employment, Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		ILO-ILMS

Malaysia

Stocks of Foreign Workers	Figure for agriculture includes plantations.	ILO-ILMS
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Mongolia

Stocks of Foreign Workers		National Statistics Office of Mongolia, Mongolian Statistical Information Service
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Nepal

Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		Department of Foreign Employment, for Nepalese Fiscal Years
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Pakistan

Stocks of Workers in Non-OECD Countries	Figures are for stocks of Pakistanis overseas (including workers, students, and other categories). We assume that for the Gulf countries, most of this figure represents migrant workers.	Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment
Flows of Workers Deployed		Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment

People's Republic of China

Emigrant Population Living in OECD Countries	Some destination countries such as Germany and the United States include Taipei, China and Hong Kong, China data.	
Stocks of Foreign Workers		Country presentation at ADBI-OECD roundtable (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security).
International Students in OECD Countries	Figures include those for Taipei, China.	
Stocks of Workers in Non-OECD Countries		Country report. 2008. <i>Asian and Pacific Migration Journal</i> , Vol. 17, Nos. 3-4 (original source: Ministry of Commerce).
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		Ministry of Commerce

Philippines

Inflows of Foreign Workers	New permits delivered to foreign workers.	ILO-ILMS
Stocks of Workers in Non-OECD Countries		Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		ILO-ILMS

Singapore		
Stocks of Foreign Workers		ILO-ILMS
Sri Lanka		
Stocks of Workers in Non-OECD Countries		Institute of Policy Studies. 2008. <i>International Migration Outlook, Sri Lanka</i> (original source: Bureau of Foreign Employment); <i>Sri Lanka Country Study</i> by Judith Shaw (original source: SLBFE 2005); <i>Policy on Labour Migration for Cambodia</i> , ILO and Department of Employment and Manpower Cambodia, June 2010.
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Economic and Social Statistics of Sri Lanka.
Taipei, China		
Key Indicators		National Statistics, Taipei, China
Emigrant Population Living in OECD Countries	Some destination countries such as Australia, Germany, and the United States are not included.	
Stocks of Foreign Workers		Bureau of Employment and Vocational Training
Stocks of International Students		Ministry of Education
International Students in OECD countries	Number of students obtaining visas from foreign nations.	Ministry of Education
Thailand		
Stocks of Foreign Workers		Department of Employment, Ministry of Labour
Inflows of Foreign Workers		Migration Information System in Asia (original source: Office of Foreign Workers' Administration)
Stocks of Workers in Non-OECD Countries	Includes illegal workers.	Overseas Employment Administration Division
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		Overseas Employment Administration Division
Viet Nam		
Stocks of Foreign Workers		Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA)
Stocks of Workers in Non-OECD Countries		MOLISA, country presentation at ADBI-OECD roundtable.
Flows of Workers Deployed to Non-OECD Countries		ILO-ILMS

ANNEX 2

COMPARATIVE TABLES

**Table A2.1: Inflows from Asia to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
by Nationality ('000s)**

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Afghanistan	17	20	15	13	13	16	15	11	13	18	24	29	35	34	45	139	126
Azerbaijan	1	2	5	4	4	4	5	3	3	3	6	4	4	4	5	6	7
Bangladesh	23	24	19	22	30	37	42	34	40	50	50	50	42	43	47	51	53
Bhutan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	9	14	13	11	9	7	5
Brunei Darussalam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cambodia	4	5	5	5	6	7	11	9	10	9	10	12	15	16	16	17	19
PRC	282	334	335	322	367	438	503	518	530	460	508	531	504	547	555	541	538
Georgia	1	2	7	7	8	11	10	9	8	8	8	9	10	11	12	14	13
Hong Kong, China	10	12	13	12	10	8	10	8	8	6	9	7	6	9	7	7	9
India	113	151	161	145	192	213	206	213	215	227	253	243	229	241	263	268	272
Indonesia	29	32	33	31	27	35	30	27	31	22	25	29	31	36	35	35	39
Japan	34	38	39	35	36	42	34	32	29	34	32	34	37	37	34	37	35
Kazakhstan	5	4	17	15	12	9	8	7	7	7	8	9	7	9	11	12	16
Korea, Rep. of	59	69	62	54	57	66	68	72	79	78	76	71	71	75	70	65	74
Kyrgyz Republic	1	1	3	3	3	3	3	4	3	3	4	3	3	3	3	4	4
Lao PDR	2	2	2	1	2	2	4	4	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	3	3
Malaysia	11	14	12	13	16	11	12	20	24	20	22	17	21	23	19	22	23
Maldives	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mongolia	6	6	4	7	8	11	15	15	15	9	10	9	10	9	8	15	14
Myanmar	2	3	3	3	3	5	11	10	10	23	19	24	27	23	23	27	29
Nepal	4	3	5	6	8	9	14	17	19	23	25	30	33	39	42	47	50
Pakistan	54	59	49	47	73	74	83	74	76	77	100	106	84	73	78	99	95
Philippines	165	188	195	192	211	192	173	169	158	164	168	161	160	152	158	181	170
Singapore	6	6	6	5	6	7	7	7	7	5	7	9	9	8	9	7	7
Sri Lanka	23	21	22	24	23	28	28	21	33	33	41	36	35	30	29	31	33
Tajikistan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	3
Taipei, China	16	21	21	15	20	17	32	33	22	24	20	18	17	22	18	22	26
Thailand	32	35	34	35	36	47	51	48	47	47	50	53	59	61	87	64	73
Turkmenistan	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	1	0
Uzbekistan	8	6	8	11	8	9	11	12	20	13	16	16	19	19	21	21	24
Viet Nam	52	60	64	55	66	78	82	88	98	76	87	95	94	102	125	152	186
Total Asia	960	1,117	1,139	1,083	1,245	1,379	1,470	1,465	1,511	1,449	1,593	1,621	1,578	1,645	1,734	1,895	1,949

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD International Migration Database.

Table A2.2: General Characteristics of Emigrants from Asia in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2010–2011

Country of Origin	Emigrant Population Age 15+ ('000)	Women (%)	Low Educated (%)	Highly Educated (%)	Age 15–24 Years (%)	Age 65+ (%)	Recent (Less than Age 5 Years) (%)
Afghanistan	394	43.3	45.3	23.0	24.6	5.9	19.7
Azerbaijan	86	56.6	22.1	43.6	17.0	11.4	17.9
Bangladesh	533	42.5	37.0	37.9	13.7	4.7	23.3
Bhutan	7	45.9	58.0	18.2	22.6	4.3	67.9
Brunei Darussalam	13	50.6	9.3	52.4	29.6	3.9	31.3
Cambodia	277	54.1	46.2	19.2	5.3	11.4	7.1
PRC	3,632	54.6	27.3	43.8	18.4	12.3	21.3
Georgia	180	58.7	28.2	33.2	11.0	13.1	20.0
Hong Kong, China	296	52.7	12.8	56.8	12.4	13.1	9.2
India	3,615	47.0	17.8	62.7	9.8	11.5	24.3
Indonesia	355	55.3	19.8	44.4	10.6	22.6	12.7
Japan	654	63.3	8.3	55.9	11.1	12.1	23.7
Kazakhstan	1,007	53.3	34.2	16.1	16.4	10.7	2.8
Korea, Rep. of	1,773	57.3	13.8	48.0	13.5	13.3	14.2
Kyrgyz Republic	18	65.8	14.6	54.3	19.1	2.7	30.6
Lao PDR	263	51.3	41.2	19.9	3.2	9.6	3.4
Malaysia	293	55.0	12.9	59.4	16.5	8.7	22.1
Maldives	2	38.4	16.8	31.4	13.0	7.2	43.8
Mongolia	23	62.5	16.0	46.3	24.6	1.5	45.8
Myanmar	125	49.9	38.6	35.1	15.0	13.2	36.2
Nepal	153	43.6	21.7	45.8	25.9	1.5	60.7
Pakistan	1,184	43.5	37.4	38.8	14.0	6.7	21.7
Philippines	3,015	62.1	13.2	52.3	9.7	11.8	15.0
Singapore	137	55.4	13.4	55.8	17.1	7.2	19.6
Sri Lanka	579	47.6	31.7	35.3	10.4	7.9	19.0
Tajikistan	13	53.0	13.7	46.7	18.8	7.0	9.7
Taipei, China	470	56.7	6.9	71.5	10.2	7.9	21.4
Thailand	523	71.7	35.3	31.5	16.5	3.3	21.9
Turkmenistan	12	64.3	26.3	38.9	19.9	7.7	36.4
Uzbekistan	149	54.5	16.0	47.0	16.3	10.7	12.4
Viet Nam	1,939	52.4	33.5	28.5	8.2	10.9	8.1
Total	21,720	53.7	23.6	45.3	12.8	10.8	18.0

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 2010–2011.

Table A2.3: Emigration Rates to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development by Level of Education, 2000–2001 and 2010–2011

	Total (%)		Highly Educated (%)	
	2010–2011	2000–2001	2010–2011	2000–2001
Afghanistan	2.0	1.1	5.7	3.2
Azerbaijan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Bangladesh	0.5	0.4	3.5	2.6
Bhutan	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Brunei Darussalam	4.1	3.7	16.8	15.4
Cambodia	2.7	3.1	14.8	52.7
PRC	0.4	0.3	1.9	2.1
Georgia	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Hong Kong, China	4.4	6.6	12.9	16.5
India	0.4	0.3	3.5	3.0
Indonesia	0.2	0.2	2.6	3.6
Japan	0.6	0.5	0.9	0.9
Kazakhstan	8.0	3.8	7.0	4.8
Korea, Rep. of	4.2	3.8	4.5	4.4
Kyrgyz Republic	0.4	1.2	1.7	2.2
Lao PDR	6.1	8.0	14.9	25.3
Malaysia	1.5	1.4	5.2	6.3
Maldives	0.6	0.3	10.2	6.9
Mongolia	1.1	0.3	2.9	1.3
Myanmar	0.3	0.2	1.5	1.5
Nepal	0.8	0.2	8.9	2.2
Pakistan	1.0	0.8	6.5	3.3
Philippines	4.8	3.9	8.1	6.8
Singapore	3.4	3.3	9.6	9.9
Sri Lanka	3.4	2.1	6.7	4.1
Tajikistan	0.3	0.5	1.8	2.3
Taipei, China	2.4	2.4	4.4	6.0
Thailand	1.0	0.6	2.7	2.8
Turkmenistan	0.3	n.a.	1.0	n.a.
Uzbekistan	0.7	n.a.	2.1	n.a.
Viet Nam	2.8	2.8	10.6	18.3
Average	2.1	2.0	6.2	8.0

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, n.a. = no data available, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: OECD Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries (DIOC) 2000–2001 and 2010–2011.

Table A2.4: Outflows of Workers from Asian Countries, by Destination

	Bangladesh						India					
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Gulf Cooperation Council countries												
UAE	215,452	14,241	24,232	25,271	8,131	4,135	141,138	202,016	224,033	225,718	163,731	149,962
Saudi Arabia	21,232	12,654	10,657	58,270	143,913	551,308	357,503	354,169	329,937	308,380	165,356	78,611
Oman	170,326	134,028	105,748	129,859	188,247	89,704	84,384	63,398	51,318	85,054	63,224	53,332
Kuwait	2	6	3,094	17,472	38,188	49,604	55,868	70,072	80,419	66,579	72,402	56,380
Bahrain	21,777	25,155	23,378	20,720	72,167	19,318	20,150	17,269	14,220	15,623	11,964	11,516
Qatar	28,801	57,584	87,575	123,965	120,382	82,012	63,096	78,367	75,935	59,384	30,619	24,759
Other Middle East												
Jordan	11,726	21,383	20,338	22,093	23,017	20,449	1,819	1,462	2,133	2,047	2,742	2,341
Lebanon	14,864	15,098	16,640	19,113	15,095	8,327	288	281	313	341	316	110
Israel												
Asia, OECD												
Japan	420	41	55	99	165	145						
Korea, Rep. of	1,447	2,121	1,748	2,359	1,689	1,522						
Asia, non-OECD												
Singapore	58,657	60,057	54,750	55,523	54,730	40,401						
Malaysia	804	3,853	5,134	30,483	40,126	99,787	21,241	22,388	22,926	20,908	10,604	14,002
Taipei, China												
Thailand							9	15	53	10	1	0
Hong Kong, China												
Brunei Darussalam	5,038	5,971	6,633	6,354	5,836	8,587						
Indonesia							11	38	29	6	1	10
India												
PRC												

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Table A2.4: Outflows of Workers from Asian Countries, by Destination

	Indonesia						Nepal					
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	2015/16	2016/17
Gulf Cooperation Council countries												
UAE	35,571	44,505	17,962	7,619	2,575	1,667	34,503	58,586	55,426	53,094	52,793	57,887
Saudi Arabia	40,655	45,394	44,325	23,000	13,538	6,471	68,103	96,903	86,613	96,887	138,529	72,892
Oman	8,836	10,719	19,141	6,766	1,014	1,085	1,884	3,931	3,952	3,470	3,059	3,066
Kuwait	2,518	2,534	1,714	310	987	1,162	9,165	17,376	20,196	9,634	10,049	13,134
Bahrain	6,328	5,384	5,472	2,570	123		3,100	4,255	4,418	4,168	3,146	3,911
Qatar	20,380	16,237	7,862	2,460	1,355	1,037	44,883	103,932	128,550	124,050	129,038	121,128
Other Middle East												
Jordan	106	0	0	103	65							
Lebanon											167	
Israel											189	
Asia, OECD												
Japan	3,293	3,042	2,428	468	279	538					3,844	
Korea, Rep. of	13,593	15,374	11,848	5,501	5,912	3,728					7,432	
Asia, non-OECD												
Singapore	41,556	34,655	31,680	20,895	17,700	13,379						
Malaysia	134,023	150,236	127,827	97,635	87,616	88,991	96,272	158,663	210,009	196,497	60,979	95,244
Taipei, China	81,071	83,544	82,665	75,303	77,087	62,823						
Thailand	1,035	1,041	717	90	6							
Hong Kong, China	45,478	41,769	35,050	15,322	14,434	68,103						
Brunei Darussalam	13,146	11,269	11,616	9,993	8,152	6,623						
Indonesia												
India	535	409	203	68	97							
PRC	1,967	2,055	915	108	65							

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Table A2.4: Outflows of Workers from Asian Countries, by Destination

	Pakistan						Philippines					
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Gulf Cooperation Council countries												
UAE	182,630	273,234	350,522	326,986	295,647	275,436	259,546	261,119	246,231	227,076	276,278	
Saudi Arabia	358,560	270,502	312,489	522,750	462,598	143,363	330,040	382,553	402,837	406,089	460,121	
Oman	69,407	47,794	39,793	47,788	45,085	42,362	16,048	16,577	15,880	22,274	27,579	
Kuwait	5	229	132	164	770	773	75,286	67,856	70,098	86,019	109,615	
Bahrain	10,530	9,600	9,226	9,029	8,226	7,919	22,271	20,546	18,958	21,428	21,429	
Qatar	7,320	8,119	10,042	12,741	9,706	11,592	104,622	94,195	114,511	133,169	141,304	
Other Middle East												
Jordan	279	345	328	321	282	285	3,025	2,223	3,393	7,253	9,970	
Lebanon	23	15	57	33	42	24	1,227	2,874	3,010	3,694	3,959	
Israel							4,582	4,385	4,590	2,288	2,850	
Asia, OECD												
Japan	62	44	69	82	102	153	9,947	10,936	12,815	14,161	21,363	
Korea, Rep. of	7	12	46	13	17	9	8,979	11,664	11,958	11,418	13,592	
Asia, non-OECD												
Singapore	47	42	76	68	33	544	172,690	173,666	140,205	141,453	171,014	
Malaysia	1,309	2,031	20,577	20,216	10,625	7,174	38,407	34,088	31,451	26,199	33,178	
Taipei, China							41,492	41,145	58,681	62,598	65,364	
Thailand							9,204	8,659	6,653	7,204	9,321	
Hong Kong, China	17	20	38	29	38	54	131,680	130,686	105,737	85,704	116,467	
Brunei Darussalam	74	67	48	85	85	212	14,907	17,000	11,478	14,088	10,099	
Indonesia							5,166	5,489	5,007	3,880	5,302	
India									466	581		
PRC	220	155	254	355	482	457	9,969	9,829	6,229	6,564	9,166	

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Table A2.4: Outflows of Workers from Asian Countries, by Destination

	Sri Lanka						Thailand					
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Gulf Cooperation Council countries												
UAE	38,234	48,502	50,347	43,666	40,124	36,657	7,245	5,495	5,038	4,623	4,014	3,270
Saudi Arabia	97,993	80,887	80,480	74,894	63,389	37,900	517	509	446	36	358	297
Oman	4,889	5,317	5,759	7,082	9,748	8,872	298	280	260	245	370	288
Kuwait	44,229	42,740	43,552	38,473	32,415	37,420	1,792	1,729	1,626	2,448	1,265	1,703
Bahrain	4,533	4,547	3,979	3,722	3,222	3,002	1,106	969	888	853	904	807
Qatar	57,478	80,724	84,622	65,139	59,527	56,644	2,623	2,392	2,449	2,273	1,562	904
Other Middle East												
Jordan	10,387	7,060	6,197	4,809	3,870	3,929						
Lebanon	3,945	3,537	3,058	2,604	2,640	2,408						
Israel	1,768				2,274	2,498	5,126	8,393	7,618	7,144	8,629	7,494
Asia, OECD												
Japan	112				144	402	8,596	6,904	7,614	7,705	8,610	9,196
Korea, Rep. of	5,629	5,402	6,686	6,967	8,609	5,805	10,393	11,758	9,835	189	12,609	12,609
Asia, non-OECD												
Singapore	980	1,265	1,470	1,461	1,840	1,789	11,864	10,728	8,191	7,265	5,843	5,399
Malaysia	2,691	3,297	3,312	3,239	2,916	1,995	4,441	3,852	3,237	3,318	3,263	7,141
Taipei, China							39,128	34,631	37,105	34,738	35,027	35,199
Thailand	2				11	16						
Hong Kong, China	449	513	468	493	573	635	2,533	2,225	2,209	2,185	2,160	2,296
Brunei Darussalam	11	15	12	9	14	1	2,697	2,489	1,944	1,846	1,461	1,299
Indonesia					20	21	2,480	3,210	3,103	2,538	1,967	1,724
India	97				187	157	2,480	3,210	3,103	1,860	1,646	1,468
PRC	6					10	923	1,169	725	405	261	398

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Table A2.4: Outflows of Workers from Asian Countries, by Destination

	Viet Nam						Myanmar					
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Gulf Cooperation Council countries												
UAE	1,731	2,075	831	286	136		39	0	14	77	271	127
Saudi Arabia	2,360	1,703	4,191	3,975	16							
Oman	154	25	57	86								
Kuwait	440	31	30	54	40	9	1	0	0	0		
Bahrain	11	16	9									
Qatar	105	206	850	455			10	77	15	0	73	135
Other Middle East												
Jordan	20	0	0									
Lebanon												
Israel	210	141	484	268	250							
Asia, OECD												
Japan	8,775	9,686	19,766	27,010	39,938	54,504	0	36	518	1,678	2,384	3,331
Korea, Rep. of	9,228	5,446	7,242	6,019	8,482	5,178	3,669	4,003	4,482	4,475	5,731	5,676
Asia, non-OECD												
Singapore	107	149	92	31	29		452	791	501	431	707	355
Malaysia	9,298	7,564	5,139	7,354	2,079	1,551	26,921	25,905	25,892	35,022	33,920	3,325
Taipei, China	30,533	46,368	62,124	67,121	68,244	66,926						
Thailand	0	0	0	0			37,347	36,029	33,188	53,578	102,722	148,942
Hong Kong, China	0	0	0		11							
Brunei Darussalam	74	18	0	0								
Indonesia	0	0	0	0								
India												
PRC	0	4	0		7							

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Table A2.4: Outflows of Workers from Asian Countries, by Destination

	Cambodia					
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Gulf Cooperation Council countries						
UAE						
Saudi Arabia						
Oman						
Kuwait						
Bahrain						
Qatar						
Other Middle East						
Jordan						
Lebanon						
Israel						
Asia, OECD						
Japan	102	111	518	1,399	1,562	2,280
Korea, Rep. of	8,132	8,820	7,671	7,073	7,371	5,967
Asia, non-OECD						
Singapore	0	111	190	99	87	138
Malaysia	180	90	470	807	123	27
Taipei, China						
Thailand	26,390	13,468	15,839	16,163	76,433	87,909
Hong Kong, China						
Brunei Darussalam						
Indonesia						
India						
PRC					0	15

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, PRC = People's Republic of China, UAE = United Arab Emirates.

Note: Empty cells indicate no data available.

Source: ILO ILMS. National sources. 2016 figures for the Philippines are estimates.

Table A2.5: Migrant Remittance Inflows in Asian Countries, 2000–2017 (\$ million)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017 ^e
Afghanistan	106	152	342	185	252	314	268	301	387	410
Azerbaijan	57	104	181	171	227	623	790	1,268	1,518	1,255	1,410	1,893	1,990	1,733	1,846	1,270	643	1,050
Bangladesh	1,969	2,100	2,860	3,192	3,582	4,642	5,428	6,562	8,941	10,521	10,850	12,071	14,120	13,867	14,988	15,296	13,544	13,469
Bhutan	2	3	4	5	8	10	18	12	14	20	34	40
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia	121	133	140	138	177	164	184	186	188	142	153	160	172	176	377	400	371	386
PRC	758	1,209	2,354	4,620	6,640	23,626	27,565	38,395	47,743	41,600	52,460	61,576	57,987	59,491	62,332	63,938	61,000	63,860
Georgia	210	222	231	236	303	446	627	883	1,065	1,112	1,184	1,547	1,770	1,945	1,986	1,459	1,521	1,794
Hong Kong, China	136	153	121	120	240	297	294	317	355	348	340	352	367	360	372	387	399	430
India	12,845	14,229	15,707	21,015	18,753	22,125	28,334	37,217	49,977	49,204	53,480	62,499	68,821	69,970	70,389	68,910	62,744	68,968
Indonesia	1,190	1,050	1,260	1,490	1,866	5,420	5,722	6,174	6,794	6,793	6,916	6,924	7,212	7,614	8,551	9,659	8,891	8,997
Japan	1,374	1,987	1,821	1,079	930	905	1,177	1,384	1,732	1,595	1,684	2,132	2,540	2,364	3,734	3,325	3,819	4,578
Kazakhstan	122	171	205	147	166	62	84	143	126	198	226	180	178	207	229	194	275	355
Korea, Rep. of	4,862	4,836	5,530	6,301	6,574	5,178	4,826	5,130	6,952	5,982	5,836	6,582	6,571	6,455	6,551	6,444	6,504	6,332
Kyrgyz Republic	9	11	37	78	189	313	473	704	1,223	982	1,266	1,709	2,031	2,278	2,243	1,688	1,995	2,486
Lao PDR	1	1	1	1	1	1	4	6	18	38	42	110	59	60	40	93	116	124
Macau, China	47	48	53	53	55	54	52	48	47	48	47	49	37	40	28	29
Malaysia	342	367	435	571	802	1,117	1,365	1,556	1,329	1,131	1,103	1,211	1,294	1,423	1,580	1,644	1,585	1,634
Maldives	2	2	2	2	3	2	3	8	6	5	3	3	3	3	3	4	4	4
Mongolia	12	25	56	129	202	180	181	178	225	200	266	250	324	257	255	261	260	269
Myanmar	102	116	105	84	117	129	115	81	55	54	115	127	275	1,644	279	387	682	723
Nepal	112	147	678	771	823	1,212	1,453	1,734	2,727	2,983	3,464	4,217	4,793	5,589	5,889	6,730	6,612	6,947
Pakistan	1,080	1,460	3,550	3,961	3,942	4,280	5,121	5,998	7,039	8,717	9,690	12,263	14,007	14,629	17,244	19,306	19,761	19,665
Philippines	6,957	8,769	9,740	10,244	11,473	13,733	14,988	15,853	18,064	19,078	21,557	23,054	24,610	26,717	28,691	29,799	31,145	32,808
Singapore
Sri Lanka	1,163	1,190	1,312	1,434	1,586	1,976	2,167	2,507	2,925	3,337	4,123	5,153	6,000	6,422	7,036	7,000	7,257	7,190
Tajikistan	79	146	252	467	1,019	1,691	2,544	1,748	2,021	2,722	3,222	3,698	3,384	2,259	1,867	2,220
Taipei, China	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Thailand	1,700	1,250	1,380	1,610	1,620	1,187	1,333	1,635	1,898	2,776	4,433	5,256	5,657	6,585	6,524	5,895	6,270	6,729
Turkmenistan	14	30	50	34	35	35	37	40	30	16	9	10
Uzbekistan	898	1,693	3,007	2,071	2,858	4,276	5,693	6,689	5,828	3,062	2,479	2,839
Viet Nam	1,340	1,100	1,770	2,100	2,310	3,150	3,800	6,180	6,805	6,020	8,260	8,600	10,000	11,000	12,000	13,200	11,880	13,781
Total	36,464	40,632	49,602	59,688	62,831	91,288	108,022	137,570	173,362	167,977	193,829	224,960	239,796	251,278	262,432	262,682	251,695	267,718

e = estimate, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, n.a. = no data available, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: All numbers are in current US dollars.

Source: World Bank.

Table A2.6: Net Migration Rate (per 1,000 population)

	1985–1990	1990–1995	1995–2000	2000–2005	2005–2010	2010–2015	2015–2020	2020–2025
Afghanistan	-24.7	31.7	-4.1	8.2	-5.8	2.9	-1.7	-1.5
Azerbaijan	-4.6	-3.1	-2.8	0.9	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Bangladesh	-0.4	-1.4	-1.2	-2.2	-4.8	-3.2	-2.8	-1.7
Bhutan	0.6	-32.7	0.1	9.4	4.9	2.6	0.0	0.0
Brunei Darussalam	2.4	2.8	2.0	1.9	-1.1	1.0	0.8	0.8
Cambodia	-1.9	8.3	6.1	-0.6	-4.3	-2.0	-1.9	-1.7
PRC	-0.1	-0.1	-0.1	-0.3	-0.4	-0.2	-0.2	-0.2
Georgia	-1.6	-20.9	-15.0	-12.1	-13.7	-14.9	-2.5	-2.6
Hong Kong, China	8.0	5.3	11.7	1.9	2.6	2.1	4.0	2.4
India	0.0	-0.1	-0.1	-0.4	-0.5	-0.4	-0.4	-0.3
Indonesia	-0.2	-0.4	-0.3	-0.8	-0.6	-0.7	-0.6	-0.5
Japan	-0.5	0.1	-0.2	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.4	0.4
Kazakhstan	-8.1	-17.3	-17.0	0.6	-0.4	1.9	0.0	0.0
Korea, Rep. of	0.8	0.3	0.7	0.3	-0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8
Kyrgyz Republic	-6.1	-12.4	-1.2	-6.9	-2.9	-4.9	-3.3	-3.1
Lao PDR	0.0	-2.7	-5.3	-5.3	-3.7	-5.5	-2.1	-2.0
Malaysia	5.2	3.1	4.5	5.3	5.3	5.3	1.6	1.5
Maldives	-2.5	-2.6	-0.8	9.2	10.5	11.2	4.4	2.1
Mongolia	0.0	-7.9	-4.5	-1.2	-1.1	-1.1	-1.0	-0.9
Myanmar	-1.0	-3.3	-2.4	-5.3	-5.9	-1.8	-0.4	-0.4
Nepal	-2.4	0.8	-4.1	-6.5	-7.8	-2.7	-2.4	-1.9
Pakistan	0.3	-1.7	-1.1	-0.9	-1.7	-1.3	-1.1	-0.8
Philippines	-1.0	-1.5	-2.1	-2.7	-3.3	-1.3	-1.2	-0.9
Singapore	8.4	15.3	13.8	20.7	18.8	12.7	10.4	4.9
Sri Lanka	-1.6	-2.9	-5.0	-4.7	-5.2	-4.7	-4.3	-3.5
Tajikistan	-2.8	-10.5	-9.8	-2.5	-2.0	-2.5	-2.2	-2.0
Taipei, China	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Thailand	1.9	-2.1	2.3	1.2	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.3
Turkmenistan	-2.3	2.2	-3.0	-5.4	-2.5	-1.9	-0.9	-0.8
Uzbekistan	-3.6	-3.0	-2.0	-1.9	-1.0	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3
Viet Nam	-1.0	-1.1	-0.6	-1.6	-2.0	-0.4	-0.4	-0.4

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, n.a. = no data available, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Source: UN DESA/Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision. <https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/dataquery/> (accessed 20 December 2017).

Table A2.7: International Students in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Countries by Nationality

	Number of International Tertiary Students Enrolled			Of Which at Master's and Doctoral Level	As a Percentage of Total Tertiary	Number of Graduates at Master's and Doctoral Level
	2014	2015	% change	2015	2015	2015
Afghanistan	4,050	5,550	37	2,350	42	220
Azerbaijan	10,100	14,190	40	4,070	29	760
Bangladesh	20,330	21,440	5	13,150	61	2,700
Bhutan	830	910	10	550	60	200
Brunei Darussalam	2,630	2,480	-6	500	20	300
Cambodia	2,650	2,860	8	1,340	47	230
PRC	686,120	745,870	9	321,120	43	68,310
Georgia	7,480	5,040	-33	2,150	43	340
Hong Kong, China	32,870	35,750	9	4,420	12	2,020
India	186,370	222,690	19	152,180	68	18,650
Indonesia	27,810	32,270	16	12,230	38	3,020
Japan	30,490	28,620	-6	9,670	34	1,980
Kazakhstan	9,250	10,600	15	3,450	33	860
Korea, Rep. of	100,600	102,740	2	29,540	29	2,300
Kyrgyz Republic	2,910	3,230	11	1,200	37	140
Lao PDR	770	750	-3	420	56	70
Malaysia	45,820	49,320	8	11,190	23	4,160
Maldives	1,780	530	-70	210	40	110
Mongolia	7,200	7,430	3	2,690	36	240
Myanmar	3,720	4,210	13	1,210	29	220
Nepal	26,200	30,750	17	11,850	39	2,230
Pakistan	26,800	31,340	17	17,320	55	4,700
Philippines	10,930	12,430	14	4,020	32	690
Singapore	21,810	23,100	6	5,450	24	2,150
Sri Lanka	12,370	12,490	1	5,120	41	1,240
Tajikistan	1,110	1,350	22	410	30	70
Taipei, China
Thailand	21,450	23,570	10	11,940	51	4,080
Turkmenistan	7,470	9,590	28	530	6	60
Uzbekistan	3,740	4,430	18	1,890	43	240
Viet Nam	53,610	63,660	19	19,120	30	3,820
Total	1,369,270	1,431,510	5	629,750	44	121,990
Rest of the world	1,688,530	1,854,800	10	836,900	45	172,770
Total	3,057,800	3,286,310	7	1,466,650	45	294,760
Share of Asia (%)	45	44		43		41

Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PRC = People's Republic of China.

Note: Data for graduates in Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States are not available.

Source: OECD. Online Education Database. www.oecd.org/education/database.htm (accessed December 2017).

BUILDING PARTNERSHIPS FOR EFFECTIVELY MANAGING LABOR MIGRATION

Lessons from Asian Countries

This report analyzes labor migration trends in Asia and emphasizes the importance of partnerships to promote effective labor migration management. It addresses temporary migrant worker programs, focusing on the Republic of Korea's Employment Permit System and Malaysia's Electrical and Electronics industry. It also highlights the key role multilateral and bilateral agreements play in protecting migrant workers' social security entitlements. Key issues covered are how these partnerships can provide safe, orderly, and fair labor migration, and, hence, a fair environment in Asia's labor market.

The four chapters capture the ideas, insights, and discussions from the "Eighth Roundtable on Labor Migration in Asia - Building Partnerships for Effectively Managing Labor Migration: Lessons from Asian Countries for the UN Global Compact on Migration", hosted by Human Resource Development Korea in Incheon, Republic of Korea, in January 2018. The event, co-organized by the Asian Development Bank Institute, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the International Labour Organization, brought together regional experts and policy makers.

The report's introductory chapter reviews recent regional trends, and two statistical annexes offer detailed coverage of intra-Asia migration flows, as well as cross-regional migration flows.

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